|

|
|
The British Record on Partition
April,
1948 |
Introduction
In the spring of 1948, as the fate of Palestine was being decided on the
roads and hills, and the question of Palestine was debated in the United
Nations, The Nation magazine prepared an extensive report concerning the role of
the British in the events following the Palestine partition resolution, which
was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly together with very detailed
documentary proof, consisting of secret British correspondence and records.
The report documented unequivocally a number of facts concerning the period
of the
Israel War of Independence
that have since been obscured by historical "revisionists," many of which were
common knowledge at the time:
Arab irregular forces entered Palestine with the active connivance of
the British, and not just by inadvertence.
Arab irregular forces included a number of former Nazis. Those this
number may have been exaggerated by hearsay, at least four of them were handed
over to the Haganah in Haifa.
The Grand Mufti, Hajj Amin al Husseini, evidently prevented Haifa from being
declared an open city, and therefore he was responsible for the subsequent
destruction of the Arab community, which fled despite Jewish and British please
to remain.
The British disbursed a huge sum to the Higher Muslim Council, which led the
violence against the Jews, leaving the Palestine treasury bankrupt.
The British handed out public lands to Arabs.
The British took most the land registry records with them to England, so that
it would be impossible to determine the true status of land ownership.
The report also asserts that the Arab League had been formed with the
encouragement of the British and included a British representative at its
meetings. The sole purpose of the League, according to the Nation report, was to
prevent the formation of a Jewish state:
The Arab revolt was openly projected in the fall
of 1947 at the very time when the United Nations were meeting in the regular
Assembly session and discussing the Palestine issue. The decision to launch the
revolt was made at a meeting of the Council of the Arab League in Sofar,
Lebanon.
This meeting was attended not only by the heads
of the Arab governments constituting the League, the Mufti and Fawzi
Kawukji, later of the
Arab liberation army in Palestine, but by Brigadier P. A. Clayton, the British
representative in Egypt, and a number of his associates from Cairo and
Jerusalem. It was at this meeting that the formation of a so-called volunteer
force for the liberation of Palestine was decided upon, as against the use of
regular troops of the Arab governments. The decision to substitute so-called
volunteer forces for the regular armies was adopted under the influence of
Brigadier Clayton and his associates.
The Arab
League was in fact first projected in 1943 by Brigadier Clayton who was able to
convince Anthony Eden, then Foreign Minister of England, of its usefulness. The
League was formed in 1945 and Brigadier Clayton continues to be the only
non-Moslem who regularly attends the meetings of the Arab League.
The
participation of British representatives in Arab League meetings was confirmed
by Richard H. S. Crossman, British MP in the House of Commons on December 11,
1947. He said:
"British
diplomacy has, alas concentrated Arab attention to the Zionist issue. At
meetings of the Arab League British representatives have been in attendance
regularly even when the most violent anti-Jewish actions were approved. We
are now suffering the consequences of creating the Arab League on the basis
of a single programme of denying a Jewish state to the Jews."
That is perhaps the most damning accusation, since it would place most of the
blame for the Arab-Israeli conflict on the machinations of the British Foreign
office.
The Nation report is not the only source that has made these allegations and
documented proof of British encouragement of Arab extremism in World War I as
well as British connivance with the Arabs to maintain British bases in Palestine
in the 1940s. In "Fabricating Israeli History," Efraim Karsh presented
documentary evidence of British and Jordanian connivance with the aim of getting
a port that would serve the British military in what is now southern Israel. In
"In the Labyrinth," Elie Kedourie presented an even more interesting documentary
picture: it was British diplomacy in World War I that greatly encouraged, if not
invented pan-Arabism and Islamist dreams of empire, complete with a promised
Arab Caliphate.
The aim or excuse for British machinates in the 1940s was to provide a
military base in Palestine. They even enacted a law that would have ensured that
airfields in the former Palestine mandate would remain under British control.
Ami Isseroff
Notice: The source below was put in the public domain by
http://emperors-clothes.com/history/br.htm; it may have
corrected against the original.
Notice - Copyright
This introduction is Copyright 2010
by the author and by Zionism Israel Center. Please tell your friends about
Zionism-Israel.com and link to this page.
Please do not copy this page to your Web site. You may print this page out for classroom use provided that this notice
is appended, and you may cite this material in the usual way. Other uses by permission only. The source material
below is presented for educational purposes only under the fair use doctrine. It
must not be used for commercial purposes without the express permission of The
Nation Magazine.
This document is at
http://zionism-israel.com/hdoc/Nation_Report_British_Partition_1948.htmThe British Record on Partition
as revealed in
British Military Intelligence and other Official Sources
A Memorandum Submitted to the Special Session
of The General Assembly of the United Nations
April 1948
Published by
The Nation Associates
20 Vesey Street
New York 7, N.Y.
Volume 166 New York * Saturday * May 8, 1948 No.
19, Part II
The pages which follow present
in condensed form a memorandum which was submitted by The Nation
Associates to the General Assembly of the United Nations on April 30,[1948] covering the British record in Palestine since November 29, 1947.
Deletions made in this version merely eliminate the less pertinent parts
of certain documents and a section comprising photostat reproductions of
documentary texts.
Additional copies of this supplement may be obtained
from The Nation, 20 Vesey Street, New York 7, N.Y., at the rate of
twenty-five cents apiece.
=====================
Introduction
=====================
***
The General Assembly of the United Nations, for the
third time in twelve months, is meeting to discuss "the future
government of Palestine." Discussions are taking place in an atmosphere
of violence which may touch off an explosion far beyond the boundaries
of the Holy Land.
The question which the General Assembly must face, and
world opinion as well, is this: was an inherent injustice in the
November 29 resolution of the General Assembly responsible for the
current explosion?
The Nation Associates presents the facts in this
memorandum as essential to a wise and just decision. An examination of
the facts will show that the present violence in Palestine results
from:
1) British sabotage of Partition -- This
British sabotage was deliberately undertaken in order to insure British
base rights in Palestine in perpetuity, as well as to safeguard British
oil and trade and military interests in the Middle East.
2) British Alliance with Arab League -- To
achieve these ends, the British have embarked on an alliance with the
Arab League, composed of the governments of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Transjordan, and Yemen. The Arab League, and not the Arab
Higher Committee, controls the military and political developments among
the Arabs of Palestine. Representatives of the British government were
present at the meetings of the Arab League where the revolt was planned
and organized and are in continuous connection with it. Within a month
after the November 29th resolution, the Arabs were encouraged to believe
partition would be substituted by a Federal State, and arms shipments
continued to the Arab States despite their known use for Palestine
warfare. On April 28 [1948] Foreign Minister Bevin was still refusing
to halt them.
The facts will show, moreover, that:
The British have allowed 10,000 foreign invaders to
enter Palestine, offering the feeble excuse that the British armed
forces, consisting, at the outset, of over 80,000 men, could not
adequately protect the border.
Although since December 11, 1947 the British have been
promising to return to Transjordan the contingents of the Arab Legion
brought to Palestine for police duty, they have allowed the members of
that force to remain in Palestine and to attack Jewish communities. The
only conclusion to be drawn is that the Arab Legion constitutes a major
part of the effort to coerce the Jews into accepting less than the
Jewish State granted by the United Nations.
At no time has the British government, in spite of its
alleged impotence, requested any help from the United Nations; in fact,
as the record shows, the British have continued to deprecate the
situation, refused to identify the invaders, and have consistently
denied that the Arab states as such are involved.
Through their action they have admitted into Palestine
Arabs of known Nazi allegiance in command of the invading forces, and
have even admitted escaped Nazi prisoners of war, now to be found in
command of Arab detachments.
From secret British intelligence reports, which are
quoted extensively in this record, it is clear that the British know and
have always known of every single Arab troop movement in Palestine, and
that their relations with the Arabs are such that they could ask Arab
leaders to request the invading forces to remain unobtrusive.
British sabotage has resulted in turning Jerusalem
into an armed camp, has permitted the Arabs to seize the Old City and to
hold as hostages some 2000 Jews.
The British have failed to take any action to insure
that Haifa should remain an open city, even though they were fully aware
of the desire of local Arabs to achieve this and that the Jews wanted
only to be safe from attack.
Their prejudice against the Jews has been clearly
indicated in their refusal to allow the Jews to arm for defense against
Arab attack, and their blowing up of Jewish defense posts; in their
turning over to the Arabs - and to certain death - members of the
Haganah; in their confiscation of Haganah arms; in their treatment of
Jewish defense personnel as criminals. The British have connived at the
starving of the Jewish population of Jerusalem by their failure to keep
the highways open. They have refused armed escorts to the Jews.
Their attitude to the Arab community is quite
different. By British admission, the Arab community has been armed by
the British. Arab train robberies, which have been frequent, have been
met with shooting over the heads of the robbers. Arab desertions from
the police, for the purpose of joining the attackers, accompanied by the
stealing of arms, have never been prevented, and Arab violators of the
peace go unpunished.
To this record can be added the detailed facts
concerning the fashion in which the British have destroyed central
authority, and, under the guise of establishing greater local authority,
turned over in largest part to the Arabs the various services of the
Palestine government created and maintained chiefly by taxation of the
Jewish community. Simultaneously, assets have been dissipated and vital
communications disposed of to foreign agencies. The effect of this has
been to seal the Jewish community in a limited area, cut off its access
to the outside world by land and sea, and surround it by Arabs in order
to create such a state of siege as would cause the Jews to send up a
white flag.
By arrangement with the Arab League, if partition is
shelved through any one of several schemes to assure Arab dominance in
Palestine, the British are to receive base rights in Haifa, the Negev
and Galilee.
But the British are not depending on Arab promises
alone. They have already taken the necessary steps to assure the
permanent rights in Palestine to air bases and land and sea
communications. To be able to carry out this program, the Mandatory has
required a free hand. That is why it has kept the United Nations
Commission out of Palestine and refused it cooperation.
The facts contained in this document come for the most
part from the confidential reports of British Intelligence.
So intent are the British upon destroying partition
that they have shown themselves oblivious to the fact that with it they
may destroy the authority of the United Nations, and even the peace of
the world.
Freda Kirchwey, President
The Nation Associates
===============================================
I. British Pledge of
Cooperation not Carried out
===============================================
On
November 13, 1947, Sir Alexander Cadogan, British delegate, told
Sub-committee I of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, in reply to a
question as to whether the United Kingdom would accept the
recommendations of the General Assembly:
"If the Assembly by a two-thirds majority approves any solution, His
Majesty's Government would not take any action contrary to it."
