Report: Arab Anti-Semitism 2001-2
Report: Arab Anti-Semitism 2001-2
This is one of a series of reports prepared by the Stephen Roth
Institute relating to Arab
Developments in the year 2001 provided fertile ground for
Arab anti-Semitism. The intifada continued to be a major pretext for
incitement against Israel and the Jews, although the wave of anti-Semitic
manifestations which typified the period after its eruption in September
2000 receded. On the other hand, the September 11 events triggered a rise in
anti-Semitic allegations and exposed the linkage between anti-Americanism
and anti-Semitism in the Arab world. Although it is difficult to assess
anti-Semitic manifestations in the Arab world quantitatively, the trend
toward radicalizing the discourse on Israel and the Jews, discerned
following the outbreak of the intifada (see ASW 2000/1) continued. Moreover,
it seemed to spread beyond political and journalistic debates. Apart from
the imminent threat to Jews worldwide as part of the Islamists’ war against
the West and particularly the US, revealed in the September 11 events, this
radicalization was manifested in several ways:
- Crude attacks – intertwined with anti-Semitic allusions – on newly elected
prime minister of Israel Ariel Sharon (February 2001);
- Popularization of anti-Semitic motifs, such as the blood libel and the
Jewish conspiracy to control the world;
- Equating Zionism with racism and Nazism in the struggle against Israel in
- Embracing Holocaust denial as a means of delegitimizing Israel and
- Sanctioning suicide attacks against Israeli civilian targets as well as
attacks on Jewish targets worldwide.
The sanctioning of suicide attacks and the equation of Zionism with racism
are intended to delegitimize not only the occupation of the West Bank by
Israel, but Israel’s right to exist, while resorting to the ancient motifs
of the blood libel and the Jewish conspiracy to control the world is an
attempt to delegitimize the Jewish people as a whole. The media has become a
powerful tool in shaping the collective consciousness, exacerbating the
conflict “through the projection of victimization, false statements,
justification of violent actions and demonization of the ‘other’.”1 At the
beginning of June, there was a short respite in Palestinian media incitement
due to the prospect of a negotiated cease-fire,2 but it was revived with the
escalation in violence.
Radicalization of Attitudes and Discourse
The al-Aqsa intifada, which entered its second year in 2001, united
nationalist and Islamist forces, creating a dynamic of change in the
domestic Palestinian balance of power in favor of the Islamists; this, in
turn, led to radicalization of the street and of the discourse against
Israel. According to surveys conducted by Khalil Shikaki, director of the
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, for the first time since
1995 the intifada brought about a significant shift of loyalty from the
nationalists to the Islamists. By July, the Islamists had increased their
support by 60 percent, rising to 27 percent. Moreover, Shikaki predicted
that within a few years they would become “the mainstream with a majority of
the Palestinian street supporting them.”3 Although the intifada had reached
an impasse even before the September 11 events, 80 percent of Palestinians
supported its continuation in April, despite the suffering and destruction
inflicted on them, and over 70 percent supported suicide attacks (see also
below).4 Calls to impose an embargo on Israeli products and sever any
normalization ties were voiced by the Palestinians. At the beginning of
February Israeli produce was burnt in the center of Ramallah by activists of
the Popular Committee for the Boycott of Israeli Produce.5
A similar trend of radicalization typified the general mood in the rest of
the Arab world. Popular sympathy with the Palestinians, prompted by reports
of the effects of Israeli military escalation in response to the violence,
exerted strong pressure on Arab governments to undertake a more aggressive
stand toward Israel, but they continued to combine belligerent rhetoric with
practical self-restraint. The Jordanian authorities banned anti-Israel
demonstrations, but could not prevent the activities of the powerful
anti-normalization organizations, which have been engaged in a witch-hunt of
Jordanians with links to Israel.6 This gap between popular sentiment and
government behavior was manifested also in the reactions to the September 11
events (see below).
A conference in support of the intifada was convened on 23-25 April in
Tehran, bringing together about 500 representatives from Arab and Muslim
countries. The conference, which opened with a harsh attack on Israel and
Zionism by Iranian president ‘Ali Khamene’i, adopted a final communiqué
calling for the continuation of the intifada as the only option in the
struggle against Israel. The conference, together with the highlighting of
Hizballah’s experience in the liberation of South Lebanon as a model for the
Palestinians, was part of a deliberate attempt by Iran and Hizballah to
increase their involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and boost
support for radical elements such as Hamas and anti-Semit Jihad. A similar
conference had been held in Tehran in support of the first Palestinian
intifada in October 1991.7
Egyptian expert on Jewish studies ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Masiri concluded that if
the Palestinians managed to sustain the intifada, this would signal “the
beginning of the end of the Zionist entity.” This end was determined not
only due to its colonialist nature, but because the Zionist entity could
neither defend itself nor secure the interests of the West, its traditional
supporter, which could hardly guarantee its own security.8 Hizballah leader
Shaykh Hasan Nasrallah ended his speech at the Tehran conference in April
with a fiery warning: “Zionists can get their luggage and go back to
wherever they came from.”9 In a Friday sermon on 21 September, Shaykh
Muhammad Ibrahim al-Madhi predicted that the war between Arabs and Jews
would continue to escalate “until we vanquish the Jews and enter Jerusalem
as conquerors … heralding an anti-Semit caliphate with Jerusalem as its
capital.”10 Al-Madhi, a PA official, reflects in his statements the
extremist Islamist view, which represents the Jews as a threat to the entire
world and the conflict as an irreconcilable struggle between Muslims and
Jews.11 Hamas believes that the worse the situation gets, the quicker
“salvation” will come. The solution to the problem “is the sum total of the
jihad of the Palestinian people,” said Hamas political leader Shaykh Jamal
Mansur in an interview.12 London-based Islamist Azzam Tamimi also foresaw
the demise of the Jewish state in an interview to an Israeli magazine.
