Israel War of Independence

That convoy was the next to last to attempt to reach Jerusalem in March. The following day a single convoy of about 60 vehicles got through, presumably because Arabs were celebrating their victory.

On March 26, the Arab forces cut traffic along the coastal road to the Negev settlements in what is now Gaza. On March 27, a convoy to Kibbutz Yehiam, in Northern Israel was ambushed and intercepted. On the same day, a convoy from Jerusalem to Gush Etzion was ambushed (see Nebi Daniel Convoy). As this convoy included virtually all the armored vehicles of the Jerusalem command and all the vehicles that had come through in the last convoy from Tel Aviv, it was a severe setback. Jewish leaders in Jerusalem complained to the government that the situation in Jerusalem was untenable. (See: Situation in Jerusalem and Palestine, April 1948 )

It was decided that the Hagannah must go over to the offensive even before the British left Palestine. The Haganah had an operational plan that had been updated periodically. Successive revisions were called Plan A, (aleph) Plan B (bet) etc. It's latest version was updated in March of 1948 and was called Plan D (Plan Daled). These plans had all envisioned a situation where the British had already left Palestine, and it was necessary to defend the state that would be declared. But now it was decided to activate Plan D before the British left. As part of the plan, because of the active participation of Arab inhabitants in the blockades, road ambushes and fighting, it was deemed essential to temporarily clear Arab villages at strategic points of their inhabitants. Given that in the case of Jerusalem, this was the only way to avert the starvation or surrender of 100,000 people, it was an understandable military precaution. Revisionist historians, especially Ilan Peppe, have argued falsely that Plan D was a plan for "ethnic cleansing" of Palestine. 

The chief focal point of the effort would be the road to Jerusalem. The Haganah  mounted its first brigade sized operation, Operation Nachshon, using 1,500 troops. The condition of the Jewish defenders at this time can be appreciated from the fact that this required scouring troops from several different units, as well as more or less raw recruits, including girls who had to be told that they could not bring flowers and poetry books on this expedition.  The Haganah command had envisioned a much smaller force of 400. David Ben-Gurion was adamant that Jerusalem must be held at all costs, and that a large scale operation, befitting a regular army was required. In preparation for the assault. Ben Gurion cabled Ehud Avriel, who was in Czechoslovakia purchasing arms for the Haganah, to find a way to get at least part  of those arms into the country, despite the British blockade. On the night of April 1, the Haganah took over an abandoned RAF airstrip in the south of the country, bringing electric lights and an improvised "control tower." The tiny transmitter kept repeating its code word "Hassida" into the night, until it was heard by the sole incoming aircraft - a DC4 (a different aircraft according to some accounts)  chartered by Freddy Fredkens. It landed on the improvised strip bringing a large quantity of Czech rifles, mortars and machine guns. 

Prior to activation of Operation Nachshon itself, the Haganah and Palmach engaged in two important operations. In Ramle, the Haganah blew up the headquarters of Hassan Salame (the commander of the Mufti's al Futtuwah). This attack prevented Salame's forces from thwarting Haganah preparations on the coastal plain, and it drew off supporters from the Jerusalem area. Then on April 3, the Haganah-Palmach forces attacked and overran Arab positions in the village of Qastel, an Arab village that stood in a key position between Jerusalem and Kyriat Anavim and blocked the entrance to Jerusalem. In Damascus, Abdel Khader al Husseini, military leader of the Mufti's forces heard about the attack on Qastel and hurried back. He had been in Damascus attempting to obtain arms, but to no avail. 