On
December 11, 1947, Arthur Creech Jones, British Colonial Secretary, told
the House of Commons:
"I
could not easily imagine circumstances in which the United Kingdom
would wish to prevent the application of the settlement recommended
by the General Assembly."
A day
later, Foreign Minister Bevin told the House of Commons:
"I
am not going and His Majesty's Government is not going to oppose the
United Nations' decision. . . . There that
decision is of that world organism whether we agree with it or not.
It is on the statute book of that great organisation. May it be
possible to implement it! If it is, and if my colleagues or I can
render any assistance, with advice, with help, with our officials,
with our administrative ability, with our historical knowledge, to
smooth out the transition, to try to prevent the divisions from
being widened - in other words to do anything possible to promote
concord, friendship and amity between these peoples - we shall do
it."
British pledge to maintain peace
and security
A
specific promise that the British would maintain law and order in
Palestine was made by Colonial Secretary Creech Jones. In the House of
Commons on December 11, 1947, he said:
"So long as the British remained in any part of Palestine they would
maintain law and order in the area of which they were still in
occupation. . .. It has been made quite clear by the High
Commissioner to the leaders of the Jewish and Arab communities that
so long as the Mandate continues the Mandatory Government is
responsible for law and order and will do its duty in protecting the
life and property of citizens irrespective of race. . .. Between now
and the termination of the Mandate, the British Government in
Palestine will remain responsible for law and order."
None
of these pledges have been fulfilled.
Colonial Secretary Gives Preview of
British Non-Cooperation
Actually, a preview of the form British non-cooperation would take was
offered by Creech Jones on December 11, 1947, in the very same speech in
which he assured the House of Commons of British compliance with the
Assembly's resolution. He then made clear that the primary objective
would be an orderly withdrawal of the British from Palestine. Then he
set down the following principles:
1.
"In order that the withdrawal may be conducted in the most orderly
manner and with the least destruction of the ordinary life of the
country, it is essential that the Mandatory Power should retain
undivided control of the country until the evacuation is well under
way. It will be appreciated that Mandatory responsibility for
government in Palestine cannot be relinquished piecemeal. The whole
complex of governmental responsibility must be relinquished by the
Mandatory Government for the whole of Palestine on an appointed day.
. . . And the date we have in mind for
this, subject to negotiations with the United Nations Commission, is
15 May". . . .
2.
"As His Majesty's Government have made it clear that they cannot
take part in the implementation of the United Nations plan, it will
be undesirable for the Commission to arrive in Palestine until a
short period before the termination of the Mandate. For reasons of
Administrative efficiency, responsibility, and security, this
overlap period should be comparatively brief."
. . . .
3.
"Other matters on which negotiations with the United Nations
Commission will have to be made include the proposal in the
partition plan that an area situated in the Jewish state, including
a seaport and hinterland, shall be evacuated by February 1, 1948.
This presents considerable difficulty and must be studied further
with the UN Commission in connection with the thorny problem of
immigration. . . . If the traffic
(immigration) is encouraged during the next few months a grave
situation in Palestine will arise which will make an orderly
withdrawal and transfer of authority extremely difficult. The camps
in Cyprus also have to be emptied.
"The Government are aware of the strong resentment already expressed
by the Arab States in regard to what may appear to them as
encouragement to immigration for strengthening the Jewish State. It
is essential to maintaining orderly life in Palestine, while at the
same time, preparing, in accordance with international decision, to
transfer authority."
Bevin Refuses to Assign Port
The
following day, December 12, 1947, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, made
clear that there would be no consultations with the United Nations
Commission, declaring: "that the date for the termination of the Mandate
had been fixed."
He
told the House of Commons:
(1) "We have fixed, after the most careful consideration, the date
of May 15. (2) We should have liked to have accepted the suggested
date in February but we found it physically impossible to do so.
[The reference being to the clearance of a port and area for Jewish
immigration].
"I
cannot agree to open a port until we lay down the Mandate. We cannot
have two administrations at one time. Really, it is impossible."
The
security situation was further offered as an excuse for failing to open
a port for Jewish immigration, for refusing to permit recruitment of a
Jewish militia as provided in the Assembly's resolution.
On
March 10, 1948, Creech Jones again told the
House of Commons:
"We have been unable on grounds of security to make a port
available for the Jews from 1 February for
immigration of men and arms. We could not thus render our authority
over a part of Palestine while still retaining responsibility for
law and order in the country."
He
said further:
"We were also asked whether we would agree to allow the provisional
councils of the two successor states to recruit armed militias from
their residents, leaving political and military control to the
Commission. We have made it clear that we could not permit any
authority other than our own to exercise governmental functions in
Palestine before the end of the Mandate. To allow the recruitment of
militias would involve two distinct authorities in the country at
one time, one of them taking steps to implement the United Nations
plan. Further, such a procedure could not fail to increase
immeasurably the possibility of grave disturbances while the Mandate
still ran. The suggestion did not take account of the realities of
the situation. The possible result of an attempt to form a
representative militia for the proposed Jewish State, which includes
some 400,000 Arabs in its area, when the Arabs were strongly
resisting the implementation of the partition plan, should be
apparent to everybody. The objections to this step, of course, apply
with even greater force to the Jewish request that the Commission
should immediately start to establish a purely Jewish militia for
the Jewish State, with full training facilities and the acquisition
of the necessary equipment and stores."
British Declare November 29
Resolution Unworkable
That
same day, moreover, he told the House of Commons the decision was
unworkable and forecast that the Commission would be unable to go to
Palestine.
"The situation in Palestine has tragically deteriorated since the
Assembly resolution. Consequently, the Assembly's plan, conceived
as it was in conditions of strong partiality, has in some
respects proved impractical and unworkable. . .
. It is possible that the Palestine Commission of
the UN may find itself unable to proceed to Palestine because
suitable arrangements have not been made either by the Security
Council or by other organs of the United Nations for it to take up
its duties there."
On
March 2, 1948, Creech Jones, in the Security Council of the United
Nations, openly charged the partition plan with prejudice, declaring:
"It is not for me to comment on certain obvious defects in the
partition plan which arose from its being conceived in conditions of
strong partiality.
"The United States asks us to endorse the plan adopted by the
General Assembly. For reasons which we have so often explained, we
cannot do so. . .. We cannot participate in any way in the
implementation of a plan which involves the coercion of one of the
Communities, and in Palestine, that is the larger community."
Small
wonder that on April 10 the Palestine Commission reported to the General
Assembly that:
(1)
Security has not been maintained and that "unless security is restored
in Palestine, implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly
will not be possible."
(2)
That as a consequence of the non-cooperation of the Mandatory power:
"(a) The provisions of the Assembly's resolution for a progressive
transfer of administration from the Mandatory Power to the
Commission have not been complied with. The Mandatory Power has
insisted on retaining undivided control of Palestine until the date
of termination of the Mandate and on relinquishing the whole complex
of governmental responsibilities on that day, except for the areas
still occupied by British troops. In the view of the Mandatory Power
the progressive transfer of authority refers only to those areas.
"(b) The Commission could not proceed to Palestine until two weeks
prior to the termination of the Mandate. The insistence of the
Mandatory Power on this point, even though the Commission has been
prepared to restrict its activities in Palestine prior to 15
May
1948, to preparatory work and would not attempt to exercise any
authority there, made it impossible for the Commission to take the
necessary preparatory measure to ensure continuity in administration
after the date of termination of the Mandate.
"(c) The Commission could not take any measures to establish the
frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem,
since the Mandatory Power informed the Commission that it could not
facilitate the delimitation of frontiers on the ground.
"(d) The refusal of the Mandatory Power to permit any Provisional
Council of Government, whether Arab or Jewish, if selected, to carry
out any functions prior to the termination
of the Mandate, made it necessary for the Commission, in accordance
with Part I, B, 4 of the resolution of the General Assembly, to
communicate that fact to the Security Council and to the
Secretary-General.
"(e) The refusal of the Mandatory Power to permit the taking of
preparatory steps toward the establishment of the armed militia,
envisaged by the resolution for the purpose of maintaining internal
order and preventing frontier clashes, has made it impossible to
implement the Assembly's resolution in that respect."
=================================================
II.
The Intention behind
British Policy in Palestine
=================================================
On
December 29, 1947, exactly one month following
the United Nations decision on partition with economic union, the
Lebanese Envoy in London, reporting to the Foreign Minister of Lebanon
on a meeting between himself and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, quoted
Mr. Bevin as telling him the following: "Now that the question has
reached this stage, we are determined to withdraw from Palestine so that
Arabs and Jews should remain alone to face each other and the hard
facts."
British Aim: A Federal State
In the same
report, the Lebanese envoy wrote: "Official circles here believe that if
America. . .were to change its position. . .the Arabs and Jews would remain
alone face-to-face with the facts. The result would then be the attainment of a
solution of the question on the basis of a federal state."
United States Minister to Beirut Tells About
Federal Plan or Abdullah Conquest
On February
11, 1948, the United States Minister in Beirut, Mr. Lowell C. Pinkerton,
informed the United States State Department of the plans being discussed in
Lebanon for substituting the partition plan with a new scheme either in the form
of a federal state or in the form of a Jewish state within a Greater Palestine.
In his communication Mr. Pinkerton wrote:
"Many
Lebanese feel that they have already shown an earnest of their intention to
prevent partition at all costs, and that Jews now doubt their own ability to
defend the territory allotted to them by the partition plan.
"Two
proposals, at least, have been discussed, either of which might be
acceptable to a sizeable number of the Arabs. If adopted, the first might be
only prelude to the second:
"'1.
Revival of the eleventh hour Arab compromise suggestion at Lake Success
- cantonisation, or a federal state.
"'2.
An autonomous Jewish state within a Greater Palestine, under King
Abdullah, which would have all its own machinery of government. It has
even been suggested that such a state might take all of the Jews now in
displacement camps in Europe, since the question of a majority would not
arise. This proposal would certainly meet widespread opposition in
Syria, [Saudi] Arabia and possibly Egypt.'
"Visitors
recently arrived in Lebanon from the United States are all eagerly
questioned on the possibility of a change in the attitude of the United
States towards partition, but no satisfactory reply has been received."
British Knowledge of Abdullah Plan to Occupy
Palestine
On April 17, a
day after the Security Council had adopted a resolution calling for a truce
between the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency, and upon the
neighbouring states to refrain from activity which would upset the truce, King
Abdullah of Transjordan let it be known that he would send the Arab Legion into
Palestine to defend the Arabs allegedly against the Jews.