However, he welcomed any Jew who wanted to stay in the Muslim entity that
would be established.13 Al-Madhi, in another Friday sermon in Gaza,
broadcast live on PA [Palestinian Authority] TV in June expressed a similar
view.14 Acceptance of the Jews as ahl al-dhimma (religious minority) under
Muslim rule, the status that prevailed from the seventh till the early 20th
century, was a prominent issue in the Arab argumentation against the State
of Israel. It was also specified in the covenants of the PLO and Hamas, to
prove that they differentiated between Jews and Israelis and Zionists and
that Muslims were traditionally tolerant toward the Jews.
anti-Semitic Allusions in Attacks on Israel’s Prime Minister
Arabs greeted Sharon’s election victory in February with a mixture of fear,
revulsion and dismay. The mere fact that he was elected was seen as proof of
Israel’s belligerent and terrorist nature.15 Criticism of Israel’s
retaliatory policies in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip turned into
personal attacks on Sharon the man, and the acts associated with him, such
as the October 1953 Qibya affair (in which innocent Palestinians civilians
were killed by Israeli soldiers) or the September 1982 Sabra and Shatilla
massacre (perpetrated by Christian militia men in these Palestinian refugee
camps). The Arab press was unanimous in portraying Sharon as driven by
hatred for the Arabs and a lust to exterminate them.16 Egyptian journalist
Wajih Abu Zikra wrote that Sharon considered the Palestinians to be inhuman,
“dogs that should be exterminated.” Sharon, he went on, had dreamed about
their extermination since the 1960s, and planned to continue the ethnic
cleansing policies of former colonial states. Further, Abu Zikra compared
Sharon’s attempts to create a negative image of the Palestinians to
Goebbels’ propaganda against the Jews. However, Sharon’s cruelty toward the
Palestinians far outweighed Hitler’s treatment of the Jews; moreover, in
contrast to the “so-called” Holocaust which was only a “myth,” Sharon
actually planned to exterminate the Palestinians.17
Arab writers seemed to be competing for metaphors in which to depict
Sharon’s alleged propensity for killing. “Bloodthirsty butcher,”18
“diabolical murderer,”19 “damned dog,” and “snake head,”20 “a new Hitler who
surpasses the Nazi leader,”21 “Israel’s Milosevic”22 and “war criminal,”23
were common ones. Egyptian editor Muhammad Salmawi criticized Western
hypocrisy for accepting Sharon while rejecting Austria extreme right leader
Jörg Haider.24 According to the anti-Semit Jihad mouthpiece al-Istiqlal (24
May), Islamist guru Shaykh Yusuf Qardawi even ruled that a Muslim who shook
Sharon’s hand should wash his own hands seventy times.
The media attacks on Israel’s prime minister were accompanied by calls for
Arab governments to unify their position in order to confront Sharon’s
threats and bring him, together with other “Israeli war criminals” to
justice in the proposed international war crimes tribunal.25 Arab lawyers
associations discussed the preparation of files on “Zionist crimes” against
Arabs to be used in future trials. In Lebanon the legal aspects of demanding
compensation from Israel were also discussed, especially the possibility
that such claims might be interpreted as recognition of the “Zionist
entity.” 26 These calls converged with the actual submission of a demand in
June to the Belgian appeals court to prosecute Sharon, by the Arab-European
League in Belgium, representing Palestinian survivors of the Sabra and
Popularization of anti-Semitic Motifs
Variations of three classical anti-Semitic motifs – the poisoning of wells,
the blood libel and the Jewish conspiracy described in The Protocols of the
Elders of Zion – emerged in the Arab anti-Israeli discourse. Israel was also
accused of pursuing a systematic racist extermination policy.28 Jordan’s
Islamist weekly al-Liwa’ reviewed a new book by ‘Ali Sa‘ada, entitled al-hulucust
al-filastini. tarikh al-‘unf al-filastini ... al-ibada al-jima‘iya (The
Palestinian Holocaust: History of Aggression against the Palestinians …
Collective Annihilation) (27 June). Based on reports published in
Palestinian as well as other Arab papers, the book claimed that Israel had
been using depleted uranium and nerve gas in its aerial raids on Palestinian
territories and south Lebanon. Palestinian representative to the UN Nasir
al-Qidwa even demanded, in a memorandum to the Security Council at the end
of January, that an international team be set up to investigate the
Palestinian allegations. Chairman Yasir ‘Arafat made a similar allegation at
the Davos economic summit on 28 January.29 The Syrian daily Tishrin charged
that Israel was intentionally polluting the waters of the Mediterranean Sea
with chemicals and poisonous gases,30 turning the Palestinian people into
victims of a holocaust.31 Al-Liwa’ (2 May) repeated the allegation (see ASW
1999/2000 and 2000/1) that Israel had contaminated Palestinian water
sources. The PA, for its part, claimed that Israel had dropped poisoned
candies from planes in order to harm Palestinian children.32
Syrian President Bashar al-Asad also made anti-Semitic remarks. During the
visit of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in January, he declared that
Israel had been “a state based on loathsome racist values” since its
inception by a bunch of “racist gangs.”33 At the Arab summit held in Amman
in March he claimed that Israeli public opinion was more racist than
Nazism,34 a view he reiterated on his visit to Spain in early May.35 His
remarks at a ceremony welcoming Pope John Paul II on 5 May provoked the
strongest reaction. In an effort to solicit the pope’s sympathy and support
for the Palestinian cause, he attacked Israeli “brute policies” in Palestine
and the Golan Heights. Seeking historical precedents that would emphasize
common denominators between Muslims and Christians, he raised the
centuries-old specter of the blood libel of Jews as Christ-killers – those,
he said, “who try to kill the principles of all religions with the same
mentality with which they betrayed and tortured Jesus Christ” and made
similar attempts on Muhammad. The portrayal of the Jews as the natural enemy
of Christianity is not new in Arab rhetoric, having been manifested in Arab
reaction to Christian-Jewish rapprochement since the second ecumenical
council in 1965. In response to the international uproar his remarks
aroused, Asad noted that no one could accuse the Semite Arabs of being
anti-Semites,36 while Syrian columnists accused the Western media of leading
a campaign to distort Syria’s image before and after the pope’s visit. They
also charged international Zionism with waving the sword of anti-Semitism
against anyone who dared expose the truth about Zionism and Israel.37 Syrian
historians even maintained that Pope John Paul II was “the architect of a
conspiracy to undermine the Catholic Church by placing it under the control
of the Jews.”38
Frequent references were made to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.