Operation Nachshon itself began on April 6 in the Latrun area with Haganah forces taking over the Wadi al-Sarrar camp, Arab Hulda and Deir Muheisin. The village of Beit Machsir in the region of Bab el Wad was attacked by Palmach forces, thus clearing the mountain road to Jerusalem. The road was now open.  Sixty Palmach trucks drove up to Jerusalem carrying supplies, and a total of five convoys got through in subsequent days. On April 7 and 8, Arab forces counterattacked in the area of Motza and pressed the Jewish forces in the Qastel. Despite the brigade-sized operation, the Haganah could only spare about 60 defenders at a time for the Qastel. The Arabs counterattacked with hundreds of men, and pushed the Jews into the outskirts of the town. By April 7, Abdel Khader El Husseini was back in Palestine. Unaware that the Jewish forces held part of the Qastel, he came confidently up the hill. A sentry on a balcony spotted him and called out in English, "Who is there?" Abdel Khader answered something like "Nahnu, el Shebab" - it's us guys. The sentry shot him. It was some time before the identity of the dead man was discovered. As soon as he went missing, thousands of Arabs stormed the Qastel looking for Abdel Khader El Husseini. As soon as they found him, the Arab attack, which was on the verge of overwhelming the small Jewish force, collapsed. Abdel Khader el Husseini's body was taken back to Jerusalem for burial in an ostentatious funeral. 

The death of the Arab hero caused a temporary general collapse of Arab resistance. Qolonia and Bet Iksa, which overlooked the Jerusalem - Tel Aviv road were taken without much resistance by April 11. However, led by Emil Ghory, the Arabs managed to close the road to Jerusalem once again by April 20, this time relying on barricades, mines and ambushes rather than massive "faza" attacks from the villages.

About this time there occurred a senseless tragedy in the village of Deir Yassin. All evidence indicates that the Irgun and Lehi committed an unplanned and senseless massacre there, killing a large number of defenseless civilians as well as numbers of fighters. The attack was not part of any plan of the Zionist executive, and the massacre was not planned by the attackers. The Zionist organization apologized for Deir Yassin, but the damage had been done.  

Some of the individuals involved in the Deir Yassin attack may have been motivated by revenge for attacks by Deir Yassin in the 1930s, or by the killing of the convoy of 35 on their way to Gush Etzion in January, or by the Nebi Daniel and Yehiam ambushes that had occurred in March. The attack on Deir Yassin was not part of Plan D, or of operation Nachshon, a claim made both by anti-Zionists and by right wing Zionist partisans. It did not signal the implementation of a policy of "ethnic cleansing." No massacres took place in any of the villages conquered by the Haganah and Palmach in operation Nachson.   As best as anyone can determine, those are the facts regarding Deir Yassin.

The immediate result of Deir Yassin was to provide either the motivation or the excuse for two horrendous massacres of Jews by Arabs. There had been Arab massacres of Jews, including civilians, before Deir Yassin, going back to the 1920s. However, the "reprisals" that followed Deir Yassin were particularly large and ugly.  The first took place on April 13, a massacre of a convoy to the Hadassah Hospital. With British connivance, the convoy of medical personnel and patients was ambushed, killing about 80 persons including the director of the hospital. The Hadassah convoy massacre was obviously planned, as the ambush could have had no other intent, and it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the British knew about the planned attack and deliberately allowed it to take place. The second took place at  Gush Etzion on May 13, 1948. It was possibly an unplanned massacre by irregular troops. In each case, the attackers screamed "Deir Yassin! Deir Yassin!"

Deir Yassin became emblematic of the conflict for the Arabs of Palestine. While Arabs had been leaving Palestine in considerable numbers before the Deir Yassin massacre, it is frankly hard to imagine that it had no effect on their perception of the conflict and the intentions of the Jews, and the dangers involved in their remaining in their homes. Until today, the Arabs commemorate the Deir Yassin attack of April 9 and use the occasion to stir up hate against Israel. Apart from the humanitarian and moral aspects, it should be clear that no military or political advantages were gained by committing what can only be described as war crimes against civilians. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the Arabs committed such massacres at almost every opportunity, and were prevented from wiping out the entire Jewish population of Palestine as they had intended, only because the lost the war.

In the last weeks of the war, the Haganah had gone over to the offensive following the decision to implement Plan Daled even though the British were still in the country. This was facilitated by clandestine shipments of small arms. In particular, the SS Nora had brought 10,000 rifles on April 3.  In the north, Fawzi El-Kaukji's "Liberation Army" was beaten back at the Battle of Mishmar Ha'emek on April 4-15, 1948. These successes helped convince US President Truman that the Jews would not be overrun by Arab forces, and he abandoned the trusteeship proposal that the US had put before the UN earlier.  