On January 31,
The Nation had reported a plan whereby King Abdullah of Transjordan would be
permitted to overrun Palestine in exchange for giving up his ambition to
establish the Greater Syrian Federation through the annexation of Syria and
Lebanon.
On February 13
the British Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 61 Hq. Palestine confirmed
The Nation's story and anticipated the April 17 declaration of Abdullah. British
Intelligence reported that Musa Al Ami, head of the Iraqi-supported Arab Office,
who had been living abroad for a year, had returned to the Middle East.
This is its
explanation:
"Apart
from the question of the Arab officers, there is reason to believe that Musa
Al Ami's visit had certain political implications. It has been rumoured that
in return for the shelving of the Greater Syria scheme, Syria and the
Lebanon may be asked to consent to King Abdullah's occupying Palestine. Musa
Al Ami's recent visit to the King may well have something to do with this."
======================================================
III.
British Representatives Present
When Arab League Projected Revolt
========================================================
The Arab revolt was openly projected in the fall
of 1947 at the very time when the United Nations were meeting in the regular
Assembly session and discussing the Palestine issue. The decision to launch the
revolt was made at a meeting of the Council of the Arab League in Sofar,
Lebanon.
This meeting was attended not only by the heads
of the Arab governments constituting the League, the Mufti and Fawzi
Kawukji, later of the
Arab liberation army in Palestine, but by Brigadier P. A. Clayton, the British
representative in Egypt, and a number of his associates from Cairo and
Jerusalem. It was at this meeting that the formation of a so-called volunteer
force for the liberation of Palestine was decided upon, as against the use of
regular troops of the Arab governments. The decision to substitute so-called
volunteer forces for the regular armies was adopted under the influence of
Brigadier Clayton and his associates.
The Arab
League was in fact first projected in 1943 by Brigadier Clayton who was able to
convince Anthony Eden, then Foreign Minister of England, of its usefulness. The
League was formed in 1945 and Brigadier Clayton continues to be the only
non-Moslem who regularly attends the meetings of the Arab League.
The
participation of British representatives in Arab League meetings was confirmed
by Richard H. S. Crossman, British MP in the House of Commons on December 11,
1947. He said:
"British
diplomacy has, alas concentrated Arab attention to the Zionist issue. At
meetings of the Arab League British representatives have been in attendance
regularly even when the most violent anti-Jewish actions were approved. We
are now suffering the consequences of creating the Arab League on the basis
of a single programme of denying a Jewish state to the Jews."
Arabs careful not to attack the British
On March 6,
1948, E. D. Horn, acting for the Chief Secretary of Palestine, addressed a
communication to the District Commissioner of Jerusalem, copies of which were
dispatched to all district commissioners, asking them to request Arab leaders to
see to it that the foreign soldiers in Palestine remained as unobtrusive as
possible. In this communication, numbered C.S.749 and
marked "top secret," Mr. Horn wrote:
"It is the
opinion of the Committee that this development greatly increases the risk of
clashes taking place between these persons and the security forces and I am
to request that you will take whatever steps are possible to bring this
danger to the notice of Arab leaders who would be well advised to secure
that the foreign soldiers remain as unobtrusive as possible."
British condone invaders
British
Intelligence in Palestine is authority for the statement that the Arabs have
careful instructions not to fight the British. Fortnightly Intelligence
Newsletter No. 61 of February 13, 1948, issued by Hq.
British Troops in Palestine, reported that the Arab irregulars are
"anxious to avoid being involved with the British troops, in
fact, they have orders to surrender rather than fight their way out if
challenged by British troops."
The
Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 62, Hq. Palestine, dated February 27,
1948, further says:
"The Arab
leaders are anxious not to aggravate the British in any way but the question
is whether so many men, possibly ten thousand of them at present in this
country, with their bitter hatred of the Jews and their excitable character,
whose sole raison d'etre is the killing of Jews, can hold themselves in
check until the British forces have quitted."
In proof of
this careful Arab attitude, the Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 63 dated
March 12, by the Hq. British Troops in Palestine, reported the following:
"18. On
three different occasions, the GOC's car and escort were attacked in the
vicinity of Bab el Wad on the Jerusalem-Jaffa
road. On the first occasion a Brigadier travelling from Sarafand to
Jerusalem in the car was shot at and a bullet penetrated the bonnet. On the
second occasion the car was hit three times, once through the door, once
through the window and once through the petrol tank. Fortunately there were
no passengers and no one was hurt. Two days later the car ran into the line
of fire when at Kilo 21 on the same road a Jewish convoy was engaged by fire
from Arabs. Doctor Hussein Khalidi of the Arab Higher Executive told an
officer of this Headquarters that in his opinion the car had not been
attacked by Arabs as they had been instructed to avoid conflict with the
security forces. A phone call received by this Headquarters from a person
who claimed to be Abdul Kadir el
Husseini, denied that Arabs had fired at the GOC's car. Arabs held great
respect for the British and especially the GOC, the speaker
claimed."
==============================================
IV. British know every Arab
invasion plan
==============================================
On April 10
the Palestine Commission of the United Nations, in its report to the General
Assembly, stated that violence in Palestine as of April 3 has resulted in 6,187
killed and wounded, including 121 British dead, 309
wounded; 959 Arabs dead, 2,118 wounded; 875 Jews dead, 1,858 wounded.
The casualties
were inflicted in the course of Arab attacks and Jewish reprisals.
Responsibility for the violence rests in chief part on some 10,000 Arab invaders
who have entered Palestine as members of the Arab Army of Liberation formed by
the Arab League and representing incursions from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq,
and Transjordan, and upon members of the Transjordan Arab Legion, units of which
are stationed in Palestine.
The British
government, which maintains a number of liaison officers with the Palestine
Commission, has reported to that Commission only six incursions involving small
numbers. And it has offered as the excuse for not stopping these incursions the
length of the frontier, the difficult nature of the terrain, and therefore the
impossibility of one hundred percent frontier control.
Secret British Reports Give Full Data
The fact is,
however, that the British are fully aware of every incursion of foreign invaders
and their exact deployment. This is indicated in the reports of British Military
Intelligence in Palestine and the Middle East. A few typical excerpts from these
reports indicate as early as last January the full knowledge of British Military
Intelligence, and therefore of the Palestinian administration, the British
Colonial Office, and the British Foreign Office.
A report on
Arab infiltration was offered on January 30, 1948, in the Fortnightly
Intelligence Newsletter No. 60 issued by HQ Palestine:
"19. The
main item of interest is undoubtedly the arrival of Arab bands from outside
Palestine. The figures have varied considerably, but it is thought that they
can be put at between 1,000 and 1,500. They are almost certainly members of
Fawzi Qauqji's [Kawukji - EC]
Yarmuk Division, to which reference
has been made in previous newsletters. Contrary to numerous rumours, however,
Fawzi himself has not entered Palestine. He has constantly stated that he
has no intention whatever of returning to this country like a thief in the
night as the head of a rabble, and that he will come when preparations are
complete and he can do so openly as a soldier."
On February
13, 1948, the Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 61 issued by HQ
British Troops in Palestine, reported:
"More and
more Arab irregulars have crossed the Syrian and Lebanese borders and moved
into villages in the Safed area and the Galilee hills."
British Intelligence Reports Detailed Invasion
Plan
On March 5, in
a secret report entitled "Intelligence Summary No. 68"
by the Sixth Airborne Division, a detailed record of the Arab invasion was
presented:
"12. The
infiltration of Arab bands from the neighbouring Arab States is continuing
and an Arab source thought reliable has estimated the strength of the Arab
Liberation Army in Samaria as being approximately 5,000,
organised into four detachments:
"'(a)
The Yarmuk: This was the first to arrive and is now located in
the Jenin sub-district with its Headquarters at Sir 179196.
"'(b)
The Huttein: (Named after the battle of the Horns of Huttin
1187), located in the Tulkarm sub-district and reported to be
commanded by an Iraqi named Nashed Bey.
"'(c)
The Hussein: (Probably named after the Mufti), occupying the
Tubas area but believed to be incomplete. This detachment is said to
be equipped with a British type rifle, and to be about 800 strong at
present.
"'(d)
The Circassian: Composed of about 300 men - a further draft of
300 is expected shortly. This detachment is commanded by an ex-Captain
of the Syrian Regular Army, and is reported to be moving into the hills
to the west of Nablus.'
"Whilst
the main Arab forces are located in the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm area, it is
known that a strong force is being built up in the Galilee hills and further
reports have been received of the movement of small Arab bands across the
Lebanese frontier into the villages of Upper Galilee.
"13.
According to a reliable source, approximately 1,000 men crossed the
Transjordan and Lebanese frontiers into Palestine on 25
February in 100 trucks. These Arab irregulars are
reported to be dressed in American type battle dress with orange hattas. One
detachment of some 500 men went to the Nablus area via Tubas and was
received by members of the National Committee. A parade was held in their
honour attended by Arab Scouts and Youth Organisations. More than 10,000
local Arabs are said to have been present and the Mayor of Nablus and the
President of the National Committee both made short addresses to the
assembly. Mohd Saffar, Arab Commander in the Nablus area, then lectured this
detachment of newly-arrived irregulars in the Palestine Hotel, Nablus.
Following this address which lasted for two hours, the group is reported to
have left for the Beisan area where the report states, they will be used in
attacks on Jewish colonies which are expected to take place in the near
future.
"14. The
second detachment, also of approximately 599, are reported to have crossed
the Lebanese frontier in the area of Bint Jhall 190280 where they were met
by high-ranking officers in the 'National Liberation Army.'
This detachment later dispersed into villages in the Upper Galilee area. The
report indicates that these two contingents are the most well-equipped to
cross the frontier to date. They are armed with rifles, Brens and other
automatic weapons, and heavier type gun of unspecified calibre for use in
the hills. Each man is said to be carrying arms sufficient for two persons,
as the band is hoping to be backed up by local guerillas who will be
recruited throughout the area. The leader of the force is an Iraqi
officer, who informed local leaders in the Acre sub-district that the
detachment would remain in the villages in Galilee as a force available for
defence, until orders are received from the Arab Liberation Army
Headquarters in Damascus to start the offensive."
British Reveal
Kawukji's Entry into Palestine
On March 12,
Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 63 issued by Hq. British Troops in
Palestine, supplemented his report with the following:
"13. The
arrival in Samaria of Fauzi Qauqji
[Kawukji - EC]
is definitely confirmed, but he is
believed to be paying a short visit only this time. He has indicated his
desire not to embarrass the authorities in any way, but when in Transjordan
recently it was reported that he talked about renewed activity against
Jewish settlements, possibly with the intention of influencing the UN
Security Council. It has not yet been confirmed which route he used to
enter Palestine although strong rumor has it that he came across Allenby
bridge at night."