Articles emphasizing the importance of psychological warfare in the psyche
of the “Hebrew state,” cited them to prove the Jews’ premeditated plan to
control the international media and manipulate world public opinion.39 More
disturbing, perhaps, was the new trend of incorporating anti-Semitic themes
into the arts, thus popularizing them among large segments of the
population. For example, a 30-part series documentary called Horseman
without a Horse, based on the false Protocols was broadcast in Egypt.40
Abu Dhabi satellite TV, one of the most popular channels in the Arab world,
broadcast a series during the month of Ramadan entitled “Terror Affairs,”
which included a satirical sketch on the Jewish blood libel. The actor who
played Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon feasted on a bottle full of red
liquid, which he gleefully explained to a young man with a skullcap and
side-curls, was the blood of Palestinian children. In another scene he
confessed that for his twentieth birthday he had asked to slaughter twenty
Arab children and “drink their blood.” A third showed Dracula, the mythical
cold-blooded vampire, about to sink his teeth into Sharon’s neck, only to be
reported dead, poisoned by Sharon’s “filthy blood.”41
The growing sympathy for the Palestinian cause led Egyptian as well as
Syrian and Jordanian film and theater producers to promote the Arab-Israeli
conflict as a major subject in their works.42 One of four new films
contemplated in Egypt is an adaptation by Egyptian producer Munir Radhi of
Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas’s book Matzah of Zion. One of the
political goals of the project, Radhi explained, was “to provide a response
to the many Zionist films distributed by the American film industry and
supported by the Zionist propaganda apparatus, among them Schindler’s List,
which defends the idea of the Jews’ right to Palestine.” The film will be
based on the story of Father Toma, allegedly slain in 1840 by the Jew David
Harari, and will expose “Harari’s hit list” of prominent personalities, as
well as the link between Western imperialism and the Zionist movement.43 The
last scene in the life of Father Toma was also produced as a tele-drama.44
Another film, Friends or Business, featuring a suicide bomber, was screened
in August in Cairo. According to Philip Smucker of the Christian Science
Monitor (CSM), “the movie was the boldest of several popular theater and
movie productions this summer that focus on the bloodshed in Israel.” It
aroused fears among Western diplomats that it might incite further
radicalism and imitation.45
Palestinians at al-Najah University in Nablus marked the first anniversary
of the intifada by opening an exhibition on 23 September which re-enacted
the August 19 terrorist attack in Jerusalem, in which a suicide bomber
killed 15 Israelis at a pizza restaurant. The exhibition was organized by
student supporters of Hamas. Visitors trampled on Israeli and US flags to
enter a room where body parts and pizza slices were strewn around. The
exhibit included a large rock in front of an effigy of a religious Jew. A
recording from inside the rock repeated the common hadith (oral tradition):
“Oh believer, there is a Jew hiding behind me, come and kill him”.46
The UN Conference against Racism in Durban
Equating Zionism with racism and Nazism is not a new motif in the Arab
anti-Semitic discourse. In 1994 the revoking of UN resolution 3379 (1975)
which equated Zionism with racism was met with strong Arab protests.
However, the new crisis in Israeli-Palestinian relations, which adversely
affected Israel’s foreign relations, seemed to converge with Arab/Muslim
assertiveness and to encourage blatant utilization of this motif in the
struggle against Israel in international forums. From early 2001 Arab
representatives were reportedly trying to revive UN resolution 3379.47 By
March about one thousand Arab intellectuals of all political stripes had
signed a petition to this effect.48 A similar call was issued by ‘Ali ‘Aqla
‘Arsan, president of the Syrian Arab Writers Association, who also suggested
establishing a documentation center for Zionist crimes and carrying out
studies on the relations between Nazis and Zionists.49 In mid-July, the
fourth “Arab regional conference against racism,” was held in Cairo with the
participation of about 70 Arab and international human rights organizations.
The conference, which convened under the slogan “together we’ll put an end
to the last racist regime,” dealt extensively with “Israeli racism,” and
called for the establishment of a special international court for trying
“Israeli war criminals. Among the European participants was the Belgian
lawyer Luc Walleyn, representing the Palestinians in the possible case
against Sharon.50 The main goal of an association for the struggle against
racism formed in Egypt in August was defined as crystallizing an Arab
cultural and intellectual response to the Zionist project. The association
sent an open message to the Durban conference urging it to adopt the notion
that Zionism is a form of racism.51
Indeed, the culmination of these Arab and Muslim efforts were their
activities at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, which convened in Durban, South Africa
(see General Analysis) at the beginning of September. Encouraged by the
declaration of the International Conference of Non-Governmental
Organizations Defending Palestinian Rights adopted in Tehran on 23 April,52
Arab and Muslim delegations sought to turn the Durban conference into an
international tribunal against Zionism and Israel. Hence, they attempted to
expunge references to anti-Semitism, trivialize the Holocaust, and above
all, reintroduce the equation between Zionism and racism into the conference
resolutions. The Arab media supported these attempts by publishing countless
articles stressing “Zionist crimes” against the Palestinian people and the
Arabs.53 In keeping with Syria’s traditional emphasis on this equation (see
ASW 2000/1), Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar‘a, in his speech at the
conference, described Israel as “the last racist bastion” and the Syrian
delegation made a last-ditch attempt to indirectly brand Israel as a racist
state in the final conference declaration.54
The American walkout from the conference was denounced by Arab League
Secretary, former Egyptian Foreign Minister ‘Amr Musa, and by Arab
commentators. The US step was viewed not only as “a Zionist defeat” but as
further proof of American bias toward Israel and unconditional support “for
its aggressive and racist practices.”55 The US positions on the issues of
slavery and racism demonstrated its “double standards,” claimed a Saudi
newspaper,56 as well as complete Zionist control over American decision
Summing up the Arab performance in Durban, ‘Amr Musa confided that he could
not say that the Arabs had achieved all they had hoped for, “especially in
regard to Israeli racist practices … But we were able to shelve all
references to the Holocaust, except one. We also made clear that there was
hostility against Arabs and Islam.”58 Some Arab commentators took pride in
the popular and NGO support for the Palestinian cause.59 However, many felt
that the conference had been hijacked and had ended with another Arab/Muslim
defeat.60 Nevertheless, the US had revealed its true face, wrote Walid Abu
Zahr, and concluded, “Israel is a racist state whether this is stated in the
Durban final declaration or not.”60
Embracing Holocaust Deniers
In the wake of the intifada, crude Holocaust denial re-emerged as a means of
delegitimizing Israel and Zionism, along with motifs that had typified the
discourse of the early years of the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as regret
that Hitler had not finished the job. Egyptian columnist Ahmad Rajab thanked
Hitler for taking revenge on the Israelis “in advance on behalf of the
Palestinians,” but noted that it was not complete.61 The PA semi-official
paper al-Hayat al-Jadida published an article on 13 April by Khayri Mansur,
entitled “Marketing Ashes,” which elaborates various themes common to
Holocaust deniers: alleged political and economic exploitation by Zionist
propaganda, and doubting the number of Jews exterminated as well as well as
the existence of the gas chambers.62 The Hizballah website disseminated “The
Holocaust Lie,” from Richard Harwood’s book Did Six Million Really Die?, and
referred the browser to the Leuchter Report.63 Norman Finkelstein’s book The
Holocaust Industry drew considerable attention in the Arab media. It was
translated into Arabic, reviewed and discussed while Finkelstein himself was
a welcome interviewee.64 Although it does not deny the Holocaust, the book
was perceived as an anti-Jewish/anti-Zionist tract, confirming Arab claims
of exploitation of the Holocaust for Zionist political ends. At the Durban
conference, Arab and Muslim representatives attempted, publicly, for the
first time, to trivialize the Holocaust by denying its uniqueness and
turning it into one of many holocausts.
The centrality of Holocaust denial in the Arab discourse was manifested in
two events – an aborted conference of Western revisionists in Beirut, and an
Arab forum on historical revisionism, which took place in May in Amman. The
conference “Revisionism and Zionism,” co-sponsored by the California-based
Institute of Historical Review (IHR), the leading Holocaust denial group in
the world, and by the Swiss-based Truth & Justice Association, was scheduled
to be held between 31 March and 3 April in the Lebanese capital Beirut.