In the remaining weeks before the war, the Jewish forces were able to slightly improve the situation around Tel Aviv, Haifa. eastern Gallee and in the Jerusalem corridor. In many cases, they concentrated on trying to take up positions abandoned by the British before Arabs could man them. 

In the Jerusalem front, Operation Harel and Operation Maccabee were supposed to follow up on the success of operation Nachshon and open the corridor to Jerusalem. Operation Harel was abandoned after initial success because of faulty intelligence that called the Harel Brigade to Jerusalem in order to man positions that were supposedly being given up by the British.  Though many positions in the Jerusalem corridor were captured in Operation Maccabee, the Arab irregulars held Latrun until just before May 15. The Haganah took this key fortification for a brief time when the Arabs abandoned it, but they had to abandon Latrun.  Operation Yevussi, intended to capture British positions as they left, was a failure, because it was started prematurely. Operation Kilshon  which had the same purpose, was begun just before independence and was an overall success, capturing most of the southern part of West Jerusalem for the Jews. Operation Shfifon was the first of several tragic failures to capture the old city of Jerusalem.

In the Galilee, Jewish settlements were isolated by interspersed Arab towns and villages that were held by the Arab Liberation Army. Most of these were meant to be part of the Jewish State established by the partition plan. To establish Jewish control, it was necessary to take police forts and army camps abandoned by the British, as well as towns. As there were no troops to garrison these towns, in some cases, such as Beisan, the inhabitants were forced to leave after large quantities of arms were discovered in their houses. . More frequently, the Arabs fled when the Haganah took the town. The British did not interfere except to provide buses for refugees.  In Eastern Galilee, the Haganah took Tiberias on April 18-19. Operation Yiftach resulted in the capture of Safed on May 10/11. Arab inhabitants fled before the Haganah entered.  Operation Gideon cleared the Beit Shean area, and captured Beit Shean on May 13. Operation Matateh opened the road from Tiberias to Metulla in the far north, but many smaller settlements remained isolated and the Arab Liberation army controlled Arab towns. In Western Galilee, Operation Misparayim took Haifa at the end of April. Arab residents fled despite pleas of Jewish leaders to remain.  Operation Ben Ami cleared Western Galilee and took Acco on May 17.

In the Tel Aviv area, Operation Chametz conquered Arab villages east of Tel Aviv and Jaffo. These had been manned by Iraqi volunteer forces that disrupted traffic. The Haganah did not not attack Jaffo initially because it was meant to be part of the Arab state. However, the Arab forces in Jaffa attacked Tel Aviv, and the Irgun launched their own attack on Manshiyeh, a suburb, uncoordinated with the Haganah. When the Irgun ran into trouble the Haganah assisted them, resulting in the capture of Jaffo toward the end of April. Operation Medina captured Arab Kfar Saba, removing the threat to Jewish Kfar Saba on May 13.

The Arab Invasion - The governments of neighboring Arab states were more reluctant than is generally assumed to enter the war against Israel, despite bellicose declarations. However, fear of popular pressure combined with fear that other Arab states would gain an advantage over them by fighting in Palestine, helped sway Syria, Jordan and Egypt to go to war. Various Arab armies  invaded Israel beginning May 15, 1948.

Balance of forces in the Arab-Israeli-War of 1948

Troops fielded in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948

The numbers of troops and equipment varied at different times throughout the conflict, with both sides materially reinforcing their armies in successive stages of the war. Moreover, the numbers of Israeli "troops" in the initial period are not too meaningful, as many had little training and the Israelis had no heavy armor or aircraft. Moreover, while Syrian, Egyptian, Iraqi, and Lebanese troop figures represent only active combat personnel deployed in the field, Israeli and Jordanian figures include both frontline personnel and those who serve at headquarters as well as many in Israel who guarded their own villages as part of civil defense. It is likewise impossible to count Arab irregulars armed with rifles in the same way as troops of regular armies. Therefore, reckonings of relative "troop strength" are deceptive.