German Officers and Jugoslav
Moslems Join Liberation Army
On January 19,
C. T. Evans, the District Commissioner for the Galilee District, wrote to the
Chief Secretary of Palestine, Sir Henry Guerney, that the training of the Arab
Liberation army is by European volunteers and that, in fact, one of the
incursions was led by a German officer. In this connection, Mr. Evans wrote:
"There is
no doubt that well equipped volunteers are coming across the Lebanese
frontier and bivouacking in Palestine in such inaccessibly places as Wadi
Kurn. They appear to be bound mainly to Jaffa and that such local Arabs
trying to join have been turned away. The volunteers are not coming down on
the villages for provisioning.
"It is
reported that European volunteers are being brought to Syria and the Lebanon
as instructors and one of the parties who have crossed the frontier is
stated to have been led by a German officer."
On March 12,
in the Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 63, issued by the
HQ British Troops in Palestine, the
British revealed the presence in Palestine of non-Arab volunteers as members of
the Arab Liberation army, including German officers and Yugoslav Moslems. The
report declares:
"11. An
observer of the Arab scene in Palestine has given an appreciation of the
non-Arab volunteers who have been working with Arabs in Palestine owing to
allegiance to the Mufti. Firstly there are the Jugoslav
Moslems, estimated at less than a dozen in number who are attached to Abdul
Qadir Al Husseini in the Jerusalem area. They have had experience in warfare
and have expert knowledge of underground activities. Their number is almost
certain to be increased later. Then there are three or four German
Officers attached to Sheikh Hassan Salameh in areas around Jaffa and Lydda.
One popular rumor has it that they are survivors of the Germans who
parachuted down during the last war in the Jericho region to contact
Salameh, with whom they have kept in touch ever since. These Germans
refuse to meet any British volunteers. Thirdly, there are constant rumours of
some British nationals, but little or nothing is known about them."
*A
"12. The
infiltration of the Arab Liberation Army into Palestine continues,
particularly in the Ras el Ain area
*B
and Jaffa, where the new commander, Abdel Bey Najin ed
Din, who took over from Abdul Wahab Bey when the latter went to Syria,
probably has some 1,500 regulars under his command. The Jaffa-Tel Aviv
struggle has already entered a new phase, the Arabs having adopted a plan of
attack as opposed to their former policy of defence."
*A Despite this, Foreign Minister Bevin still says he has
no knowledge of non-Arab fighters in Palestine.
*B
Area of the water pipe line to Jerusalem, mined by
Arabs on April 8.
British Know Every Detail of Invaders'
Deployment
On March 19,
British Intelligence put out a document on the Arab Liberation
Army detailing its location in every area of Palestine, its numbers,
and its command as follows:
- ARAB LIBERATION ARMY -
Information as at 19.3.48
General: - G.O.C.
Gen. Ismail Safwat Pasha, formerly Deputy Chief of Staff to the Iraqi Army, H.Q.
DAMASCUS
Commands
in Palestine: -
North Pal:
O.C.
Fawzi Al Kaukji Bey.
2. i/c
Mohd Bey As Safa.
East
Pal: O.C. Abdul Qadir
Husseini.
West Pal:
O.C.
Sheik Hassan Salama.
2. i/c
a German Engineer Officer.
South
Pal: Acting O.C. Col.
Tarik Bey, a Sudanese.
Detail -
North Pal:
Forces at
present in this area are mainly concentrated in the Samaria district. They
consist of four regiments, each of two or three battalions. Total strength
is reported as about 4,000. The Safad-Nazareth-Acre area does not seem to be
garrisoned by A.L.A.
troops, but is used by troops in transit. Attacks in this area would appear
to be the work of local gangs or troops on sorties from Syria.
Yarmuk
Regt. - O.C. Mohd Bey As
Safa, Lebanese.
Located in the Jenin area with an H.Q. at Sir
179176. Responsible for the attack on Tirat Tsevi on 16
February.
Huttein
Regt. - O.C.
Nashed Bey.
Located in the area south of Tulkarm, with a battalion 600 strong under
an Iraqi at Ras Al Ain 144167. Responsible for the attack on Magdiel 141
174.
Hussein
Regt. - O.C. Abdul
Wahab.
Located north of Tulkarm, with an H.Q. at
Attil 157197. Responsible for the attack on Marbata 15282070 on
28 February.
Circassian
Regt. - O.C. Issan Bey.
Located in the Nablus area. Reported to have made no attacks as yet.
East Pal:
Forces are
mainly in the Jerusalem area. They consist of Husseini gangsters and do not
appear to be properly organised or disciplined.
West Pal:
Area
corresponds to the Civil District of Lydda together with that part of the
Gaza District North of a line Al Majdal 111119 to Falluja 126114.
Jaffa area
- O.C. Lt. Col. Abdel
Najn Ad Din Bey.
Strength reported to be more than 2,000 men, possibly part of the Yarmuk
regiment. This garrison includes Yugoslavs trained in sabotage.
Ramle area
Strength two battalions of 500 men, each commanded by an Iraqi captain.
One battalion H.Q. reported at 13671504; the
other at Salama village.
South Pal:
H.Q.
of the district is at Mughazi camp 091092.
Julis
area.
1,000 men
reported to be forming up at Julis camp 119122, which is at present
commanded by Capt. Ibrahim Isdar, a Syrian. This area may be used as a base
hospital.
Gaza area
- Mustafa Al Wakil bn, an Egyptian unit, is at Gaza air field 199198. 200
men are reported at Maghazi.
A training
camp is in the process of being established at Nabi Husein 108118.
===============================================
V. Arab Legion cannot Move
without British Signal
===============================================
On December 12, 1947, Foreign Minister Bevin told the House of
Commons that the units of the Transjordan Arab Legion would be withdrawn from
Palestine. He said:
"I was asked a question about the Arab Legion. I should
explain that this is a Force, which owes allegiance to the King of
Transjordan, but units of it have, for some time, been serving under the
orders of the British G.O.C. in accordance with a long-standing arrangement
with King Abdullah. It has been decided that all these units will be
withdrawn from Palestine at the same time as the withdrawal of the British
Forces. That withdrawal will be completed when the withdrawal of the British
Forces is completed."
British Promise to Withdraw Arab Legion
from Palestine
But on April 16, these units numbering some thousands were
still in Palestine, encamped near the units of Arab invading forces, still
engaged in a series of unprovoked aggressions on peaceful Jewish residents and
passersby. On that date Sir Alexander Cadogan told the Security Council: "We
have already announced that the units of the Arab League in Palestine will be
withdrawn before the Mandate comes to an end."
The following day, however, on April 17, King Abdullah of
Transjordan announced that he would send his Arab Legion into Palestine to help
the Arabs, and was seconded by his Foreign Minister, a threat which has since
been repeated. On April 26, King Abdullah announced that on May 1st he would
march into Palestine in personal command of the armies of Transjordan, Syria and
Lebanon.
Could King Abdullah carry out his threat without British
knowledge and consent? The facts show that Transjordan is a military appendage
of the British and could not act without their knowledge and consent.
The Arab Legion, regarded as the finest military force in the
Middle East, is under the command of a Britisher, Brigadier J.B. Glubb. The
Legion is organized, trained, officered, and paid for by the British government
at a cost of more than $7,500,000 annually. Nonetheless, Foreign Minister Bevin
told the House of Commons on April 28:
"I am not going to be drawn into promises and commitments
about the Transjordan Force until I know the final decision of the U.N. on
Palestine."
Do the British Control the Arab Legion?
The first partition of Palestine took place in 1922 when the
British separated Transjordan from it. In January 1946, Great Britain, without
the consent of the United Nations, announced the independence of Transjordan
which, since 1922, had been governed under the Palestine Mandate.
On March 22, 1946, the British Government announced the
conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance with Transjordan, which recognized
Transjordan as an independent Kingdom, and the Emir Abdullah as its sovereign.
In an annex to the Treaty, provision was made for British bases in Transjordan
and the training of the armed forces of that country by British military
personnel.
On March 15, 1948 a new Treaty of Alliance was signed between
Transjordan and Great Britain. Under the new Treaty, Britain continues its
annual grant for the maintenance of Transjordan's armed forces. Brigadier John
Bagot Glubb, commander of the Transjordan Arab Legion, retains his post under
King Abdullah. The British are responsible as well for equipping the Legion, and
supply, in addition to Brigadier Glubb, more than 40 British senior officers.
Provisions of 1948 Treaty with
Transjordan
Under the March Treaty, the British receive the right to
maintain units of the R.A.F. in Transjordan. The British finance the maintenance
and development of airfields, ports, roads and other lines of communication. The
British undertake to train Transjordan Forces in the United Kingdom or in any
British colony. In Transjordan joint training operations are to be maintained
with the British providing training personnel. The British undertake to provide
arms, ammunition, equipment, aircraft and other war materials; all Transjordan
war materials to be standardized with that of the British. The British receive
port rights. To carry out the military alliance a permanent Joint Defense Board
has been set up.
=================================================
VI. The British "Protection"
of Jerusalem
=================================================
On December 11, 1947 Arthur Creech-Jones, Secretary of State
for the Colonies, told the House of Commons:
"Up to the date of the relinquishment of the Mandate the
Palestine Government remains responsible for the security of Jerusalem and
its Holy places."
But not even the special position of Jerusalem has deterred
the British from sacrificing it to its own plans for an Arab alliance.
To be sure, soon after the passage of the November 29
resolution, the British government did cooperate with the Trusteeship Council of
the United Nations in drawing up a draft statute for Jerusalem establishing it
as an international city under international trusteeship. But when the Arab
Higher Committee objected to its efforts on the score that it was implementing
one of the November 29 General Assembly resolutions, the line of cooperation was
dropped and supplanted by the line of capitulation.
Under the guise of spurious neutrality it made possible a
series of events initiated by the Arabs which have splattered the sanctity of
the Holy City with blood.
Thus, thanks to British neutrality:
1. Ben Yahuda Street, the chief commercial center of
Jewish Jerusalem, was bombed.
2. A band of the Mufti's henchmen, calling itself the
Arab National Guard, could seize and hold with impunity the Old City of
Jerusalem, where the ancient shrines of all the religions are to be found; and
keep 2,000 Jews as hostages. The British have even concluded an agreement with
this band permitting passage to distribute food and other supplies.
3. Thus the Arabs could bomb the offices of the Jewish
Agency on March 11, killing 13 and wounding forty-five.
