International Court of Justice (ICJ) Ruling on the Israeli Security Barrier ("Wall") -
July 9, 2004

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International Court of Justice (ICJ) Ruling on the Israeli Security Barrier ("Wall") II - July 9, 2004

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          30. The Court would recall that resolution 377 A (V) states that:

“if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures . . .”

The procedure provided for by that resolution is premised on two conditions, namely that the Council has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as a result of a negative vote of one or more permanent members, and that the situation is one in which there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.  The Court must accordingly ascertain whether these conditions were fulfilled as regards the convening of the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, in particular at the time when the Assembly decided to request an advisory opinion from the Court.

          31. In the light of the sequence of events described in paragraphs 18 to 23 above, the Court observes that, at the time when the Tenth Emergency Special Session was convened in 1997, the Council had been unable to take a decision on the case of certain Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, due to negative votes of a permanent member; and that, as indicated in resolution ES‑10/2 (see paragraph 19 above), there existed a threat to international peace and security.

          The Court further notes that, on 20 October 2003, the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly was reconvened on the same basis as in 1997 (see the statements by the representatives of Palestine and Israel, A/ES‑10/PV.21, pp. 2 and 5), after the rejection by the Security Council, on 14 October 2003, again as a result of the negative vote of a permanent member, of a draft resolution concerning the construction by Israel of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.  The Court considers that the Security Council again failed to act as contemplated in resolution 377 A (V).  It does not appear to the Court that the situation in this regard changed between 20 October 2003 and 8 December 2003, since the Council neither discussed the construction of the wall nor adopted any resolution in that connection.  Thus, the Court is of the view that, up to 8 December 2003, the Council had not reconsidered the negative vote of 14 October 2003.  It follows that, during that period, the Tenth Emergency Special Session was duly reconvened and could properly be seised, under resolution 377 A (V), of the matter now before the Court.

          32. The Court would also emphasize that, in the course of this Emergency Special Session, the General Assembly could adopt any resolution falling within the subject-matter for which the Session had been convened, and otherwise within its powers, including a resolution seeking the Court's opinion.  It is irrelevant in that regard that no proposal had been made to the Security Council to request such an opinion.

          33. Turning now to alleged further procedural irregularities of the Tenth Emergency Special Session, the Court does not consider that the “rolling” character of that Session, namely the fact of its having been convened in April 1997 and reconvened 11 times since then, has any relevance with regard to the validity of the request by the General Assembly.  The Court observes in that regard that the Seventh Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, having been convened on 22 July 1980, was subsequently reconvened four times (on 20 April 1982, 25 June 1982, 16 August 1982 and 24 September 1982), and that the validity of resolutions or decisions of the Assembly adopted under such circumstances was never disputed.  Nor has the validity of any previous resolutions adopted during the Tenth Emergency Special Session been challenged.

          34. The Court also notes the contention by Israel that it was improper to reconvene the Tenth Emergency Special Session at a time when the regular Session of the General Assembly was in progress.  The Court considers that, while it may not have been originally contemplated that it would be appropriate for the General Assembly to hold simultaneous emergency and regular sessions, no rule of the Organization has been identified which would be thereby violated, so as to render invalid the resolution adopting the present request for an advisory opinion.

          35. Finally, the Tenth Emergency Special Session appears to have been convened in accordance with Rule 9 (b) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, and the relevant meetings have been convened in pursuance of the applicable rules.  As the Court stated in its Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 concerning the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), a “resolution of a properly constituted organ of the United Nations which is passed in accordance with that organ's rules of procedure, and is declared by its President to have been so passed, must be presumed to have been validly adopted” (I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 22, para. 20).  In view of the foregoing, the Court cannot see any reason why that presumption is to be rebutted in the present case.

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          36. The Court now turns to a further issue related to jurisdiction in the present proceedings, namely the contention that the request for an advisory opinion by the General Assembly is not on a “legal question” within the meaning of Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter and Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court.  It has been contended in this regard that, for a question to constitute a “legal question” for the purposes of these two provisions, it must be reasonably specific, since otherwise it would not be amenable to a response by the Court.  With regard to the request made in the present advisory proceedings, it has been argued that it is not possible to determine with reasonable certainty the legal meaning of the question asked of the Court for two reasons.

          First, it has been argued that the question regarding the “legal consequences” of the construction of the wall only allows for two possible interpretations, each of which would lead to a course of action that is precluded for the Court.  The question asked could first be interpreted as a request for the Court to find that the construction of the wall is illegal, and then to give its opinion on the legal consequences of that illegality.  In this case, it has been contended, the Court should decline to respond to the question asked for a variety of reasons, some of which pertain to jurisdiction and others rather to the issue of propriety.  As regards jurisdiction, it is said that, if the General Assembly had wished to obtain the view of the Court on the highly complex and sensitive question of the legality of the construction of the wall, it should have expressly sought an opinion to that effect (cf. Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion, 1925, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 10, p. 17).  A second possible interpretation of the request, it is said, is that the Court should assume that the construction of the wall is illegal, and then give its opinion on the legal consequences of that assumed illegality.  It has been contended that the Court should also decline to respond to the question on this hypothesis, since the request would then be based on a questionable assumption and since, in any event, it would be impossible to rule on the legal consequences of illegality without specifying the nature of that illegality.