Herzog and Gazit estimate that there were about 40,000 Israelis under arms about May 15, 1948 (p. 48). The following numbers are given by Herzog and Gazit, 2005 for Arab forces and seem to pertain to the period on or about May 15, 1948:

Benny Morris, who is a proponent of the theory that the Israelis had superiority or parity in men and equipment, gives these estimates (1999 pp. 215-218) . On May 15, according to Morris, the Haganah/Palmach had a total of 30-35,000 troops, and the Irgun/LEHI another 3,000, roughly corresponding to the estimate of 40,000 given by Herzog and Gazit. By June, the IDF had 42,000 troops. by mid July 65,000 troops. and by early spring 1949 there were 115,000 Israeli troops. By then the fighting had ended however. The Egyptian troops initially numbered 5,500 according to Morris, the Legion 6,000-9,000, the Syrians 6,000 and the Iraqis 4,500, together with foreign volunteers and Palestinian irregulars giving a total of 28,000. As the forces of Arab countries alone numbered 25,000 in Morris's count, it would mean that the Lebanese (4 battalions) the small contingent of Moroccans (about 800) that accompanied them,  the ALA and the Husseini's forces and the Arab irregulars totaled 3,000 troops, which almost certainly too low. Morris also claims that by July the Arabs had about 40,000 troops in Palestine and 55,000 by October.

Morris also tells us (p. 241) that by the time the second truce ended, the Israelis had 12 brigades. This is an active combat force of less than 36,000 troops, as opposed to his estimate of 55,000 enemy forces. But in any case, by October, the war was coming to an end except for the Egyptian front. The Israeli cabinet had decided on September 26 not to engage the Jordanians in further hostilities. In the Galilee, they would continue some mopping up operations and push the Lebanese and the ALA out, but they did not manage to dislodge the Syrians from Mishmar Hayarden. Morris also tells us that the Israelis had about 300 armored cars and half-tracks, 15 tanks, 150 artillery pieces and over a dozen fighter aircraft including Spitfires and Messerschmitt 109s (or Avia - a Czech imitation), as well as 16 bombers and 50 light and transport planes. He doesn't mention that the Egyptians had at least 132 light tanks and 3 Sherman tanks, and the Syrians had 45 Renault R-35 and R-39 light tanks. (see here)  

The twelve Israeli combat brigades that actually fought the war were:

Balance of Military Equipment in the Arab Israeli War of 1948

Israel suffered from a lack of heavy equipment from the start of the war.  According to Morris, 1999 (p. 217) the Israelis had 12 armored cars of which four had canon, three tanks, three half-tracks and three patrol vessels. By the end of May Israel had acquired 10 additional tanks and about a dozen half tracks. Morris credits Israeli forces with about "one hundred armored trucks and personnel carriers," but most of these, he admits were homemade vehicles created by "armor" plating trucks (the "sandwich" of sheet metal and plywood).   Morris claims that there were four or five "small" field artillery pieces in the possession of Israeli forces on May 15. They must have been very small, since most sources claim that the first Israeli artillery were the 65mm "Napoleonchik" sightless pre- WW I vintage guns used in defending Degania after May 20. By the end of May, Morris claims IDF had 45 artillery pieces. The nature of this impressive artillery is detailed a bit more by Herzog and Gazit, 2005 (p. 48):

... while the 'artillery' units had acquired some Hispano-Suiza 20 mm guns and some French 65 mm howitzers without sights dating from the beginning of the century.

The French 65s, valuable as antiques, were affectionately known as "Napoleonchiks." From such stuff did Morris and others create the myth of Israeli military superiority.

According to Morris (p, 217), Haganah/IDF had about 75 PIAT anti-tank weapons, about 700 2" mortars and 100 3" mortars (195 3" mortars according to Herzog and Gazit, 2005 p. 48), and a few "Davidka" devices. The Davidka was a home-made contraption born of desperation, somewhere between artillery and a mortar and having physical effects most resembling a large  firecracker. In Jerusalem, a "canon" was improvised from an old Turkish canon that had been a display piece.