4. The Arabs could on April 13, within full sight of a
British army post, attack a Hadassah medical convoy flying a medical symbol in
the course of which 76 persons were killed and 20 wounded. The casualties
included the Director of the Hadassah Hospital, Dr. H. Yassky, doctors, nurses,
and other medical personnel, as well as academic staff including scientists
attached to the Hebrew University of Mt. Scopus.
This attack took place within two hundred yards of a British
Army Post. Iraqi soldiers were among the Arab gangs which attacked the convoy.
The attack lasted for six hours before the eyes of the British Military, who not
only failed to halt the attack, but prevented the Haganah from coming to the
rescue.
The April 13 attack was the climax of a series begun on
December 30, 1947. Continuous complaints and a request for protection of the
road, which leads to the Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University, had been
made by the Jewish Community Council of Jerusalem and by Hadassah itself.
The area requiring protection was half a mile in length on the
Scopus Road. Between March 26 and April 6 no incidents occurred. On December 27
the Arab Higher Committee, and on January 13 the Palestine Arab Medical
Association issued memoranda asking the Arabs to refrain from attacking
hospitals, ambulances, doctors, nurses. None the less, these attacks were
accelerated. On March 17 Abdel Kadi el-Husseini, then the Arab Military
Commander in the Jerusalem area (subsequently killed by the Haganah) publicly
announced that he would occupy or even demolish the Hadassah Hebrew University
Medical Center.
Despite the full evidence concerning this, no effective action
was taken by the British.
On April 13 British soldiers watched the Arab onslaught, and
instructed the Haganah not to send reinforcements. When Jewish reinforcements
finally reached the scene, they were blocked by the British. When British troops
ultimately intervened they fired mortar shells not only at the Arabs, but at
Jews trying to defend themselves from the Arabs.
When Jacques de Reynier, representative of the International
Red Cross, attempted to arrange a truce, it took the British five and one half
hours to bring M. de Reynier to the scene of the attack, which is not more than
a 10 minute ride from the heart of Jerusalem.
Not even the events of April 13 caused the British to
safeguard the road, with the result that on April 24 the Hadassah Hospital had
been, for a week, without food replenishments.
When on April 25, the Haganah attempted to insure safe passage
on the road and captured a key Arab attacking post, Sheikh Jarrah village, the
British in force encircled the Haganah and compelled their evacuation.
5. Though the Mufti's Organization, the Arab Higher
Committee, with its headquarters in Jerusalem is directing the whole operation,
not one of its leaders has been arrested.
On the contrary, the British have refused permission to the
Jewish population to organize their own defense.
They have blown up Jewish defense posts.
They have advised the Jews to evacuate the commercial section
of Jerusalem.
The British authorities are conniving at the starving of the
Jewish population of Jerusalem.
They have failed to protect the highways and refused to allow
armed escorts and self-arming by the Jews.
British Attack Jews
When the Jewish Agency told the UN Palestine Commission that
the Jews of Jerusalem were starving because of Arab road blocks on the road from
Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, and that the British Government had neither offered to
escort food convoys nor stipulated conditions under which escort might be
provided, J. Fletcher Cooke, British Liaison with the UN Commission, replied on
April 12, 1948 with an attack on the Jews.
He said:
"It should be emphasized again that the problem is not one
of food shortage in Palestine as a whole. The Government of Palestine has
reported that there is food available in Palestine to maintain the necessary
supplies for Jerusalem. The problem is entirely one of the transport of this
food from the ports to Jerusalem.
"It may be added that transport by rail to Jerusalem is
ruled out because, even if trains succeeded in escaping Arab attacks or
sabotage en route, the railway station at Jerusalem is in a predominantly
Arab area, and the Arabs would not permit off-loading of food destined for
the Jews. Any attempt to do this would result in a major engagement."
He then proceeded to place the blame on the Jews.
"(2) Very early in the disturbances which have occurred in
Palestine since 29 November, 1947, attacks on traffic using this road were
made by both Jews and Arabs. It is difficult to say who initiated these
attacks, but it is fairly certain that firing action was first taken by the
Jews after their vehicles had been stoned by Arabs in Ramleh.
"(3) The situation then developed into a fight for control
of the road. The Arabs, no doubt in order to facilitate action by their
troops, withdrew all their own vehicles from the stretch of the road in
question and were then secure in the knowledge that any civilian traffic
which they cared to attack must be Jewish.
"(4) The Jews then appealed for assistance. During
December certain escorts were provided by the Army and the Police; but it
became the Jewish practice to produce at the convoy rendezvous more vehicles
than had been arranged for, with the result that the escort provided was
insufficient. The blame for this was laid by the Jews on the Government of
Palestine."
He then charged the Jews with being responsible for the
failure of their food convoys to get through because of "the employment by Jews
of long slow columns of armored and unarmoured vehicles."
The British representative also disclosed an attempt to get
Arab permission for Jewish food convoys, "provided nothing but food was carried;
that Jewish accompanying personnel were reduced to a minimum and that convoys
were subject to search at some selected point."
Mr. Fletcher Cooke was greatly surprised that Jewish Agency
officials refused this offer of capitulation to the Arabs.
British Draft Capitulation Under Truce
Guise
Last month the British were agents for another proposal for
capitulation by the Jews. Mr. R. Graves, nominated by the Palestine government
as the Chairman of the Municipal Commission of Jerusalem, drafted a peace
project for Jerusalem, later amended by Sir Henry Gurney [Guerney - EC], the
Chief Secretary of Palestine.
This peace project proposed that "all armed men should leave
the portion of the Old City occupied by Orthodox Jews whose safety would be
guaranteed by the Arabs if this were done. And the old Montefiore quarter should
be similarly evacuated by all armed men and placed under the protection of
British forces and the municipality."
Other provisions of the plan were:
"(a) Each Community should for the time being restrict the
movement of its members to its own areas which will be policed by its own
members of the Municipal Police Force.
"(b) Each Community should solemnly undertake not to
attack the other by sending armed men into that Community's area or by
firing from one area into another.
"(c) Each Community should bind itself to exercise the
utmost self restraint and control the violent elements in its midst.
"(d) Each Community should refrain from retaliation and
reprisals, which can only make it more difficult for the leaders of either
Community to prevent further attacks and counter reprisals. This
recommendation is the most difficult of fulfilment, but it is the most
important of all.
"(e) Each Community should fully respect all vehicles
carrying the Red Cross, Red Crescent or Red Shield, and should undertake
that any such vehicle would not be used for any purpose not authorized by
these signs.
"(f) Passage by members of one Community through the
territory of the other would be permitted in the case of funeral parties or
revictualling parties under a flag of truce. A minimum number of omnibuses
should be permitted to operate.
"(g) No armed men should be permitted to live within any
area reserved for the other Community."
On March 9 Mr. Graves told the Chief Secretary, Sir Henry
Gurney [Guerney]:
"I have the honor to inform you that I have handed copies
of my Peace Project for Jerusalem as amended by you, and with a few minor
additions, to Dr. Hussein Khalidi, Secretary of the Arab Higher Committee,
and Mr. David Ben Gurion, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Jewish
Agency for Palestine.
"2. Dr. Khalidi was very polite and thanked me for my
initiative, promising to submit the Project to his Executive. He has now
sent me a letter, of which I enclose a copy, stating that he and the Higher
Executive consider that the arrangements contemplated are premature at the
present stage.
"3. I saw Mr. Ben Gurion yesterday and discussed the
Project which had been in his hands for a few days.
"4. He disagreed with the number and the variety of the
clauses, and would not accept the proposal that the Jews of the Old City
should be guaranteed by the Arabs after the withdrawal of the Haganah which
he said was insulting to Jewry, and considered that the proposed restriction
of Jews to Jewish areas and Arabs to Arab areas was undesirable and
offensive to both Communities.
"5. However, he said that he and the Yishuv were very
anxious for the peace of Jerusalem and were prepared to undertake that not a
shot would be fired by any Jew in the City for a specified agreed period – a
week, a month or a year – if the Arabs would make and observe a similar
undertaking. When I mentioned that he might have some difficulty in making
Jewish dissidents comply with such an undertaking, he said that he would be
able to do so.
"6. I promised to convey his views to the Arab Higher
Executive."
The Breakdown of the Jerusalem Water
Supply
On April 8, 1948 an Arab mine blew up the main water pipeline
to Jerusalem at Ras-el-Ain. For seven hours water flooded the fields. The line
was finally repaired by the Haganah and British army engineers.
The British authorities claimed that the destruction of the
pipeline was accidental and that the Arabs did not know that the pipeline passed
under the road at the point where the mining operation took place. But the
revelations of British Intelligence on March 12 contradicts the British
assertion.
Until the end of World War I Jerusalem was dependent upon
wells and cisterns. After World War I, Jerusalem began to bring its water from
two nearby sources, Solomon's Pools, south of Bethlehem, and the spring of Ein
Farah, six miles from Jerusalem. In 1937, to meet the needs of a growing
population, the Palestine government built a pipeline bringing water from the
coastal plain, Ras-el-Ain, forty miles from Jerusalem, which was pumped through
the hills to Jerusalem and supplies Jerusalem with 1,500,000 cubic meters of
water annually.
The pipeline runs entirely through Arab territory. Part of the
area through which the pipeline runs was captured by the Jews, but a 20-mile
section from Ras-el-Ain to Bab el Wad remains under Arab control, exposing the
pipeline to continuous danger of being cut.
The chief victim of an interruption of the water supply would
be the Jewish community of Jerusalem. Most of the Arabs in Jerusalem have
cisterns and wells.
But the fact of the matter is that the threat to the Jerusalem
water supply has been so serious and constant that as far back as January 1948
negotiations were begun by the chairman of the Municipal Commission, Mr. R. N.
Graves, in an effort to safeguard the water supply station. Ultimately the
station at Ras-el-Ain was abandoned to Iraqi armed troops which took over the
military camp there. And Mr. Graves withdrew his demands for protection when the
Lydda District Commissioner and the military commander of the South Palestine
District explained that security forces were not inclined to drive them out by
force and the Haganah probably could not do so.
Today, the sole deterrent to another attack on the pipeline is
the supposed desire of the Arabs to maintain the water supply for their own
use.
=======================================================
VII. Mufti Turned down
Request that Haifa be Declared an Open City
=======================================================
On April 22, the city of Haifa was captured by the Haganah and
the Arabs sued for peace. That same afternoon the representative of Syria, Faris
el-Khouri, complained to the Political Committee of the General Assembly of the
United Nations at Lake Success concerning what he called the massacre of Arabs.