          Secondly, it has been contended that the question asked of the Court is not of a “legal” character because of its imprecision and abstract nature.  In particular, it has been argued in this regard that the question fails to specify whether the Court is being asked to address legal consequences for “the General Assembly or some other organ of the United Nations”, “Member States of the United Nations”, “Israel”, “Palestine” or “some combination of the above, or some different entity”.

          37. As regards the alleged lack of clarity of the terms of the General Assembly's request and its effect on the “legal nature” of the question referred to the Court, the Court observes that this question is directed to the legal consequences arising from a given factual situation considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 (hereinafter the “Fourth Geneva Convention”) and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.  The question submitted by the General Assembly has thus, to use the Court's phrase in its Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, “been framed in terms of law and raise[s] problems of international law”;  it is by its very nature susceptible of a reply based on law;  indeed it is scarcely susceptible of a reply otherwise than on the basis of law.  In the view of the Court, it is indeed a question of a legal character (see Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 18, para. 15).

          38. The Court would point out that lack of clarity in the drafting of a question does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction.  Rather, such uncertainty will require clarification in interpretation, and such necessary clarifications of interpretation have frequently been given by the Court.

          In the past, both the Permanent Court and the present Court have observed in some cases that the wording of a request for an advisory opinion did not accurately state the question on which the Court's opinion was being sought (Interpretation of the Greco‑Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926 (Final Protocol, Article IV), Advisory Opinion, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 16 (I), pp. 14‑16), or did not correspond to the “true legal question” under consideration (Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, pp. 87‑89, paras. 34‑36).  The Court noted in one case that “the question put to the Court is, on the face of it, at once infelicitously expressed and vague” (Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 348, para. 46).

          Consequently, the Court has often been required to broaden, interpret and even reformulate the questions put (see the three Opinions cited above;  see also Jaworzina, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 8Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 25;  Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 157‑162).

          In the present instance, the Court will only have to do what it has often done in the past, namely “identify the existing principles and rules, interpret them and apply them . . ., thus offering a reply to the question posed based on law” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 234, para. 13).

          39. In the present instance, if the General Assembly requests the Court to state the “legal consequences” arising from the construction of the wall, the use of these terms necessarily encompasses an assessment of whether that construction is or is not in breach of certain rules and principles of international law.  Thus, the Court is first called upon to determine whether such rules and principles have been and are still being breached by the construction of the wall along the planned route.

          40. The Court does not consider that what is contended to be the abstract nature of the question posed to it raises an issue of jurisdiction.  Even when the matter was raised as an issue of propriety rather than one of jurisdiction, in the case concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court took the position that to contend that it should not deal with a question couched in abstract terms is “a mere affirmation devoid of any justification” and that “the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 236, para. 15,  referring to Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948, I.C.J. Reports 1947‑1948, p. 61;  Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 51;  and Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 27, para. 40).  In any event, the Court considers that the question posed to it in relation to the legal consequences of the construction of the wall is not an abstract one, and moreover that it would be for the Court to determine for whom any such consequences arise.

          41. Furthermore, the Court cannot accept the view, which has also been advanced in the present proceedings, that it has no jurisdiction because of the “political” character of the question posed.  As is clear from its long‑standing jurisprudence on this point, the Court considers that the fact that a legal question also has political aspects,

“as, in the nature of things, is the case with so many questions which arise in international life, does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a ‘legal question' and to ‘deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by its Statute'(Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J, Reports 1973, p. 172, para. 14).  Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to admit the legal character of a question which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial task, namely, an assessment of the legality of the possible conduct of States with regard to the obligations imposed upon them by international law (cf. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948, I.C.J. Reports 1947‑1948, pp. 61‑62;  Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, pp. 6‑7;  Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 155).”  (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 234, para. 13.)

In its Opinion concerning the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, the Court indeed emphasized that, “in situations in which political considerations are prominent it may be particularly necessary for an international organization to obtain an advisory opinion from the Court as to the legal principles applicable with respect to the matter under debate . . .” (I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 87, para. 33).  Moreover, the Court has affirmed in its Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that “the political nature of the motives which may be said to have inspired the request and the political implications that the opinion given might have are of no relevance in the establishment of its jurisdiction to give such an opinion” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 234, para. 13).  The Court is of the view that there is no element in the present proceedings which could lead it to conclude otherwise.

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          42. The Court accordingly has jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion requested by resolution ES‑10/14 of the General Assembly.

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          43. It has been contended in the present proceedings, however, that the Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction because of the presence of specific aspects of the General Assembly's request that would render the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction improper and inconsistent with the Court's judicial function.

          44. The Court has recalled many times in the past that Article 65, paragraph 1, of its Statute, which provides that “The Court may give an advisory opinion . . .” (emphasis added), should be interpreted to mean that the Court has a discretionary power to decline to give an advisory opinion even if the conditions of jurisdiction are met (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 234, para. 14).  The Court however is mindful of the fact that its answer to a request for an advisory opinion “represents its participation in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused” (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 71;  see also, for example, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), pp. 78‑79, para. 29.)  Given its responsibilities as the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations” (Article 92 of the Charter), the Court should in principle not decline to give an advisory opinion.  In accordance with its consistent jurisprudence, only “compelling reasons” should lead the Court to refuse its opinion
 

(Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 155;  see also, for example, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), pp. 78‑79, para. 29.)