Israel had about 28 miscellaneous light planes that could be used for transport and reconnaissance. Some of these were fitted with machine guns and used for primitive strafing and bombing. Israel's first real fighter planes arrived toward the end of May. They were Czech AVIA S199 versions of the Messerschmitt bf 109g, These aircraft had oversize Junkers motors and propellers intended for bombers and therefore handled poorly. (see Debut of Israel's Air Force).

The Arab armies, according to Morris, had about 75 combat aircraft, 40 tanks, 500 armored vehicles, 140 field guns and 220 anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns. But, he tells us, these were poorly maintained and mostly unserviceable. This is scarcely credible, given the effective artillery barrages used by the Egyptians against Yad Mordechai and other settlements, and by the Syrians against Mishmar Hayarden and Degania. The Jordanians for their part seemed to keep the large quantity of 25 pound cannon with which they had been supplied by the British in top notch condition at Latrun and in pounding Jerusalem. However, it is true that after the end of May the British were no longer supplying ordnance to the Jordanians and ammunition was in short supply. Morris (page 218) tells us that in October, 1948, the IAF gained "immediate" air superiority over the Egyptians thanks to its "surfeit" of pilots. But the war had been going on since May, so it is hard to understand how this gain could have been "immediate."

This account provides eyewitness evidence about the conditions of training and equipment in the elite Palmach Negev Beasts unit of the Negev Brigade - it may be more telling than statistics - Memoirs of a Palmach volunteer, 1948

Actions in the fighting of the first period of the Arab Israeli War of 1948

In the first period of fighting to June 10, notable actions included:

In fact, neither the Hagannah nor the IDF were ever able to open the Jerusalem road by force. The solution to the problem was afforded by a bypass road, the "Burma" road, that was ultimately constructed to circumvent the Arab strong points and was ready by June 10. While this shows ingenuity and initiative born of desperation, it also shows the sad state of Jewish forces until the first armistice on June 10. Saving Jerusalem was a primary war objective, decreed as such by Ben-Gurion. The obstacles raised by the Arabs, and even the fortifications held at Latrun by the legion were relatively puny. Two brigades backed by minimally competent air and artillery support could have swept the Arabs from the corridor and opened the road. This was not going to happen. Repeatedly, positions were taken by the Haganah/Palmach and then relinquished because there was simply no manpower to hold them. On paper, there might have been 20,000 or 30,000 or 60,000 Haganah soldiers. In reality, there were not 3,000 trained and organized troops to take Latrun or 6,000 troops to take and hold the road to Jerusalem. 

The period of the "Ten Days" was marked by the following major operations, many of which, with the notable exception of operations Dani and Dekel, were abortive Israeli attempts to dislodge Arab troops:

Kfar Darom in Gaza evacuated (July 8) ahead of truce expiration.

Operation Danny (Dani) (July 9-18) conquest of Lod airport and Ramla in central Israel. Inhabitants flee or are expelled for the most part.

Operation Dekel (July 9-18) - capture of Nazareth and southern Galilee. The Arab inhabitants of Nazareth remained.

Operation Brosh (July 9-18) - failure to dislodge Syrians from Mishmar Hayarden area in northwestern Galilee.

Operation Av Peer (July 8-12)  fails to dislodge Egyptians and take Iraq el Suiedan (now Qiriat Gat)

Operation Betek (July 11-12) In Western Galilee, Alexandroni brigade retakes Rosh Ha'ayin from Iraqis.

Second Egyptian attack on Negba - (July 12) Once again, a small group of defenders withstood a massive attack.

Last failed attempt to take Latrun (July 15/16) - This was part of operation Dani.

Operation Kedem (July 16/17) - The last, dubiously planned attempt to reconquer the Jewish quarter of the old city of Jerusalem fails.

Operation Death to the Invader - "Mavet Lapolesh" (July 17-18) Yet another attempt to dislodge the Egyptian army and break through to the Negev fails.