But the fact is that it was the Mufti, Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee,
who prevented Haifa from being declared an open city. And it is the British
Intelligence in Palestine which is the authority for that statement.
Nor did the British make any attempt to assure this even
though as far back as December, Creech Jones in the House of Commons,
anticipated disturbances in that city.
In its Fortnightly Newsletter No. 61, dated February 13, 1948,
the British Intelligence reported the Arab effort to make Haifa an open city.
"Toward the end of January a delegation representing all
classes of Arabs from Haifa, headed by Archbishop Hakim, visited the Mufti
in Cairo with the intention, it was rumored, of obtaining support for a plan
to declare Haifa an ‘open city.' It was unsuccessful. (However, it is
learned that all sections of the Arab community have been placed under the
command of the Haifa Arab national committee, who feel that it is in their
own interest to maintain peace in the city for as long as possible. This,
and the fact that the moneyed Jewish community in Haifa wishes for peace,
provides some grounds for the hope that order may be maintained there for
some time. Both communities are well armed and tension of course exists. The
situation depends entirely upon the control the leaders of both factions are
able to maintain over their more irresponsible followers.)"
On April 24, Sir Alexander Cadogan told the Security Council
that the Syrian charges were without justification and that in fact only about
100 Arabs had been killed.
From Jerusalem, Sir Allen Cunningham, British High
Commissioner, informed the British Foreign Office that the attacks had been
started by the Arabs and that the charges of massacre were untrue. The
exoneration of the Haganah by the British represented the first such action in
recent disturbances in Palestine.
The fact is that Haifa had been one of the areas in Palestine
where the most friendly relations existed between Jews and Arabs, not only
during the recent conflict, but as a matter of record even during the 1936 –
1939 disturbances.
The most recent disturbances in Haifa are due to the incursion
of foreign Arabs. These foreign Arabs conducted a continuous warfare, attacking
the Jewish residential area and Jewish traffic, inviting Jewish retaliation.
The Commander of the Haifa Legion, until he was killed,
actually was a Lieutenant in the Transjordan Arab Legion and his identity card
is produced elsewhere in this document. On March 9, 1948, an advertisement by
him appeared in Al Urduni Amman daily. The advertisement declared:
"Muhammed Bay el Hamad, Commander of the Haifa region
announces that he is prepared to accept volunteers of all ranks who have
previously served in the Arab Legion or the Transjordan Frontier Force. The
registration of such volunteers will take place in Haifa."
The presence of Germans and Nazis in the Arab ranks in Haifa
was revealed by the Haganah in the truce terms which it laid down. These truce
terms asked for the deportation of all foreign Arab fighters from Haifa and the
handing over to the British military authorities of all Germans and Nazis in
Arab ranks. Five Nazis were handed over. The safety of all citizens was
guaranteed by the Haganah which asked for the laying down of arms and the
surrender of them to the Jews, as well as a 24-hour curfew in order to arrange
for the disarming.
The presence in Haifa of well-armed foreign invaders, as far
back as March 5, was verified in Intelligence Summary No. 68 of the Sixth
Airborne Division. Reporting on the Haifa area, it said:
Haifa Area
"At a recent meeting of Arab Commanders in the Haifa area
it was decided that a request be sent to Syria for the assistance of a
further 100 trained street-fighters to assist in attacks planned against the
Jews. Pending the arrival of these men, Mohd Bey El Hamed, the Arab
Commander in Haifa, ordered that bomb attacks against the Jews were to be
postponed for the time being, as he considered that such attacks would only
provoke reprisals which the Arabs are not yet in a position to counter
effectively. He, however, gave instructions for squads of nine men from the
Munazzamat Fi Di'aya (Arab Commando Organization) to be formed to carry out
attacks against Jewish traffic on the roads leading out of Haifa. Three
taxis are reported to have been allocated for this purpose. The ‘Commandos'
are said to be armed with Stens, TMGs and grenades.
"Further supplies of arms and ammunition are known to be
arriving in Haifa to replace those confiscated by the Army during searches
in town. On 22 February, seven Bren guns together with 5,000 rounds of
ammunition are reported to have arrived in Haifa from Damascus, and the
following day 15 boxes of grenades and 3 machine guns were brought to Haifa
by a Druze from Syria. Considerable quantities of explosives and ‘Molotov
Cocktails' are said to have recently arrived, together with five bomb
experts from Syria. These bomb experts are stated to have already prepared
three bombs of considerable size for use against Jewish targets. Several
local Arabs have been attached to this group for instruction in the
manufacture of bombs. A further report indicates that 25 Yugoslavian bomb
experts are en route to Haifa from Damascus to assist in the preparation of
bombs to be used in attacks on Jewish quarters in the town."
==================================================
VIII. Arab Governments
behind Invasion of Palestine
==================================================
On February 16, in its first report on security to the
Security Council, the Palestine Commission stated:
"(a) The security situation in Palestine continues to be
aggravated not only in the areas of the proposed Jewish and Arab States, but
also in the city of Jerusalem, even in the presence of British troops.
[. . .]
"(c) Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside
Palestine, are defying the resolution of the general Assembly and are
engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged
therein."
If the activity of the Arab League, comprising the states of
Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Transjordan, all members of
the United Nations except Transjordan, were not sufficient evidence that the
Arab states as such are in revolt against the November 29th decision of the
General Assembly, British Intelligence reports offer proof of the support by
Arab Governments of the armed invasion of Palestine by the so-called Arab Army
of Liberation.
Thus the Weekly Intelligence Report No. 45, issued on January
16, 1948 by the HQ British Forces in the Middle East (M. E. L. F.) reported:
"The training of volunteers in Syria is with government help and the
contribution of materials by the Lebanese government." This report says:
[. . .]
"E. Syria
"The ‘Palestine Liberation Army' is reported to be
organized in four 'divisions', though as yet little is known of these
beyond their names, which are the ‘Qiadet el Yarmuk' (or Holy Battle
Brigade), ‘Haj Amin' (named after the Mufti), ‘Fawzi Kawukji', and
‘Palestine Federation'. The Training centre at Qatana outside Damascus
is working to capacity, and there is good reason to suppose that
training is going on in other parts of the country as well, assisted by
the Syrian Army. Volunteers from universities and schools, probably
numbering some 5,000 in all, are being trained in elementary military
subjects, though their supplies of arms and equipment are at present
very limited. For the regular forces, the Government passed, in
December, a conscription law, whereby all men over the age of 19 must do
up to two years' military service, followed by 18 years on the reserve.
Exemption from this service is said to cost 1,000 pounds but it is not
known how many have as yet taken advantage of the concession."
"F. Lebanon
"The Lebanese contribution to the Palestine ‘war
effort' will, it appears, be confined to the provision of materials
rather than men. Owing to the pro-Jewish attitude of the Lebanese
Christians, who form a considerable proportion of the population, no
training will take place in the country, but the best of those who wish
to volunteer will be selected and sent to the Syrian centres. The
government has ordered the C-in-C of the army to purchase a quantity of
small arms and ammunition, tenders for which have been invited from both
Czechoslovakian and Belgian companies, as was done in Syria a month
ago."
The press of the Arab countries has revealed that the
recruiting regulations for the so-called Arab volunteers were issued by the
Syrian Minister of Defense; that the Syrian Prime Minister himself supervised
the training of troops for war in Palestine at the Qatana Barracks in Syria;
that the President of the Syrian Republic presided over the meeting on February
5 at his official residence where the commanders were appointed of the Arab
forces of invasion.
There is ample evidence, further, that the Egyptian government
has made financial allocations for operations in Palestine, that it has allotted
military barracks at Hilmiyeh and Helwan for the training of troops, and that
the Lebanese Prime Minister announced on February 25 his government's intention
to supply Palestine with arms, money, and men.
On February 13, 1948, the Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter
No. 61, issued by Hq. British Troops in Palestine, reported on the visit of the
Mufti, who is chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, with the President of
Syria, and on his meetings with the military committee of the Arab League. The
report detailed the decisions reached with respect to the military campaign in
Palestine as follows:
"Haj Amin el Husseini visited Damascus at the beginning of
February and had talks with President Kuwatly. On 4-6 February he attended
meetings of the Arab League Military Committee there, presided over by Taha
el Husseini with Subhi el Hadra present. Further in the military
organization of Palestine it was decided to divide the country into four
major fighting zones. The Mufti proposed that each zone should have two
commanders of equal status, one nominated by the Arab Higher Executive and
the other by the Arab League military committee. Taha el Husseini, however,
insisted on a single commander for each zone and finally it was agreed that
under General Ismail Safwat as Commander in Chief, Abdel Kader el Husseini
should command the Jerusalem zone, Hassan Salame the Jaffa-Jerusalem road
areas, Fawsi Kawujki the Nablus Tulkarm area and that the southern sector
should be operated under Egypt. A delegate of the Arab Higher Executive is
to be attached to each Commander. The Mufti returned to Cairo in time for
the ten-day Arab League Council meeting there on 7 February."
How the Arab governments have gotten around the use of army
regulars is further revealed in the Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 62,
HQ Palestine, dated February 27, 1948:
"20. In Jaffa, Colonel Abdul Wahab Bey arrived with 100
Iraqis who are said to be regular soldiers temporarily retired for the
Palestine venture. The Colonel was formerly in an Iraq Tank Regiment and
took part in the ‘Golden Square' rebellion during the war, as a result of
which he spent three years in prison. He speaks English fluently, is
displaying a pro-British attitude and discourages any action that would
bring the Arabs into conflict with the Security Forces. His presence has had
a decidedly pacifying effect on the local population similar to that in the
forces in Samaria. Naturally enough the ex-gang leaders of the 1936 Arab
revolt accept his presence and what amounts to military governorship with
considerable reluctance. Sheikh Hassan Salameh still remains in charge of
the guerillas in the area."
Thus British Intelligence challenges the claim on March 16,
1948 of Faris el Khouri, Syrian delegate in the Security Council of the U.N.,
that "The Arab States, including Syria, have not interfered by taking part in
these encounters."
On March 12, 1948, the Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter
No.63 reported that:
"7. The Arab League's Palestine Committee held a brief
meeting in Damascus on 4 March to discuss the Palestine military situation.
It is generally believed that as a result of this meeting the military
situation will enter a new stage during the forthcoming weeks and this will
be in the form of increased large-scale operations. In addition the
committee discussed the first aid arrangements for Arab wounded, the
construction of field hospitals on the Palestine Syrian frontiers and future
administrative arrangements for Palestine. After this first session it was
decided to postpone the meeting of the committee indefinitely."