          The present Court has never, in the exercise of this discretionary power, declined to respond to a request for an advisory opinion.  Its decision not to give the advisory opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict requested by the World Health Organization was based on the Court's lack of jurisdiction, and not on considerations of judicial propriety (see I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 235, para. 14).  Only on one occasion did the Court's predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, take the view that it should not reply to a question put to it (Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5), but this was due to

“the very particular circumstances of the case, among which were that the question directly concerned an already existing dispute, one of the States parties to which was neither a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court nor a Member of the League of Nations, objected to the proceedings, and refused to take part in any way” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), pp. 235‑236, para. 14).

          45. These considerations do not release the Court from the duty to satisfy itself, each time it is seised of a request for an opinion, as to the propriety of the exercise of its judicial function, by reference to the criterion of “compelling reasons” as cited above.  The Court will accordingly examine in detail and in the light of its jurisprudence each of the arguments presented to it in this regard.

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          46. The first such argument is to the effect that the Court should not exercise its jurisdiction in the present case because the request concerns a contentious matter between Israel and Palestine, in respect of which Israel has not consented to the exercise of that jurisdiction.  According to this view, the subject‑matter of the question posed by the General Assembly “is an integral part of the wider Israeli‑Palestinian dispute concerning questions of terrorism, security, borders, settlements, Jerusalem and other related matters”.  Israel has emphasized that it has never consented to the settlement of this wider dispute by the Court or by any other means of compulsory adjudication; on the contrary, it contends that the parties repeatedly agreed that these issues are to be settled by negotiation, with the possibility of an agreement that recourse could be had to arbitration.  It is accordingly contended that the Court should decline to give the present Opinion, on the basis inter alia of the precedent of the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice on the Status of Eastern Carelia.

          47. The Court observes that the lack of consent to the Court's contentious jurisdiction by interested States has no bearing on the Court's jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion.  In an Advisory Opinion of 1950, the Court explained that:

          “The consent of States, parties to a dispute, is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases.  The situation is different in regard to advisory proceedings even where the Request for an Opinion relates to a legal question actually pending between States.  The Court's reply is only of an advisory character:  as such, it has no binding force.  It follows that no State, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an Advisory Opinion which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should take.  The Court's Opinion is given not to the States, but to the organ which is entitled to request it;  the reply of the Court, itself an ‘organ of the United Nations', represents its participation in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused.”  (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 71;  see also Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 24, para. 31.)

It followed from this that, in those proceedings, the Court did not refuse to respond to the request for an advisory opinion on the ground that, in the particular circumstances, it lacked jurisdiction.  The Court did however examine the opposition of certain interested States to the request by the General Assembly in the context of issues of judicial propriety.  Commenting on its 1950 decision, the Court explained in its Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara that it had “Thus . . . recognized that lack of consent might constitute a ground for declining to give the opinion requested if, in the circumstances of a given case, considerations of judicial propriety should oblige the Court to refuse an opinion.”  The Court continued:

          “In certain circumstances . . . the lack of consent of an interested State may render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with the Court's judicial character.  An instance of this would be when the circumstances disclose that to give a reply would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent.”  (Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 25, paras. 32‑33.)

In applying that principle to the request concerning Western Sahara, the Court found that a legal controversy did indeed exist, but one which had arisen during the proceedings of the General Assembly and in relation to matters with which the Assembly was dealing.  It had not arisen independently in bilateral relations (ibid., p. 25, para. 34).

          48. As regards the request for an advisory opinion now before it, the Court acknowledges that Israel and Palestine have expressed radically divergent views on the legal consequences of Israel's construction of the wall, on which the Court has been asked to pronounce.  However, as the Court has itself noted, “Differences of views . . . on legal issues have existed in practically every advisory proceeding” (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 24, para. 34).

          49. Furthermore, the Court does not consider that the subject‑matter of the General Assembly's request can be regarded as only a bilateral matter between Israel and Palestine.  Given the powers and responsibilities of the United Nations in questions relating to international peace and security, it is the Court's view that the construction of the wall must be deemed to be directly of concern to the United Nations.  The responsibility of the United Nations in this matter also has its origin in the Mandate and the Partition Resolution concerning Palestine (see paragraphs 70 and 71 below).  This responsibility has been described by the General Assembly as “a permanent responsibility towards the question of Palestine until the question is resolved in all its aspects in a satisfactory manner in accordance with international legitimacy” (General Assembly resolution 57/107 of 3 December 2002).  Within the institutional framework of the Organization, this responsibility has been manifested by the adoption of many Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and by the creation of several subsidiary bodies specifically established to assist in the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. 

          50. The object of the request before the Court is to obtain from the Court an opinion which the General Assembly deems of assistance to it for the proper exercise of its functions.  The opinion is requested on a question which is of particularly acute concern to the United Nations, and one which is located in a much broader frame of reference than a bilateral dispute.  In the circumstances, the Court does not consider that to give an opinion would have the effect of circumventing the principle of consent to judicial settlement, and the Court accordingly cannot, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to give an opinion on that ground.