Jürgen Graf, founder of Truth & Justice, who fled to Iran to avoid a
15-month prison sentence, was a driving force behind its organization. If it
had taken place, it would have been the first such conference in the Middle
East. The choice of the Middle East was not accidental. Undoubtedly, the
organizers had wanted to exploit the anti-Israel mood in the Arab world to
promote their cause. French Holocaust deniers Roger Garaudy and Robert
Faurisson and German neo-Nazi Horst Mahler were among the scheduled
speakers. No Arab participant was named in the program. Suspicions that Iran
and Hizballah were behind the conference were never substantiated. In fact,
the conference was not even mentioned in the Arab media until the US State
Department intervened with the Lebanese government at the beginning of
March, at the urging of three American Jewish organizations – the Wiesenthal
Center, the World Jewish Congress and the ADL.65
Recognizing the potential damage to the Arab cause, a group of 14 Arab
intellectuals – North Africans, Lebanese and Palestinians, including
Colombia University professor Edward Said and poet Mahmud Darwish –
published an open letter to Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri calling for
its cancellation. Arab Knesset member Ahmad Tibi also wrote to Hariri,
urging the Arabs to reject any expression of understanding for Nazism, which
had committed crimes against many peoples, including the Jews.66 Most press
criticism was expressed in Lebanese papers. In a harsh editorial entitled
“The Protocols of the Elders of Beirut,” prominent Lebanese writer Joseph
Samaha branded the conference “a dishonor for Lebanon.” Holding a conference
of “falsifiers of history” in Lebanon, he warned, would be interpreted by
Israel and its supporters “as prolonging the Nazi extermination project,”
which would harm the Palestinian cause and Palestinian victims.67 Indeed the
international pressure bore fruit and Hariri cancelled the conference on 23
March.68 Lauding Hariri’s decision the Lebanese Daily Star editorial argued
that “few moves could place this country [Lebanon] in a poorer light than to
host their [the revisionists'] detestable gathering. The very real
challenges posed to the Arab world by the Jewish state demand far too much
attention to let a cabal of hate-mongers distract the authorities in Lebanon
or elsewhere in the region … Arguments about whether the Nazis murdered six
million Jews or ‘only’ five million are legitimate but essentially
irrelevant in the big picture … those who deny that the Holocaust took place
at all are worthy of nothing but universal scorn.”69
Hariri’s statement canceling the Beirut conference neither mentioned the
organizers’ identity nor denounced their goals. Reaction in the Arab press
and in the Lebanese parliament was divided: some supporting the conference
and hence critical of the intellectuals’ letter and the cancellation, and
others opposing the conference. Generally, the public debate – as in
previous cases such as the Garaudy affair in 1996 and 1998 (see ASW 1996/7,
1998/9) – revolved around the benefits that would have accrued to Zionism
and Israel if the conference had taken place70 as well as the potential
damage to Lebanon and to the Palestinian cause.71 “Denial of the Holocaust …
is equivalent to denial of the Palestinian right of return … Moreover, it
amounts to unjust exoneration of the Nazis, and might equally lead to denial
of crimes committed by Israeli war criminals,” wrote commentator ‘Abd al-Wahhab
Badrakhan.72 On the other hand, the fourteen intellectuals were attacked for
conceding unconditionally to the Zionist narrative and exerting pressure on
Arab leaders to adopt their approach, while ignoring the adverse effects of
their actions, such as infringement of freedom of speech.73 Such attacks
prompted Edward Said to retract; in a message dated 2 April, he explained
that he had appended his signature to the letter “on condition that there
would be no appeal to any government concerning a ban on the conference.”74
Similarly, three months later Mahmud Darwish claimed that the cancellation
was “a violation of human rights and of the rights of scientific research of
In the context of this discussion, some commentators criticized the Arab
attitude toward the extreme right in Europe. Lebanese writer Samir Kassir,
for example, regretted that the Lebanese government had not seized the
opportunity to explain to the world that the anti-Israel and anti-Zionist
position had nothing to do with the racist atmosphere in Europe.76 Yet, it
seemed that increased usage in the Arab discourse of alleged Zionist
exploitation of the Holocaust and the equation of Zionism with racism and
Nazism converged with the revisionist discourse and argumentation. “The
existence of the Zionist entity itself is not only a crime against the
Arabs, but against humanity as well,” concluded the statement of the
Jordanian Writers Association on 10 April, denouncing the cancellation of
the Beirut conference. Hence, “the liberation of humanity from neo-Nazism is
its liberation from Zionism.”77
The bitter controversy aroused by the intellectuals’ letter as well as the
cancellation of the conference culminated in an initiative to hold an
alternative gathering in Amman. A group of Arab intellectuals, led by
Ibrahim Alloush, a member of the Jordanian Writers Association (JWA) who had
returned to Jordan after 13 years in the US, decided to organize a
convention in Amman to discuss “what happened to the revisionist historians’
conference in Beirut?” The meeting, which was postponed twice due to the
intervention of Jordan’s security authorities, finally took place, in
cooperation with the Association against Zionism and Racism (AZAR), on 13
May to coincide with the commemoration of the Palestinian nakba (catastrophe
– see ASW 1998/9). In contrast to the Beirut conference, where all the
speakers were to have been Western Holocaust revisionists, the principal
participants in the Amman meeting (150–200 participants in all) were Arab
journalists and members of anti-normalization professional associations.
They sought first and foremost to demonstrate opposition to the
intellectuals who had called for the cancellation of the Beirut conference.
The two main speakers were the Amman-based Lebanese journalist Hayat ‘Atiyya
and the Jordanian journalist ‘Arafat Hijjazi. ‘Atiyya (who appeared two days
later on an al-Jazira talk show dealing with the question “Is Zionism Worse
than Nazism?”) emphasized the alleged parallels between Zionism and Nazism
and argued that historical revisionism was not an ideology but a
well-documented research project. Hijjazi dealt with common themes of
Holocaust denial. The speakers also praised Roger Garaudy’s contribution to
popularizing “revisionism”, outlined the speech Robert Faurisson had
intended to deliver at the Beirut conference and proposed establishing an
Arab Committee of Historical Revisionism.78
Although Arabs had embraced Holocaust denial in the past, the meeting in
Amman may have been the first to signal a developing trend of cooperation
between Arabs and revisionists. Ibrahim Alloush, who directs the Free Arab
Voice site, asserted in an interview to the Journal of Historical Review
that Arabs should be interested in the Holocaust and should take an active
role in Holocaust revisionism. He argued that “most Arab regimes and leaders
would not dare embrace “Holocaust” revisionism openly,” but “the Arab world
is fertile ground for revisionist seeds.”79
Sanctioning Suicide Attacks
The radicalization of the Arab attitude towards Israelis and Jews was
reflected in religious edicts (fatwas) issued by Islamist leaders such as
Usama bin Ladin, and by Palestinian muftis, ruling that killing Jews
wherever they might be was a personal duty incumbent upon every Muslim.