============================================
X. Stringent Measures
Against the Jews
[Note: There is evidently no Chapter
IX]
============================================
In contrast with the attitude of the British
toward the Arabs and the Arab incursionists is the stringent measures undertaken
to prevent the Jews from getting arms.
The following series of communications exchanged in the early
months of 1948 are illuminating. As this correspondence indicates, the British
were attempting to prevent any possibility of the Jews receiving arms at a time
when no obstacles were being placed in the way of armed Arab incursions and
attacks on Jewish Palestine:
"To S.P.*
Haifa.
"Your attention is invited to the Defence (Emergency)
Regulations published in Palestine Gazette 164 Supplement No. 2 providing
powers for the Port Authority to control ships in the territorial waters of
Palestine. The purpose of these regulations is to deal with the possibility
of arms smuggling to Tel-Aviv Port where there are only Jewish Customs
Staff. There is reason to believe that the importation of arms and
explosives through Tel-Aviv Port will be attempted from U.S. and Yugoslav
ports. It will therefore be desirable that ships from these ports should be
required to discharge all cargo at Haifa only. If no approach has yet been
made on the subject I feel that you should see the General Manager Pal.
Rly., and perhaps the Port Manager to consider what steps will be necessary
to implement the new legislation.
(Sgd) Fforde
**AIG CID"
[* S.P is Superintendent of Police
**AIG CID is Acting Inspector General Criminal Investigation Department]
"To: S.P. Haifa.
2.2.48
"I am writing about the implementation of the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations H 48 published in Palestine Gazette 164, providing
powers for the Port Authority to control ships in the territorial waters of
Palestine. (This office letter of even number dated 19/1 refers).
"O'Sullivan tells me that he saw you about this matter
last Thursday. The position, now, as I understand it, is that some ships,
including American vessels, normally discharge at Breakwater and Stevedores
are mixed Jews and Arabs. Customs normally examine any such cargo as is
actually discharged. There does not appear to be much opportunity for the
evasion of Customs examination though it is possible for a ship lying out
(and a good many ships have to do this) to discharge illegal cargo by night
on to small craft and so get it ashore. But it appears that some ships, for
recent example the ‘Exporter' are allowed to proceed to Tel-Aviv afterwards,
after first being directed to Haifa, and so get an opportunity to discharge
‘hot' cargo. The ‘Exporter' discharged a quantity of apples at Tel-Aviv
after first having been directed to Haifa. Of course there would have been
ample opportunity to discharge illegal arms etc. and so defeat the whole
object of the new legislation. Surely a ship is not being allowed to go to
Tel-Aviv once it has been found necessary to direct if from there, unless
steps have been taken to ensure that nothing is left on board which it is
not desired should be landed (which I very much doubt).
"Would you please take up this aspect of the matter and
let me know the outcome.
(Sgd) Fforde AIG CID"
"To: I.G. Secret No. CS/758
18/2/48
"I am directed to append the following extract from a
letter received from the General Manager, Palestine Railways, regarding the
enforcement of directions given by him as Port Authority under the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations made on 10/1.
'I should be grateful to know whether I should be in
order in invoking the assistance of the R.N. [Royal Navy - EC] if any
vessel should fail to comply with any order given by me prohibiting the
vessel from entering any port or the territorial waters of Palestine.'
"The Naval authorities have been consulted and have
indicated that in their view the primary responsibility for enforcing
compliance rests with the Police to whom the Port Authority should apply for
assistance, if he considers it necessary.
"Only in the event of the Police being unable to enforce
compliance would the RN be prepared to intervene. The application for Naval
assistance would be made by Police and NOT by the Port Authority.
"I am to request you to state whether you concert with the
procedure suggested
G. G. Grimwood
For Chief Secretary"
British Attempt to Charge Jews with
Responsibility for Violence
At the same time, in the United Nations, the British are
making a concerted effort to involve the Jews on an equal plane with the Arabs
in offensive violence in Palestine. Thus on January 21, 1948, the Mandatory
power told the Palestine Commission, as regards Arabs and Jews in Palestine,
that "elements on each side were engaged in attacking or in taking reprisals
indistinguishable from attacks."
This statement ignored the fact that only a month earlier,
Creech-Jones, colonial secretary, told the house of Commons on Dec. 11: "There
have been serious disturbances in Palestine since the United Nations' decision
was announced, do mainly to Arab incitement."
The attempt to place blame on the Jews for the current
violence was continued in the answers which the United Kingdom delegation gave
to a series of questions asked by the four permanent members of the Security
Council at an informal meeting on March 9.
On March 12, the answer submitted in behalf of Sir Alexander
Cadogan, reveals the bias of the Mandatory power:
Question 6: "To what extent are disorders
inside Palestine due to participation by armed elements from outside
Palestine?"
Answer 6: "The present series of disturbances began
in December last against a background of Jewish inspired disorder which had
been going on for 2½ years. The Arabs implicated in this series of
disturbances were originally all Palestinians. Since then both Palestinian
and non-Palestinian Arabs have been engaged."
Question 7: "To what extent are disorders inside
Palestine attributable to incitement to violence from outside Palestine?"
Answer 7: "As far as the Palestine Arabs are
concerned, their opposition to partition is spontaneous and universal.
Inflammatory material has appeared in the press of the neighboring Arab
countries, although the situation in this respect has recently improved. On
the Jewish side, widespread propaganda has of course been conducted for some
time in the press of the United States and other countries by persons and
organizations3 inciting the Jewish community to violence and terrorism
principally against the Mandatory power."
Asked whether arms are flowing into Palestine from outside
sources to individuals or groups unauthorized by the Mandatory power to possess
arms, the United Kingdom gave the following answer:
"Both Arabs and Jews in Palestine are now receiving
illicit consignments of arms from outside sources. While the Palestine
Government have no exact knowledge of the quantity and description of arms
possessed by either side, it is their opinion that the Jews are better armed
than the Arabs. In this connection4 it will be recalled that there have
recently been instances of the seizure in the United States by United States
authorities of large consignments of high explosives destined for Jewish
organizations in Palestine.
"As regards the possibility which has been suggested of
illicit importation of arms by aircraft landing in the desert, the Palestine
Government consider this unlikely. Such clandestine importation by air
would, however, be easier for the Jews than for the Arabs, in view of the
better facilities possessed by the former for wireless communication and for
distribution of arms after receipt."
In response to a question as to what measures, military and
civil, the British took to prevent the movement of hostile elements in Palestine
from outside Palestine, the British again tried to implicate the Jews, putting
Jewish refugees seeking asylum on the same plane with armed Arab invaders:
"The principal points of entry by land are guarded by
troops or police but owing to the length of the frontier and the difficult
nature of the terrain, it is impossible for frontier control to be one
hundred per cent effective. As regards the sea frontier, the measures taken
by the mandatory authorities to prevent the entry of Jewish illegal
immigrants are well known."
=========================================
XI. British Pro Arab Bias
==========================================
Quite different is the attitude of the British to the Arabs.
When asked by the United Nations whether the incursion of the Arabs from
neighboring countries represents a threat to international peace, the
representative of the British government replied that his government "would
furnish all the facts available" and "the question of what constitutes a threat
to the peace is for the Security Council to decide." This despite the fact that
Creech-Jones, anticipating trouble, told the House of Commons on December 11:
"The Security Council may have to be evoked by the United Nations Commission if
insurmountable difficulties occurred."
And when the United Kingdom was asked to identify Arab
personnel who have invaded Palestine, and to say whether the incursions were
privately organized or are supported or encouraged by governments outside
Palestine, the United Kingdom's answer on March 12 was an attempted exoneration
of the Arabs, as the following indicates:
Question 2: "Has the Mandatory Power been able to
identify personnel involved in such incursions?"
Answer 2: "The information of the Palestine
authorities regarding the origin of personnel involved in these incursions
is derived from common knowledge available locally and from intelligence
reports. As regards the character of these forces, they consist of irregular
formations and not organized units of any national armed force."
Question 3: "Are these incursions privately
organized by individuals or unofficial groups, or are they supported or
encouraged by Governments outside Palestine?"
Answer 3: "H.M.G. [the British government] have
no special information on this point other than that given in the answer to
question 2."
British Praise Invaders
In fact in February, 1948, the British were finding praise for
the Arab invaders as a stabilizing element, offering the following proof as
reported in the Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 61:
"In Nablus itself the good behavior of the Arab invaders
is having a stabilizing effect on the untrained and excitable Palestinians.
A complaint was made to them recently that a lorry load of wheat had been
stolen and 20 [pounds] robbed from the driver. In a very short time the
lorry and load had been returned and also the 20 [pounds], together with a
further 60 [pounds] which it was explained was the fine imposed on the
thief. A local villager, a spectator to this transaction, became a little
vociferous. Two hours later he was dead. Four Arab train robbers have
recently been dispatched to Syria by Fawzi Kawukji's men for execution."
On March 10, 1948, Mr. Rees-Williams, Deputy to Arthur
Creech-Jones in the British Colonial Office, replied to questions in the House
of Commons as to whether he was aware (a) that Fawzi Kawukji had established
field headquarters in Palestine; (b) whether he was aware that an Arab
liberation force had declared martial law in Nablus; and (c) what the government
was proposing to do with respect to the incursion of Fawzi Kawukji and his
followers. He said:
"The High Commissioner has informed me of a local rumor
that Fawzi Kuwajki recently arrived in Palestine and is in the Samaria
district. . .
"The developments referred to by my hon. Friend in the
Nablus area appear to be measure adopted by the leaders of Arab irregular
forces to control their adherents and represent no attempt to replace or
curtail the authority of the Mandatory power in this area. The District
Commission of the Samaria District continues to reside in Nablus and his
headquarters and sub-district officers are functioning normally. Palestinian
members of the Police Force continue to perform their normal duties
throughout the district under the supervision and control of British police
officers. The District Commissioner is in a position to call for the
assistance of such military forces as he may require to assert the authority
of the civil power. The security forces in Palestine will continue to
protect members of either community who may be threatened with attack."
===============================================
XII. British Smear Campaign
Shown by Official Records
==============================================
The smear campaign conducted by the British against the Jews,
since the Russian vote for partition in the Fall Assembly, has taken the form of
charging Communist infiltration, with Jewish help, into Palestine.
A striking example of this was the charge which the British
Foreign Office has allowed to be brought against the Jews in connection with the
arrival in Palestine on January 1 of the Pan York and the Pan Crescent, two
ships which sailed from Rumania at the end of December carrying unauthorized
Jewish immigrants. The British Foreign Office first permitted Mr. Herbert L.