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          51. The Court now turns to another argument raised in the present proceedings in support of the view that it should decline to exercise its jurisdiction.  Some participants have argued that an advisory opinion from the Court on the legality of the wall and the legal consequences of its construction could impede a political, negotiated solution to the Israeli‑Palestinian conflict.  More particularly, it has been contended that such an opinion could undermine the scheme of the “Roadmap” (see paragraph 22 above), which requires Israel and Palestine to comply with certain obligations in various phases referred to therein.  The requested opinion, it has been alleged, could complicate the negotiations envisaged in the “Roadmap”, and the Court should therefore exercise its discretion and decline to reply to the question put.

          This is a submission of a kind which the Court has already had to consider several times in the past.  For instance, in its Advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court stated:

          “It has . . . been submitted that a reply from the Court in this case might adversely affect disarmament negotiations and would, therefore, be contrary to the interest of the United Nations.  The Court is aware that, no matter what might be its conclusions in any opinion it might give, they would have relevance for the continuing debate on the matter in the General Assembly and would present an additional element in the negotiations on the matter.  Beyond that, the effect of the opinion is a matter of appreciation.  The Court has heard contrary positions advanced and there are no evident criteria by which it can prefer one assessment to another.”  (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 237, para. 17;  see also Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 37, para. 73.)

          52. One participant in the present proceedings has indicated that the Court, if it were to give a response to the request, should in any event do so keeping in mind

“two key aspects of the peace process:  the fundamental principle that permanent status issues must be resolved through negotiations;  and the need during the interim period for the parties to fulfill their security responsibilities so that the peace process can succeed”.

          53. The Court is conscious that the “Roadmap”, which was endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1515 (2003) (see paragraph 22 above), constitutes a negotiating framework for the resolution of the Israeli‑Palestinian conflict.  It is not clear, however, what influence the Court's opinion might have on those negotiations:  participants in the present proceedings have expressed differing views in this regard.  The Court cannot regard this factor as a compelling reason to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.

          54. It was also put to the Court by certain participants that the question of the construction of the wall was only one aspect of the Israeli‑Palestinian conflict, which could not be properly addressed in the present proceedings.  The Court does not however consider this a reason for it to decline to reply to the question asked.  The Court is indeed aware that the question of the wall is part of a greater whole, and it would take this circumstance carefully into account in any opinion it might give.  At the same time, the question that the General Assembly has chosen to ask of the Court is confined to the legal consequences of the construction of the wall, and the Court would only examine other issues to the extent that they might be necessary to its consideration of the question put to it.

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          55. Several participants in the proceedings have raised the further argument that the Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction because it does not have at its disposal the requisite facts and evidence to enable it to reach its conclusions.  In particular, Israel has contended, referring to the Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, that the Court could not give an opinion on issues which raise questions of fact that cannot be elucidated without hearing all parties to the conflict.  According to Israel, if the Court decided to give the requested opinion, it would be forced to speculate about essential facts and make assumptions about arguments of law.  More specifically, Israel has argued that the Court could not rule on the legal consequences of the construction of the wall without enquiring, first, into the nature and scope of the security threat to which the wall is intended to respond and the effectiveness of that response, and, second, into the impact of the construction for the Palestinians.  This task, which would already be difficult in a contentious case, would be further complicated in an advisory proceeding, particularly since Israel alone possesses much of the necessary information and has stated that it chooses not to address the merits.  Israel has concluded that the Court, confronted with factual issues impossible to clarify in the present proceedings, should use its discretion and decline to comply with the request for an advisory opinion.

          56. The Court observes that the question whether the evidence available to it is sufficient to give an advisory opinion must be decided in each particular instance.  In its Opinion concerning the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 72) and again in its Opinion on the Western Sahara, the Court made it clear that what is decisive in these circumstances is “whether the Court has before it sufficient information and evidence to enable it to arrive at a judicial conclusion upon any disputed questions of fact the determination of which is necessary for it to give an opinion in conditions compatible with its judicial character” (Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975, pp. 28‑29, para. 46).  Thus, for instance, in the proceedings concerning the Status of Eastern Carelia, the Permanent Court of International Justice decided to decline to give an Opinion inter alia because the question put “raised a question of fact which could not be elucidated without hearing both parties” (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 72;  see Status of Eastern Carelia, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5, p. 28).  On the other hand, in the Western Sahara Opinion, the Court observed that it had been provided with very extensive documentary evidence of the relevant facts (I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 29, para. 47).

          57. In the present instance, the Court has at its disposal the report of the Secretary‑General, as well as a voluminous dossier submitted by him to the Court, comprising not only detailed information on the route of the wall but also on its humanitarian and socio‑economic impact on the Palestinian population.  The dossier includes several reports based on on‑site visits by special rapporteurs and competent organs of the United Nations.  The Secretary-General has further submitted to the Court a written statement updating his report, which supplemented the information contained therein.  Moreover, numerous other participants have submitted to the Court written statements which contain information relevant to a response to the question put by the General Assembly.  The Court notes in particular that Israel's Written Statement, although limited to issues of jurisdiction and judicial propriety, contained observations on other matters, including Israel's concerns in terms of security, and was accompanied by corresponding annexes;  many other documents issued by the Israeli Government on those matters are in the public domain.