The international political situation as well as the mediocre military results did not necessarily favor Israel. The United States and Soviet Union defended the right of Israel to exist, but Britain worked to diminish the size of the Jewish state or eliminate it altogether. They had impressed their views on UN mediator Folke Bernadotte. In June, Bernadotte had recommended abolishing the Jewish state and the Arab state. The Jews would be allowed an autonomous  region as part of Jordan. Immigration would be limited and the Negev and Jerusalem would be Arab. The Arabs were confident enough of their military situation to reject the plan, and the Jews had to reject it.

In his second plan, September 16, 1948, Bernadotte conceded the existence of a Jewish state, but wanted to merge 75% of the area of the Palestine mandate into Transjordan, coinciding with a British plan for a "Greater Transjordan" that would give them a base on the Mediterranean. Bernadotte also noted that the war had created 360,000 Arab refugees and 7,000 Jewish refugees and called for their repatriation. This plan as well was rejected by both Israel and the Arabs, and Bernadotte was assassinated by the LEHI.  (See Bernadotte Plan ). The end of September saw the abortive creation of two rival Arab Palestinian states in Gaza and the West Bank.

Resumption of the war after the second cease fire.- The second cease fire expired October 15, 1948. The war with the Egyptians had been static, and characterized by costly and mostly unsuccessful Israeli attempts to dislodge the Egyptians from the Faluja pocket. By this time, Israeli forces had a clear military advantage. Operation Yoav (October 15-22) captured Beersheba and cleared much of the north central and western Negev of Egyptian forces. A truce imposed by the U.N. on October 22 was not honored. On October 28, the Egyptians evacuated Isdood, and on November 6 they retreated from Majdal Israel pressed the Egyptians in heavy battles in the Western Negev in Operation Assaf (December 5-7).  Israel took the war with the Egyptians to their territory and entered the Sinai peninsula. The IDF was forced to withdraw after encounters with British aircraft, including an air-battle in January 1949 in which IAF pilot Ezer Weizmann (eventually president of Israel)  shot down a British piloted Spitfire. In Operation Hiram (October 28-31), the Arab Liberation Army of Fawzi al-Kaukji was finally removed from all of the Galilee and the Syrians were forced to give up most of the territory they had conquered Israel forces also pushed into Lebanon. Operation Uvda, in March, was the last operation of the war, and concluded with the capture of Eilat and raising of the flag there. The armistice agreements determined the borders of Israel for 19 years, shown at right. The Arab countries never recognized those "green line" borders and most states did not recognize them until after the Six day war when Israel had conquered additional territory.

The Arab military defeat was not spectacular compared to the defeats they would suffer subsequently in the Sinai Campaign of 1956 or the Six day war, but relative to their expectations of overrunning unarmed Jews in a few weeks, it was certainly a disaster or "Nakba." It was converted into a human tragedy and a real disaster by the Arab refusal to absorb the Arab refugees from Palestine and their continuing obsession with wiping out "the Zionist entity." The Israelis absorbed the small number of Jewish refugees from areas ethnically cleansed by the Arabs, as the waves of Jewish immigrants who fled anti-Semitism and a planned campaign of expulsion in Arab countries. Arab states were not willing to acquiesce either in their defeat or in the decree of the UN that there should be a Jewish state in a part of Palestine. The Palestine issue, which had been a part of the motivation for creation of the Arab League, now moved front and center into Arab politics, and became the locomotive of a rising Arab nationalist movement.  

The Arab states, in large part went to war in 1948 because they had used the issue of Palestine to generate public enthusiasm for their own regimes. When the moment came, they found themselves trapped in their own rhetoric. If they did not go to war, the masses would topple them as traitors. Following the 1948 defeat, this dynamic was accelerated. Arab leaders used the Israel issue for political purposes. to maintain nationalist fervor. In Egypt and Syria, revolutions forced the failed rulers from power, promising to wiping out the "Zionist entity" and "reversing the results of 1948." They manufactured confrontations in order to mobilize support for their regimes, and competed with each other in their zeal against the Zionists. However, as Nasser did in 1967, they found that once they had started a sequence of events they could not control it. They had trapped themselves in their own rhetoric, and the masses now demanded action.