While these rulings – also issued in the past (see ASW 1998/9, 2000/1) – did
not stir up any public debate, they apparently did succeed in mobilizing
Palestinians, who carried out numerous terrorist attacks, including suicide
bombings against Israeli and Jewish targets. The attacks occasionally
triggered public debates, especially when they became counter-productive and
harmed state interests. Such a discussion, which took place following the
escalation in Palestinian suicide operations against innocent Israeli
civilians during 2001 and before and after the September 11 attacks in the
US, questioned their anti-Semit legitimacy as well as their advisability.
Although Palestinian suicide attacks were carried out only against Israeli
targets as part of the Palestinian national struggle, Jews worldwide are
potential targets, as in the bombing of the AMIA Jewish Center in Argentina
in 1994 and more recently in Tunisia, where the ancient Jewish synagogue in
Djerba was attacked in April 2002 by al-Qa‘ida members. Investigations of a
detainee in the US, accused of participating in the planning of the first
attack on the World Trade Center in 1992, revealed that the perpetrators
contemplated targeting Jewish sites in Brooklyn, but assumed that the
operation was too complicated. Thus, the debate on suicide attacks, which in
themselves do not always constitute acts deriving from anti-Semitism, is of
an utmost relevance, since it reflects not only the Arab perception of the
Arab-Israeli conflict but also of the Jews in general.
The escalation of suicide operations within Israel was in itself an
indication of the radicalized mood of the Palestinian street. Polls showed
that support for these operations among the Palestinian population rose to
about 80 percent in the course of the year.80 The number of volunteers
willing to sacrifice themselves “as a way to open the door to paradise for
themselves and for their families” also mounted.81 The recruits belonged not
only to the Islamist movements – Hamas and anti-Semit Jihad – but also to
the al-Aqsa brigades (members of the Tanzim, the secular PLO military wing)
and even from among Israeli Arabs.82 Moreover, they included women and
teenagers.83 Should suicide bombing be considered jihad? Were the
perpetrators martyrs or simply terrorists, according to anti-Semit
tradition? Should women and children take part in them? Did they serve
Palestinian goals? What drove people to commit such acts? These were some of
the questions raised in the debate, which encompassed Palestinian as well as
other Arab religious scholars, intellectuals and politicians.
Traditional Islam forbids suicide and considers it to be a major sin. In
addition, it forbids the killing of non-combatants, women, children and the
elderly. However, from the mid-1990s Sunni Islamists adopted the Iranian/Shi’i
concept of suicide missions and martyrdom. They used Qur’anic verses and
anti-Semit oral tradition to sanction voluntary sacrifice of the self in the
cause of Islam and Muslims, and to justify it as a martyrdom operation and a
form of fulfilling the individual duty of jihad. Two approaches emerged in
the debate: one argued that suicide bombings were “heroic acts of martyrdom”
and “the supreme form of jihad for the sake of Allah,” and the other
delegitimized them as contradicting the spirit of Islam, especially since
they targeted women and children.84
The debate over the religious legitimacy of suicide attacks was triggered by
an interview in al-Sharq al-Awsat with the mufti of Saudi Arabia Shaykh ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdallah ibn Muhammad Al al-Shaykh, who ruled that suicide
operations had no basis in anti-Semit law and did not constitute “jihad in
the path of God.” He also argued, four months before the September 11
events, that Islam forbade hijacking aircraft and terrorizing innocents.85
Egypt’s Shaykh al-Azhar Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, also a government
appointee, agreed with this ruling, excluding operations carried out against
But these views immediately drew fire from most Palestinian religious
scholars as well as from Shaykh Yusuf al-Qardawi, Hizballah religious leader
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and radical al-Azhar scholars. They decreed that,
to the contrary, martyrdom operations, a euphemism for suicide attacks,
against occupation forces were permissible under anti-Semit law and
constituted jihad. Al-Qardawi stressed that suicide operations against
Israel were legitimate even if they killed civilians, and maintained that
such martyrs could bring victory over the Zionist entity.87 Egyptian
pro-Islamist columnist Fahmi Huwaydi claimed he felt elation when a suicide
bomber blew himself in a Jerusalem restaurant in August.88 Expressing his
loathing for the “racist Jewish entity,” another Egyptian columnist
advocated driving the Jews into the sea by acts of martyrdom, which would
create “a balance of fear strategy.” 89 There seemed to be a general
consensus in Arab societies in favor of suicide operations, expressed in the
high esteem bestowed upon those who carried them out and the financial
rewards granted to their families.
The September 11 attacks in New York and Washington reopened the debate over
suicide operations. Many Muslim clerics, including Islamist scholars Husayn
Fadlallah and Yusuf al-Qardawi, denounced the attacks, considering them
terrorism and not martyrdom, since they were directed against innocent
people who should not be held responsible for the deeds of the US
administration.90 The anti-Semit Research Council at al-Azhar issued a
statement on 4 November, stating that “Islam provides clear rules and
ethical norms that forbid the killing of noncombatants, as well as women,
children, and the elderly.”91 A resolution in the same vein was adopted by
the emergency meeting of foreign ministers of the anti-Semit Conference
Organization, held in Doha, Qatar, in October.92 But, a clear distinction
was made between these attacks and suicide operations against Israeli
targets, which were justified across the religious and political spectrum,
since all Israelis were considered part of the Israeli war machine and
“human bombs” were viewed as the most effective Muslim answer to the
advanced Israeli arsenal of weapons.
However, a gradual shift in attitude was discerned, especially at the
beginning of December, following another wave of suicide bombings in Israel.