          58. The Court finds that it has before it sufficient information and evidence to enable it to give the advisory opinion requested by the General Assembly.  Moreover, the circumstance that others may evaluate and interpret these facts in a subjective or political manner can be no argument for a court of law to abdicate its judicial task.  There is therefore in the present case no lack of information such as to constitute a compelling reason for the Court to decline to give the requested opinion.

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          59. In their written statements, some participants have also put forward the argument that the Court should decline to give the requested opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of the wall because such opinion would lack any useful purpose.  They have argued that the advisory opinions of the Court are to be seen as a means to enable an organ or agency in need of legal clarification for its future action to obtain that clarification.  In the present instance, the argument continues, the General Assembly would not need an opinion of the Court because it has already declared the construction of the wall to be illegal and has already determined the legal consequences by demanding that Israel stop and reverse its construction, and further, because the General Assembly has never made it clear how it intended to use the opinion.

          60. As is clear from the Court's jurisprudence, advisory opinions have the purpose of furnishing to the requesting organs the elements of law necessary for them in their action.  In its Opinion concerning Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Court observed:  “The object of this request for an Opinion is to guide the United Nations in respect of its own action.”  (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 19.)  Likewise, in its Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), the Court noted:  “The request is put forward by a United Nations organ with reference to its own decisions and it seeks legal advice from the Court on the consequences and implications of these decisions.”  (I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 24, para. 32.)  The Court found on another occasion that the advisory opinion it was to give would “furnish the General Assembly with elements of a legal character relevant to its further treatment of the decolonization of Western Sahara” (Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 37, para. 72).

          61. With regard to the argument that the General Assembly has not made it clear what use it would make of an advisory opinion on the wall, the Court would recall, as equally relevant in the present proceedings, what it stated in its Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons:

          “Certain States have observed that the General Assembly has not explained to the Court for what precise purposes it seeks the advisory opinion.  Nevertheless, it is not for the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an advisory opinion is needed by the Assembly for the performance of its functions.  The General Assembly has the right to decide for itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs.”  (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 237, para. 16.)

          62. It follows that the Court cannot decline to answer the question posed based on the ground that its opinion would lack any useful purpose.  The Court cannot substitute its assessment of the usefulness of the opinion requested for that of the organ that seeks such opinion, namely the General Assembly.  Furthermore, and in any event, the Court considers that the General Assembly has not yet determined all the possible consequences of its own resolution.  The Court's task would be to determine in a comprehensive manner the legal consequences of the construction of the wall, while the General Assembly  - and the Security Council  - may then draw conclusions from the Court's findings.

*

          63. Lastly, the Court will turn to another argument advanced with regard to the propriety of its giving an advisory opinion in the present proceedings.  Israel has contended that Palestine, given its responsibility for acts of violence against Israel and its population which the wall is aimed at addressing, cannot seek from the Court a remedy for a situation resulting from its own wrongdoing.  In this context, Israel has invoked the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de sua injuria propria, [No one can take advantage of his own wrongdoing]  which it considers to be as relevant in advisory proceedings as it is in contentious cases.  Therefore, Israel concludes, good faith and the principle of “clean hands” provide a compelling reason that should lead the Court to refuse the General Assembly's request.

          64. The Court does not consider  this argument to be pertinent.  As was emphasized earlier, it was the General Assembly which requested the advisory opinion, and the opinion is to be given to the General Assembly, and not to a specific State or entity.

*        *

          65. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes not only that it has jurisdiction to give an opinion on the question put to it by the General Assembly (see paragraph 42 above), but also that there is no compelling reason for it to use its discretionary power not to give that opinion. 

*

*         *

          66. The Court will now address the question put to it by the General Assembly in resolution ES‑10/14.  The Court recalls that the question is as follows:

          “What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary‑General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?”

          67. As explained in paragraph 82 below, the “wall” in question is a complex construction, so that that term cannot be understood in a limited physical sense.  However, the other terms used, either by Israel (“fence”) or by the Secretary‑General (“barrier”), are no more accurate if understood in the physical sense.  In this Opinion, the Court has therefore chosen to use the terminology employed by the General Assembly.

          The Court notes furthermore that the request of the General Assembly concerns the legal consequences of the wall being built “in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem”.  As also explained below (see paragraphs 79‑84 below), some parts of the complex are being built, or are planned to be built, on the territory of Israel itself;  the Court does not consider that it is called upon to examine the legal consequences arising from the construction of those parts of the wall.

          68. The question put by the General Assembly concerns the legal consequences of the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.  However, in order to indicate those consequences to the General Assembly the Court must first determine whether or not the construction of that wall breaches international law (see paragraph 39 above).  It will therefore make this determination before dealing with the consequences of the construction.

          69. To do so, the Court will first make a brief analysis of the status of the territory concerned, and will then describe the works already constructed or in course of construction in that territory.  It will then indicate the applicable law before seeking to establish whether that law has been breached.

*        *

          70. Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire.  At the end of the First World War, a class “A” Mandate for Palestine was entrusted to Great Britain by the League of Nations, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant, which provided that:

          “Certain communities, formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.”

          The Court recalls that in its Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West Africa, speaking of mandates in general, it observed that “The Mandate was created, in the interest of the inhabitants of the territory, and of humanity in general, as an international institution with an international object  - a sacred trust of civilization.”  (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 132.)  The Court also held in this regard that “two principles were considered to be of paramount importance:  the principle of non‑annexation and the principle that the well‑being and development of . . . peoples [not yet able to govern themselves] form[ed] ‘a sacred trust of civilization'” (ibid., p. 131). 

          The territorial boundaries of the Mandate for Palestine were laid down by various instruments, in particular on the eastern border by a British memorandum of 16 September 1922 and an Anglo‑Transjordanian Treaty of 20 February 1928.

          71. In 1947 the United Kingdom announced its intention to complete evacuation of the mandated territory by 1 August 1948, subsequently advancing that date to 15 May 1948.  In the meantime, the General Assembly had on 29 November 1947 adopted resolution 181 (II) on the future government of Palestine, which “Recommends to the United Kingdom . . . and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation . . . of the Plan of Partition” of the territory, as set forth in the resolution, between two independent States, one Arab, the other Jewish, as well as the creation of a special international régime for the City of Jerusalem.  The Arab population of Palestine and the Arab States rejected this plan, contending that it was unbalanced;  on 14 May 1948, Israel proclaimed its independence on the strength of the General Assembly resolution;  armed conflict then broke out between Israel and a number of Arab States and the Plan of Partition was not implemented.

          72. By resolution 62 (1948) of 16 November 1948, the Security Council decided that “an armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine” and called upon the parties directly involved in the conflict to seek agreement to this end.  In conformity with this decision, general armistice agreements were concluded in 1949 between Israel and the neighbouring States through mediation by the United Nations.  In particular, one such agreement was signed in Rhodes on 3 April 1949 between Israel and Jordan.  Articles V and VI of that Agreement fixed the armistice demarcation line between Israeli and Arab forces (often later called the “Green Line” owing to the colour used for it on maps; hereinafter the “Green Line”).  Article III, paragraph 2, provided that “No element of the . . . military or para‑military forces of either Party . . . shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Lines . . .”  It was agreed in Article VI, paragraph 8, that these provisions would not be “interpreted as prejudicing, in any sense, an ultimate political settlement between the Parties”.  It was also stated that “the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI of [the] Agreement [were] agreed upon by the Parties without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto”.  The Demarcation Line was subject to such rectification as might be agreed upon by the parties.

          73. In the 1967 armed conflict, Israeli forces occupied all the territories which had constituted Palestine under British Mandate (including those known as the West Bank, lying to the east of the Green Line).

          74. On 22 November 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967), which emphasized the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war and called for the “Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”, and “Termination of all claims or states of belligerency”.

          75. From 1967 onwards, Israel took a number of measures in these territories aimed at changing the status of the City of Jerusalem.  The Security Council, after recalling on a number of occasions “the principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible”, condemned those measures and, by resolution 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, confirmed in the clearest possible terms that:

“all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section, are totally invalid and cannot change that status”.

          Later, following the adoption by Israel on 30 July 1980 of the Basic Law making Jerusalem the “complete and united” capital of Israel, the Security Council, by resolution 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980, stated that the enactment of that Law constituted a violation of international law and that “all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem . . . are null and void”.  It further decided “not to recognize the ‘basic law' and such other actions by Israel that, as a result of this law, seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem”.

          76. Subsequently, a peace treaty was signed on 26 October 1994 between Israel and Jordan.  That treaty fixed the boundary between the two States “with reference to the boundary definition under the Mandate as is shown in Annex I (a) . . . without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967” (Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2).  Annex I provided the corresponding maps and added that, with regard to the “territory that came under Israeli military government control in 1967”, the line indicated “is the administrative boundary” with Jordan.

          77. Lastly, a number of agreements have been signed since 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization imposing various obligations on each party.  Those agreements inter alia required Israel to transfer to Palestinian authorities certain powers and responsibilities exercised in the Occupied Palestinian Territory by its military authorities and civil administration.  Such transfers have taken place, but, as a result of subsequent events, they remained partial and limited. 

          78. The Court would observe that, under customary international law as reflected (see paragraph 89 below) in Article 42 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 (hereinafter “the Hague Regulations of 1907”), territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, and the occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.

          The territories situated between the Green Line (see paragraph 72 above) and the former eastern boundary of Palestine under the Mandate were occupied by Israel in 1967 during the armed conflict between Israel and Jordan.  Under customary international law, these were therefore occupied territories in which Israel had the status of occupying Power.  Subsequent events in these territories, as described in paragraphs 75 to 77 above, have done nothing to alter this situation.  All these territories (including East Jerusalem) remain occupied territories and Israel has continued to have the status of occupying Power. 

*

          79. It is essentially in these territories that Israel has constructed or plans to construct the works described in the report of the Secretary‑General.  The Court will now describe those works, basing itself on that report.  For developments subsequent to the publication of that report, the Court will refer to complementary information contained in the Written Statement of the United Nations, which was intended by the Secretary‑General to supplement his report (hereinafter “Written Statement of the Secretary‑General”).