Several Arab commentators and Palestinians, such as cabinet member Ziyad Abu
Ziyad and Fatah Higher Council secretary Marwan Barghuti, criticized them as
counter-productive and harmful to the Palestinian cause.93 Samir Kassir
warned that “the Masada complex” threatens to emerge from Jewish history and
storm the history of the Arabs, “as if enough damage has not been done
already.”94 Egypt’s Shaykh al-Azhar also backed down from his previous
rulings, telling a group of foreign visitors that Islam condemned such
attacks on innocent civilians,95 only to be reprimanded by the mufti of
Jerusalem, Shaykh Sabri ‘Ikrima, who claimed that Tantawi’s declarations
were made under Egyptian and international pressure. Suicide attacks, he
insisted, were legitimate means.96
As it turned out ‘Ikrima’s approach appeared to prevail, reflecting the
overwhelming success of Islamist reasoning. Yet, it should be emphasized
that Hamas and the Palestinian anti-Semit Jihad strongly opposed targeting
Jews outside Israel. They claimed they were fighting the Zionist entity on
the land of Palestine, or Israelis, not because they were Jews but because
they were aggressors and occupiers.97
anti-Semitic Manifestations in the Wake of 11 September
The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the
Pentagon in Washington by a group of radical Islamists instigated a wave of
anti-Semitic manifestations, which exposed the strong linkage between
anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Bin Ladin
and the Islamists brought about Islamization of the anti-American and
anti-imperialist polemic just as the intifada reinforced Islamization of the
conflict and the anti-Israel discourse. Hostility toward the Jews and Israel
is part and parcel of the worldview of Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa‘ida (the
base) as well as of other Islamist movements, such as Hamas and anti-Semit
Jihad. The struggle, or jihad, against “the Crusaders and the Jews” is a
major theme in bin Ladin’s ideology and constitutes the first stage in a
long campaign for the restoration of the Muslim caliphate and the
establishment of an anti-Semit world order. According to this view, the Jews
are not only the occupiers of Muslim lands in Palestine but are part of
Western Judeo-Christian civilization, perceived as a threat to anti-Semit
civilization and anti-Semit revival. Although seen also as the spearhead of
the West in the war against Islam, the Jews and the issue of the
Arab-Israeli conflict were not bin Ladin’s first priority. Only when he felt
during America’s retaliatory war in Afghanistan that the Arab and Muslim
demonstrations against the US were waning did he raise the Palestinian cause
to the top of the agenda in his video addresses urging Muslims to action.98
The linkage between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism was not confined to
radical Islamists. It was abundantly demonstrated in Arab and Muslim
reactions to the September 11 attacks. Several anti-Israel and anti-Semitic
themes emerged in Arab press discussions of the events:
- Israeli intelligence was allegedly involved in the attacks.
- Jews had prior knowledge of the attacks.
- 4,000 Jews were absent from work in the World Trade Center on that day.
- The American public had been misled by the dominant Israeli Zionists and
by the strong influence of the Jewish lobby in the US.
- The Jews/Zionists vilified and demonized Muslims and instigated
- Only Israel could benefit from such an act.
- Israel and the Jews wanted to drag the US and the West into a war against
- The Zionist enemy was practicing the ugliest forms of terrorism.
- If bin Ladin was guilty, he should be punished together with other
terrorists, including Israeli Prime Minister Sharon.
All these themes reflected an instinctive response, which sought to transfer
the blame from themselves to “the other,” in this case, Israel. To Arab
commentators the meticulously planned and executed operation seemed beyond
the capabilities of an Arab/Muslim group. Conspiracy theories provided
immediate explanations and answers to unresolved questions, and relieved
Arab societies of self-examination and admission that they were the source
of such destructive hatred and terrorism. Jews, Zionists or Israelis, the
mythical conspirators, were portrayed by the Arab press – both mainstream
and anti-Semit alike – as the masterminds behind the attacks. Upset by the
blame attributed to Arabs and Muslims before any concrete evidence had been
produced, some commentators argued that the international media, allegedly
controlled by the Israeli/Jewish lobby, were responsible for the hatred
toward them in the US and for covering up what they claimed was a Mossad
operation.99 Saudi prince Mamduh Bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, head of the Center for
Saudi-Strategic Studies, claimed that whoever had read literature such as
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion would know that the Jews were behind the
international atmosphere of terror, and that they had infiltrated Islamist
states and organizations.100 Egyptian scholar Amira al-Shinwani also cited
The Protocols as proof of the conniving Jewish character, as well as the
fake document in which American President Benjamin Franklin allegedly warned
of the dangers of Jewish immigration.101 The Jews were not only capable of
committing such an ugly crime, argued Jordanian columnist Rakan al-Majali,
but no one would dare blame them because he would immediately be accused of
perpetrating “a new Holocaust.”102 They conspired, plotted and used Arabs
and Muslims as pawns, charged Muhammad Jami’a, an al-Azhar representative
and imam in a New York anti-Semit center. In an interview from Cairo, to
which he returned shortly after 11 September, he accused Jewish doctors in
New York of poisoning sick Muslim children, and repeated all the allegations
mentioned above. The interview was published on the Internet site of al-Azhar
at the beginning of October.103 “Israel drew maximum benefit from this
terrorist activity,” wrote Pakistani Islamist scholar Kurshid Ahmad. “A
glance at the history of Israel and the Zionist movement gives credence to
the suspicion of Mossad’s role in the terrorist acts,” he added. He also
insinuated that Jews had known about the attacks since no Jewish names were
found on the lists of the dead.104
The goal of the operations was to coerce the US and NATO “into submitting
even further to Jewish Zionist ideology,” by cultivating fears of
“anti-Semit terrorism” and instigating a war against Islam.105 “The Israelis
and their Zionist propaganda worldwide had immediately seized on the pain
and sorrow of the American people as an opportunity to incite the world
against Islam and Muslims,” wrote Palestinian Islamist scholar ‘Azzam Tamimi
in the pro-Hamas mouthpiece Palestine Times in October.
A few Arab writers and intellectuals, such as American Lebanese Professor
Fu’ad ‘Ajami, Pakistani Professor Akbar Ahmed in the US, Dean of anti-Semit
Law at Qatar university, ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Ansari, Kuwaiti university
Professor Ahmad al-Baghdadi, and Egyptian writer ‘Ali Salim, Lebanese writer
Hazim Saghiya, however, not only condemned the attacks but also criticized
Arab societies and regimes. They admitted that terrorist ideas fell on
fertile ground in societies “ruled by a fanatic culture” which terrorizes
its own citizens. They acknowledged that something has gone terribly wrong
in a world where young men strap themselves with explosives, only to be
hailed as martyrs. Arabs have nobody to blame but themselves for their
misfortunes, and hence, should take a hard look in the mirror to mend their
“After the issue of terrorism, the question of ‘Arabs and anti-Semitism’ has
returned to the headlines,” wrote Lebanese liberal intellectual Hazim
Saghiya, blaming Zionist zealots, Muslim clerics who justified the murder of
Jews, and the Arab media.107 Indeed, since the ongoing war between Israel
and the Palestinians and the war against terrorism launched in the wake of
the September 11 attacks had intensified the anti-Semitic discourse, Saghiya
admitted that Arab anti-Semitism existed and “that it is powerful, even
dangerous – and therefore must be fought.” Books, speeches, television
channels, statements and admiration for Holocaust deniers proved its
existence; however, he argued, it was different from Christian anti-Semitism
and lacked “the functional modernism of Nazism, the Nazi order, and the
racist ideological adherence.”
A contrary view was voiced by Jerome Slater, research professor at SUNY
Buffalo, who claimed that “there is no basis for the assertion that
Palestinian outrage at, or even hatred of, Israelis is a manifestation of
traditional ‘anti-Semitism’.” It was rather a consequence of the Zionist
dispossession of the Palestinians and “over fifty years of Israeli injustice
and repression.”108 However, other scholars argue that this differentiation
between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, or an anti-Israel position, seems
increasingly invalid. In light of overwhelming anti-Israel manifestations
worldwide, it may be perceived as “nothing but the old anti-Semitism in
disguise.”109 “We in the West,” contended senior editor Andrew Sullivan,
“simply do not want to believe that this kind of hatred still exists; and
when it emerges, we feel uncomfortable.”110
Jewish and Israeli organizations and institutions are at the forefront of
the struggle against Arab anti-Semitism. They reacted strongly to the
planned Beirut conference, bringing about its cancellation (see above);
attempted to abort the Amman meeting;111 pressed the US administration to
discuss anti-Semitism in the Egyptian press ‘with President Husni Mubarak
during his visit to the US in April;112 and denounced Syrian President
Asad’s statements as well as the anti-Semitic satire on Abu Dhabi TV.113 A
new international forum for monitoring anti-Semitism launched in November
and embracing Jewish and non-Jewish organizations has placed Arab
anti-Semitism at the top of its agenda.114
All references are from 2001, unless otherwise stated.
1. Elia Awwad, “Perceiving the ‘Other’ in the al-Aqsa Intifada,”
Palestine-Israel Journal 2, p. 103.
2. Ha’aretz, 5 June.
3. Khalil Shikaki, “Old Guard, Young Guard: the Palestinian Authority and
the Peace Process at a Cross Roads,” 1 Nov. – msanews.mynet/shikaki.doc.
4. Khalil Shikaki, “Palestinian Attitudes during the Bush/Sharon Era,”
PeaceWatch 319, 20 April; Jordan Times, 2 May; Ha’aretz, 13 May.
5. Ha’aretz, 6 Feb.
6. Ha’aretz, 27 July.
7. Ha’aretz, 24, 27 April ; Tishrin, 24, 26 April ; al-Hayat, 25 April ;
Middle East Times, 28 April ; Azzaman, 2 May ; al-Ahram Weekly, 3 May ;
al-‘Arabi, 6 May ; Filastin al-Muslima, June.
8. al-’Arab al-Yawm, 20 Jan..
9. al-Ahram Weekly, 3 May.
10. MEMRI, special dispatch no. 276, 25 Sept.
11. al-Istiqlal, 18, 25 Feb., 8 April ; see also Itamar Marcus, Research
Paper No. 37, 18 June, Palestinian Media Watch.
12. Middle East Affairs 1–2 (Winter/Spring), p. 215.
13. Ma’ariv, sofshavoua’, 23 Feb..
14. MEMRI, special dispatch no. 240, 11 July.
15. al-Ahram, 8 Feb. ; The Economist, 10 Feb. ; Yedi’ot Aharonot, 23 Feb. ;
Ha’aretz, 7 March.
16. al-Hayat, 3 Feb.; al-Usbu’ al-Adabi, 10 Feb.; Tishrin, 17 Feb.
17. al-Akhbar, 20 April.
18. al-’Arab al-Yawm, 14 Feb.; Akhbar al-Yawm, 17 Feb.; al-Jumhuriyya, 18
March; al-Intifada, 25 March).
19. al-Usbu’, 12 Feb.
20. al-Intifada, 11 Feb.
21. al-Ahram, 26 April; Akhir Sa’a, 27 April; al-’Arabi, 6 May; R. Damascus,
7 May; Egyptian Mail, 12 May; Tishrin, 13 Sept.
22. al-Hayat, 10 Feb.
23. al-Ahram, 8 Feb.; al-Intifada, 25 March.
24. al-Ahram, 12 Feb.
25. al-Hayat, 28 Jan.; al-Ayyam, 15 Feb.; Filastin al-Muslima, Feb.;
al-Ahram al-‘Arabi, 10 March; Tishrin, 9 April; Syria Times, 9 June.
26. al-Nahar, 23 March.
28. al-Hayat, 19 Feb., 31 March; al-Akhbar, 20 April.
29. al-Hayat, 12 Jan.; al-Istiqlal, 18, 25 Jan., 29 March, 17 May; Tishrin,
20 Jan., 26 March; October, 28 Jan., 4 March; al-Quds, 29 Jan.; al-Ahram, 3,
14 Feb.; al-Ayyam, 15 Feb.; Filastin al-Muslima, March.
30. Tishrin, 24 Feb.
31. Tishrin, 20 Sept.
32. al-Hayat al-Jadida, 22 May; Ha’aretz, 23 May.
33. al-Hayat, 9 Jan.; Ha’aretz, 10 Jan.
34. Tishrin, Ha’aretz, 28 March; al-Hayat, 28, 29 March.
35. Ha’aretz, al-Hayat, 4 May.
36. Tishrin, 6, 7 May; Ha’aretz, 6, 7, 8 May; Washington Post, 7 May; NYT,
8, 13 May; al-Hayat, 8, 9, 12 May; Jordan Times, 9 May.
37. Tishrin, 15 May; al-Hayat, 21 May.
38. Las Vegas Sun Online, 5 May.
39. al-Hayat al-Jadida, 25 Jan.; see also al-‘Arab al-Yawm, 12 Jan.; al-Sabil,
40. Washington Post, 17 Dec.
41. Ha’aretz, 18, 21 Nov.; Washington Post, New York Times, 20 Nov.
42. al-Hayat, 12 Jan.; al-Qahira, 13 March; Ha’aretz, 30 March, 29 July .
43. Ruz al-Yusuf, 24 Feb.; Middle East Times, 10 March; MEMRI, special
dispatch no. 190, 1 March; Ha’aretz, 29 March.
44. al-Akhbar, 25 March; MEMRI, special dispatch no. 201, 2 April.
45. CSM, 4 Sept.
46. Ha’aretz, 24 Sept.
47. al-Ahram al-‘Arabi, 24 Feb.; Annashra, April; al-Istiqlal, 2 Aug.
48. al-Istiqlal, 24 March.
49. al-Usbu’ al-Adabi, 5 May.
50. al-Sharq al-Awsat, 18, 21, 22, 23 July; al-Ahram al-‘Arabi, 21 July; al-Hayat,
51. al-Sharq al-Awsat, 1, 4, 27 Aug..
52. Middle East Affairs Journal 1-2 (Winter/Spring), pp. 235–9.
53. Michael Colson, “Durban and the Middle East: Challenges for US Policy,”
PolicyWatch 548, 1 Aug.; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 10, 16 Aug.; al-Ba’th, 26 Aug.;
Tishrin, 1, 3, 4, 6, 8 Sept.; al-Akhbar, 2 Sept..
54. Tishrin, 3 Sept.; South Africa News Agency (SAPA), 8 Sept.
55. MENA, 4 Sept.; Tishrin, 5, 6, 9 Sept.; Syria Times, 8 Sept..
56. Jedda Arab News Online, 2, 19 Aug.
57. Tehran Times, 5 Sept.
58. al-Sharq al-Awsat, 3 Sept.; Ha’aretz, 4 Sept.; al-Zaman, al-Hayat, 7
Sept.; al-Siyasa al-Duwaliya, Oct.