          80. The report of the Secretary‑General states that “The Government of Israel has since 1996 considered plans to halt infiltration into Israel from the central and northern West Bank . . .”  (Para. 4.)  According to that report, a plan of this type was approved for the first time by the Israeli Cabinet in July 2001.  Then, on 14 April 2002, the Cabinet adopted a decision for the construction of works, forming what Israel describes as a “security fence”, 80 kilometres in length, in three areas of the West Bank.

          The project was taken a stage further when, on 23 June 2002, the Israeli Cabinet approved the first phase of the construction of a “continuous fence” in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem).  On 14 August 2002, it adopted the line of that “fence” for the work in Phase A, with a view to the construction of a complex 123 kilometres long in the northern West Bank, running  from the Salem checkpoint (north of Jenin) to the settlement at Elkana.  Phase B of the work was approved in December 2002.  It entailed a stretch of some 40 kilometres running east from the Salem checkpoint towards Beth Shean along the northern part of the Green Line as far as the Jordan Valley.  Furthermore, on 1 October 2003, the Israeli Cabinet approved a full route, which, according to the report of the Secretary‑General, “will form one continuous line stretching 720 kilometres along the West Bank”.  A map showing completed and planned sections was posted on the Israeli Ministry of Defence website on 23 October 2003.  According to the particulars provided on that map, a continuous section (Phase C) encompassing a number of large settlements will link the north‑western end of the “security fence” built around Jerusalem with the southern point of Phase A construction at Elkana.  According to the same map, the “security fence” will run for 115 kilometres from the Har Gilo settlement near Jerusalem to the Carmel settlement south‑east of Hebron (Phase D).  According to Ministry of Defence documents, work in this sector is due for completion in 2005.  Lastly, there are references in the case file to Israel's planned construction of a “security fence” following the Jordan Valley along the mountain range to the west.

          81. According to the Written Statement of the Secretary‑General, the first part of these works (Phase A), which ultimately extends for a distance of 150 kilometres, was declared completed on 31 July 2003.  It is reported that approximately 56,000 Palestinians would be encompassed in enclaves.  During this phase, two sections totalling 19.5 kilometres were built around Jerusalem.  In November 2003 construction of a new section was begun along the Green Line to the west of the Nazlat Issa‑Baqa al‑Sharqiya enclave, which in January 2004 was close to completion at the time when the Secretary‑General submitted his Written Statement.

          According to the Written Statement of the Secretary‑General, the works carried out under Phase B were still in progress in January 2004.  Thus an initial section of this stretch, which runs near or on the Green Line to the village of al‑Mutilla, was almost complete in January 2004.  Two additional sections diverge at this point.  Construction started in early January 2004 on one section that runs due east as far as the Jordanian border.  Construction of the second section, which is planned to run from the Green Line to the village of Taysir, has barely begun.  The United Nations has, however, been informed that this second section might not be built.

          The Written Statement of the Secretary‑General further states that Phase C of the work, which runs from the terminus of Phase A, near the Elkana settlement, to the village of Nu'man, south‑east of Jerusalem, began in December 2003.  This section is divided into three stages.  In Stage C1, between inter alia the villages of Rantis and Budrus, approximately 4 kilometres out of a planned total of 40 kilometres have been constructed.  Stage C2, which will surround the so‑called “Ariel Salient” by cutting 22 kilometres into the West Bank, will incorporate 52,000 Israeli settlers.  Stage C3 is to involve the construction of two “depth barriers”;  one of these is to run north‑south, roughly parallel with the section of Stage C1 currently under construction between Rantis and Budrus, whilst the other runs east‑west along a ridge said to be part of the route of Highway 45, a motorway under construction.  If construction of the two barriers were completed, two enclaves would be formed, encompassing 72,000 Palestinians in 24 communities.

          Further construction also started in late November 2003 along the south‑eastern part of the municipal boundary of Jerusalem, following a route that, according to the Written Statement of the Secretary‑General, cuts off the suburban village of El‑Ezariya from Jerusalem and splits the neighbouring Abu Dis in two.

          As at 25 January 2004, according to the Written Statement of the Secretary‑General, some 190 kilometres of construction had been completed, covering Phase A and the greater part of Phase B.  Further construction in Phase C had begun in certain areas of the central West Bank and in Jerusalem.  Phase D, planned for the southern part of the West Bank, had not yet begun.

          The Israeli Government has explained that the routes and timetable as described above are subject to modification.  In February 2004, for example, an 8‑kilometre section near the town of Baqa al‑Sharqiya was demolished, and the planned length of the wall appears to have been slightly reduced. 

          82. According to the description in the report and the Written Statement of the Secretary‑General, the works planned or completed have resulted or will result in a complex consisting essentially of:

(1) a fence with electronic sensors;

(2) a ditch (up to 4 metres deep);

(3) a two‑lane asphalt patrol road;

(4) a trace road (a strip of sand smoothed to detect footprints) running parallel to the fence;

(5) a stack of six coils of barbed wire marking the perimeter of the complex.

          The complex has a width of 50 to 70 metres, increasing to as much as 100 metres in some places.  “Depth barriers” may be added to these works.