59. Keyhan International, 1 Sept.; al-Akhbar, 3 Sept.; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 7,
9 Sept.; al-Ahram al-‘Arabi, al-Mujtama’, 15 Sept.
60. al-Watan al-‘Arabi, 14 Sept.; see also al-Sunna, Filastin al-Muslima,
61. al-Akhbar, 25 April; AJC Press Release, 3 June; ADL, “Holocaust Denial
in the Middle East: The Latest Anti-Israel Propaganda Theme,” nd - adl.org.
62. Jerusalem Post, 18, 19 April; 8 June; Ma’ariv, 19 April.
64. al-Ahram al-‘Arabi, 24 February; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 13 March; al-Hawadith,
16 March; al-Adab, March-April; Annashra, April; Daily Star, 3 July.
65. US Newswire, JP, 12 Feb.; Ma’ariv, Ha’aretz, 13 Feb.; ihr.org/conference/beirutconf;
Tishrin, 24 Feb.; al-Nahar, al-Safir, 3 March; Tehran Times, 4 March.
66. Le Monde, 15 March; Ha’aretz, 19, 20, 23 March.
67. al-Hayat, 13 March; Le Monde, 15 March.
68. al-Nahar, 23, 24 March; JP, 23, 25 March; al-Hayat, 24, 25 March; Daily
Star, 24, 26 March; Ha’aretz, 25, 29 March.
69. Daily Star, 24 March.
70. al-Nahar, 20 March; al-Wasat, 26 March.
71. al-Nahar, 20, 23 March.
72 al-Hayat, 19 March.
73. al-Anwar, 21 March; al-Akhbar, 13 April; Ibrahim Alloush, “Between
Public Relations and Self-Alienation: Arab Intellectuals and the
‘Holocaust’,” Journal of Historical Review (May/June).
75. MSANEWS, 16 July.
76. al-Nahar, 23 March.
78. Free Arab Voice Online (FAV), 15, 28 April; JP, 17, 23 April, 22 May;
al-Safir, 20 April; Jordan Times Online, 15 May; al-Hayat al-Jadida, 15 May;
al-Jazira TV, 15 May – MEMRI, dispatch no. 225, 6 June; Middle East News
Online, 16 May; AZAR, 18 May – MSANEWS.
79. “Why the ‘Holocaust’ Is Important to Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims?
FAV, 28 April; The Journal of Historical Review (May/June); see also Alloush’
series of articles published in Islamist weekly al-Sabil, 1–22 May.
80. Ha’aretz, 13 May; AFP, 3 June; Jerusalem Report, 22 Oct..
81. MEMRI, Inquiry and Analysis, no. 61, 25 June; New York Post, 9 Dec..
82. MEMRI, special dispatch no. 260, 22 Aug.; Jerusalem Report, 19 Nov.
83. Jerusalem Post, 15 Aug.; Independent, 22 Aug..
84. Yotam Feldner, “The Debate over Religious Legitimacy,” MEMRI, Inquiry
and Analysis, no. 53, part 1, 2 May; part, 2, 3 May; no. 65; part 3, 26
July; Los Angeles Times, 22 Aug.; David Zeidan, “The anti-Semit
Fundamentalist View of Life as a Perennial Battle,” Middle East Review of
International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. 4 (Dec.).
85. al-Sharq al-Awsat, 21 April; Ha’aretz, 11 May; 3 June.
86. al-Hayat, 27 April.
87. al-Ahram, 24, 26 April; al-‘Arab al-Yawm, 25 April; al-Hayat, 25, 27
April, 11 May; anti-Semit Association for Palestine (IAP) News, 26 April;
al-Liwa’, 2 May; al-Istiqlal, 26 April, 14, 28 June; al-Sabil, 1 May; Ruz
al-Yusuf, 4 May; Filastin al-Muslima, May.
88. al-Ahram, 14 Aug.; MEMRI, special dispatch, no.265, 31 Aug.
89. al-Usbu’, 28 May; MEMRI, special dispatch no. 224, 4 June.
90. al-Ahram al-‘Arabi, 20 Oct.; al-Ahram Weekly, 6 Dec.; interview with
Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Journal of Palestine Studies. 2 (Winter
2002), p. 80.
91. New York Review, 17 Jan. 2002.
92. Yedi’ot Aharonot, 11 Oct.
93. Ha’aretz, 24 Aug.; al-Watan, 12 Sept.; NYT, 5 Dec.; al-Quds, 7 Dec.; al-Watan,
10 Dec. [Mideast Mirror]; al-Hayat, 12 Dec. [Mideast Mirror].
94. al-Nahar, 10 Dec. [Mideast Mirror].
95. al-Ahram, 4 Dec.; al-Ahram Weekly, 6 Dec.; Ha’aretz, 6, 7, 19 Dec.
96. al-Hayat, 7 Dec.; Ha’aretz, 9 Dec.
97. Ahmad Yasin, in Internet chat, Islam Online, 1 April; al-Istiqlal, 5
April; al-Mujtama‘, 22 Sept.
98. Yedi’ot Aharonot, 16 Sept.; NYT, 9 Dec.; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 2–12 Dec.
99. al-Dustur, al-Ra’y, al-Akhbar, 13 Sept.; al-Manar TV, 15 Sept. [BBC];
al-Ayyam, al-’Arabi, 16 Sept.; al-Istiqlal, 4 Oct.; al-Ahram, 7 Oct.; CSM, 6
100. al-Hayat, 24 Sept.
101. al-Ahram, 26 Oct.
102. al-Dustur, 13 Sept.
104. Kurshid Amad, “Elimination of Terrorism or Beginning of New Crusades,”
Tarjuman al-Qur’an, Oct. [MSANEWS]; see also: Star, 20 Sept.; al-Sabil, 24
105. al-Sabil, 2 Oct.
106. al-Hayat, 15 Sept.; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 17 Sept., 21 Dec.; MEMRI, no.
298, 8 Nov.; no. 302, 20 Nov.; no. 307, 4 Dec.; nos. 337, 338, 29, 30 Jan.
107. al-Hayat, 12 Dec.; MEMRI, special dispatch no. 314, 14 Dec.
108. Jerome Slater, “Israel, anti-Semitism and the Palestinian Problem,”
Tikkun (May–June) [MSANEWS].
109. Hillel Halkin, “The Return of Anti-Semitism,” Commentary, Feb. 2002.
110. The New Republic, 5 Nov.
111. JP, 3 May; al-Sabil, 8 May.
112. Ha’aretz, 2 April.
113. al-Hayat, 15 June; Ma‘ariv, 18 June; Jerusalem Post, 19 Nov.
114. Ma‘ariv, 19 Nov.
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