          The approximately 180 kilometres of the complex completed or under construction as of the time when the Secretary‑General submitted his report included some 8.5 kilometres of concrete wall.  These are generally found where Palestinian population centres are close to or abut Israel (such as near Qalqiliya and Tulkarm or in parts of Jerusalem).

          83. According to the report of the Secretary‑General, in its northernmost part, the wall as completed or under construction barely deviates from the Green Line.  It nevertheless lies within occupied territories for most of its course.  The works deviate more than 7.5 kilometres from the Green Line in certain places to encompass settlements, while encircling Palestinian population areas.  A stretch of 1 to 2 kilometres west of Tulkarm appears to run on the Israeli side of the Green Line.  Elsewhere, on the other hand, the planned route would deviate eastward by up to 22 kilometres.  In the case of Jerusalem, the existing works and the planned route lie well beyond the Green Line and even in some cases beyond the eastern municipal boundary of Jerusalem as fixed by Israel.

          84. On the basis of that route, approximately 975 square kilometres (or 16.6 per cent of the West Bank) would, according to the report of the Secretary‑General, lie between the Green Line and the wall.  This area is stated to be home to 237,000 Palestinians.  If the full wall were completed as planned, another 160,000 Palestinians would live in almost completely encircled communities, described as enclaves in the report.  As a result of the planned route, nearly 320,000 Israeli settlers (of whom 178,000 in East Jerusalem) would be living in the area between the Green Line and the wall.

          85. Lastly, it should be noted that the construction of the wall has been accompanied by the creation of a new administrative régime.  Thus in October 2003 the Israeli Defence Forces issued Orders establishing the part of the West Bank lying between the Green Line and the wall as a “Closed Area”.  Residents of this area may no longer remain in it, nor may non‑residents enter it, unless holding a permit or identity card issued by the Israeli authorities.  According to the report of the Secretary‑General, most residents have received permits for a limited period.  Israeli citizens, Israeli permanent residents and those eligible to immigrate to Israel in accordance with the Law of Return may remain in, or move freely to, from and within the Closed Area without a permit.  Access to and exit from the Closed Area can only be made through access gates, which are opened infrequently and for short periods.

*        *

          86. The Court will now determine the rules and principles of international law which are relevant in assessing the legality of the measures taken by Israel.  Such rules and principles can be found in the United Nations Charter and certain other treaties, in customary international law and in the relevant resolutions adopted pursuant to the Charter by the General Assembly and the Security Council.  However, doubts have been expressed by Israel as to the applicability in the Occupied Palestinian Territory of certain rules of international humanitarian law and human rights instruments.  The Court will now consider these various questions.

          87. The Court first recalls that, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter:

          “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

On 24 October 1970, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2625 (XXV), entitled “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co‑operation among States” (hereinafter “resolution 2625 (XXV)”), in which it emphasized that “No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.”  As the Court stated in its Judgment in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), the principles as to the use of force incorporated in the Charter reflect customary international law (see I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 98‑101, paras. 187‑190);  the same is true of its corollary entailing the illegality of territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force.

          88. The Court also notes that the principle of self‑determination of peoples has been enshrined in the United Nations Charter and reaffirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 2625 (XXV) cited above, pursuant to which “Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to [in that resolution] . . . of their right to self‑determination.”  Article 1 common to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reaffirms the right of all peoples to self‑determination, and lays upon the States parties the obligation to promote the realization of that right and to respect it, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

          The Court would recall that in 1971 it emphasized that current developments in “international law in regard to non‑self‑governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self‑determination applicable to all [such territories]”.  The Court went on to state that “These developments leave little doubt that the ultimate objective of the sacred trust” referred to in Article 22, paragraph 1, of the Covenant of the League of Nations “was the self‑determination . . . of the peoples concerned” (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 31, paras. 52‑53).  The Court has referred to this principle on a number of occasions in its jurisprudence (ibid.;  see also Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 68, para. 162).  The Court indeed made it clear that the right of peoples to self‑determination is today a right erga omnes (see East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29).

          89. As regards international humanitarian law, the Court would first note that Israel is not a party to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, to which the Hague Regulations are annexed.  The Court observes that, in the words of the Convention, those Regulations were prepared “to revise the general laws and customs of war” existing at that time.  Since then, however, the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg has found that the “rules laid down in the Convention were recognised by all civilised nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war” (Judgment of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, 30 September and 1 October 1946, p. 65).  The Court itself reached the same conclusion when examining the rights and duties of belligerents in their conduct of military operations (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 256, para. 75).  The Court considers that the provisions of the Hague Regulations have become part of customary law, as is in fact recognized by all the participants in the proceedings before the Court.

          The Court also observes that, pursuant to Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, that Convention is supplementary to Sections II and III of the Hague Regulations.  Section III of those Regulations, which concerns “Military authority over the territory of the hostile State”, is particularly pertinent in the present case.

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International Court of Justice (ICJ) Ruling on the Israeli Security Barrier ("Wall")

International Court of Justice (ICJ) Ruling on the Israeli Security Barrier ("Wall") II

International Court of Justice (ICJ) Ruling on the Israeli Security Barrier ("Wall") III

International Court of Justice (ICJ) Ruling on the Israeli Security Barrier ("Wall") IV

 

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