Matthews of the New York Times to charge that among the 15,000 immigrants were
"many Communist agents, according to official British sources."
The Times story dated London Jan. 31, charged that "one
thousand of the 15,000 immigrants spoke Russian, belonged to militant
organizations. Some may have been non-Jews and some had documents showing that
they had served in the Soviet forces in WW II."
The Times story said further that "the immigrants on these
vessels and the number of others that sailed earlier from the Black Sea were
collected and sent toward Palestine with the knowledge, and sometimes with the
active connivance, of the Soviet Union and its satellites, according to British
officials."
Later the British Foreign Office said the same thing. When
this story first appeared Sir Godfrey Collins, Commissioner for the Jewish
immigration camps in Cyprus, said he had no information on the subject.
Subsequently, on February 5, the British Foreign Office and Colonial Office
queried Sir Godfrey, and a London dispatch to the Times on February 5 stated
that Sir Godfrey had denied that he had stated that there were no Communist
agents aboard the ships. But a few days later he repeated he had no information
on Communist agents.
Actually the top secret report of the British representative
Captain Linklater who supervised the disembarkment of the refugees at Cyprus
said, [in a preliminary report – marked "preliminary" only because of the size
of the disembarkment – dated January 2, 1948]
"If any large guerilla groups of Communists exist among
the Russian speakers of this shipment, they are either still on board or
else have arrived unarmed and without documentation."
And Captain Linklater further explained:
"Extremely large numbers of private documents, related to
individual points of the journey, were taken from the Jews as they passed
through the security screen at the reception camp, thereby showing a high
breakdown in Jewish security. In addition to this a number of passengers
were willing to discuss details. . . No documents of outstanding importance
were found."
The Pan York, Pan Crescent story is revelatory of the lengths
to which the British are prepared to go to smear the Jews. As soon as the boats
had left Balkan waters, British officials sent a cable to their Intelligence
officers in Palestine stating that the British surmise that Communists are
aboard.
As a result, when the boats landed at Cyprus, for the first
time in the history of Cyprus, baggage and documents of the refugees aboard the
boats were searched.
The flimsy evidence on which the charges against the Jews was
based is revealed in the following partial record of Captain Linklater:
|
Top Secret
Preliminary Report on the Disembarkation from the
Pan Ships, York and Crescent
General
1. A peculiar disembarkation of some 15,300
Rumanian Jews began at about 1,000 hours on 1 January 48 in
Famagusta Harbour when the 2 Panamanian vessels Pan York and
Crescent, which had been bound for the shores of Palestine
volunteered to discharge their passengers in Cyprus. . .
Passengers
4. Rather like the previous illegal Jewish ships
which sailed under Soviet auspices from a Bulgarian port, the Pan
York and Crescent contained a load drawn almost entirely from
Rumania and differed at least in this way from other illegal
immigrant vessels which usually contain a mixed bag of European
Jews. It is also noticeable yet once again that the passengers have
apparently been evacuated from Rumania by complete families
including aged grandparents and very young children. In many cases
these families were split up between the 2 ships.
5. The highest proportion of children in the past
year was contained in these ships and the load was almost equally
divided between men, women and children, some of whom however may
later be counted as adult by the Jewish Agency representatives. The
Pan York alone carried 700 children under the age of 5.
6. The passengers were small businessmen,
shopkeepers, professional lawyers and doctors, and they carried
large quantities of baggage. The Haganah authorities in Rumania had
allowed them to carry up to 20 kilos of baggage each, but there was
no form of weight control and this allowance was frequently
exceeded. They were well dressed. Only very few turned up in rags
and empty-handed. Most of them were small, rather fat and
complacent. They nearly all spoke Rumanian, Yiddish and French and
German. Those who did not speak Rumanian, spoke Russian and claimed
to come from Bessarabia. Owing to the speed at which the operation
had to be conducted, it was not possible to make a detailed
examination of the Russian speakers. It was noticed however that
they were not physically of a characteristically Russian-type . . .
.
Documentation
25. An analysis of documents carried and political
parties on board will be produced in the final report by 299FS Sec
after scrutiny of documents held by them. . . .
Conditions in Rumania
29. Most of the passengers on the Pan Ships were
agreed that there were still a large number of Rumanian Jews who
wanted to leave the country for Palestine. In several cases they
explained that these Jews would be awaiting the increased legal
immigration quota which they hoped for as a result of partition.
They thought therefore that there would not be any more large
illegal shipments at least for the next month and they believed that
their Communist Government will grant them exit visas to correspond
with their certificates after May.
Conclusions
30. The following conclusions may be drawn from
the above evidence:
a) That if any large guerilla groups of Communists
exist among the Russian speakers of this shipment, they are either
still on board or else have arrived unarmed and without documents.
b) That the movements, planning and administration
of the final evacuation from Burgas at short notice was well and
thoroughly carried out.
c) That the Moscow controlled Communist Government
of Rumania intended at all costs to evacuate this shipment of Jews
and came to an agreement with Bulgaria to use a Bulgarian Port for
this purpose after the delay at Constanza due, probably, to British
representations. The abdication of King Michael at this juncture may
well be NOT coincidental.
Famagusta, Cyprus
(Detachment)
2 January 1948
Actually, only five young men were taken off the boat by
British Intelligence agents. All the remainder of the passengers were taken
directly to the camps where no subsequent searches or interrogations took place.
The five young men were interrogated by a member of the Palestine Criminal
Investigation Department who had been sent to Cyprus in order to conduct the
investigation. He told them outright that he was concerned only with information
about Soviet activities in Bulgaria and Rumania, with particular reference to
Soviet ship movements in the Black Sea and Soviet troop movements in Rumania and
Bulgaria. When the questions failed to elicit any information the five
immigrants were slapped and kicked and finally returned blindfolded from the
interrogation center to the camp under escort. There were no further
interrogations of passengers. |
=======================================
XIII. British Dissipate
Palestine's Assets
=======================================
On December 11, 1947, Arthur Creech-Jones told the House of
Commons:
". . .We certainly did not wish to leave Palestine in
disorder after the tremendous and costly contribution Britain has made in
developing Palestine and discharging our responsibilities under the Mandate.
. . .I can assure the House that we shall wind up our affairs in Palestine
in a fair and reasonable manner and, I hope, with little suspicion and ill
feeling about the arrangements we make."
This is a promise honored only in the breach.
The refusal of the Mandatory power to permit the Palestine
Commission to reach the country until May 1st, two weeks before the scheduled
termination of the mandate, was predicated on the intention, as the facts
substantiate, to dismember the Palestine administration so as to have little or
nothing to turn over to the Palestine Commission, and to take such action as
would safeguard British interests after the end of the mandate.
Today, virtually all departments in the Palestine government
have ceased to function. The exceptions are those like the Palestine
Broadcasting Service, the Attorney General's office and the Chief Secretariat,
which serve the British primarily.
Railway and Port Services Collapsing
1. Typical examples of collapsing public services are the
railways and the port services, so that it appears unlikely that after May 1 any
operating system will exist. Yet this did not come as a sudden development.
Actually the Chief Secretary had received a number of warnings concerning such
an eventuality as early as December 17, 1947 from the manager of the railways,
Mr. A. F. Kirby.
On that date Mr. Kirby wrote to Sir Henry Gurney as follows:
"If there is to be no satisfactory transfer of function
through the U.N., I consider that a collapse of the services is likely to
come about some time before the termination of the mandate."
In the same letter, he expressed his anxiety concerning the
disposition of the property of the railroads:
"If there is to be no handing over, what will be done with
all the rolling stock on various parts of the system, who will take over the
stations, buildings, valuable work shops, the permanent way, etc.; how will
rolling stock on foreign railways be accounted for; what will happen to
goods in transit, etc., etc. . . .There must obviously be some process of
handing over – and an orderly handing over would take several weeks. . . .
"The railways outside the Haifa enclave cannot well be
operated separately, in that the main locomotive running shed, workshops,
and operational and maintenance headquarters are in Haifa. Withdrawal into
the enclave and the operation of the railway therein only for military
evacuation purposes would entail the most effective frustration possible to
a succeeding authority. This course would also cut off the supplies of bulk
oil and other essential supplies which are now distributed by rail to the
main centers of population. The closing down of the main workshops and other
activities of the railway following the termination of the mandate would
probably mean that the railway would not be able to operate again for a
prolonged period."
Three days later, on December 20, 1947, Mr. Kirby again wrote
to the Chief Secretary, this time about the port situation, declaring:
"There is nothing that this administration or the Director
of Customs can do to ease the situation there. Pressure of financial
interests is the only possibility of being effective in solving the present
situation at Haifa port."
Willing to Isolate the Jews
The Mandatory was willing to allow this breakdown on the
assumption that Jewish need for supplies would force the Jews to keep roads open
for themselves as well as the British. If the Jews failed, they could starve and
for military purposes the British could make other arrangements. This was
clearly indicated last November 27, two days before the General Assembly passed
its partition resolution, in instructions issued by the Chief Secretary of
Palestine to military commanders and heads of government departments. In his
directive of that date, he stated:
"(a) Activism in Jewish areas is likely to be negligible.
Jews cannot afford to close roads for supplies upon which they depend as
their areas are not self-supporting. They will therefore do all they can to
keep the roads open. Should, however, the situation develop adversely and
supplies through Jewish areas not be possible, the following roads will be
followed: Gaza-Haifa, Jerusalem-Haifa.
"(b) More serious will be Arab troubles, which may assume
large proportions and likely constitute a serious threat, specially in the
hilly country. Arab villages and towns are self-supporting and the populace
can forego a great deal – Jews cannot – and can therefore hamper seriously
without much harm to themselves. Serious troubles may not come about until
the end of the citrus season.
"Military authorities will decide in concertation with
government from time and time as to the methods which should be adopted to
safeguard military supplies."
Government Disposes of its Property
2. As early as April 1 the Land Settlement Department closed
down its offices. This was done after the head of the department, R. F. Jardine,
sold out the lands in the state domain to private persons, mostly Arabs. Parcels
of land in the Haifa Harbor Estate were sold by him. All plans and documents
relating to irrigation projects in Palestine were shipped by him to the United
Kingdom. Water installations were handed over to the Arab town and village
councils. Having closed his offices he secured release from his post and has now
been named by the Iraqi government as its irrigation expert.
No Possibility of Handing Over Land
Registry to U.N. Commission
3. The land registers have been distributed by the Palestine
government among several centers while microfilms of these registers have been
shipped to England. The effect of this is to create chaos in the event of any
disputes arising on land questions.
This has been done despite the fact that on January 5, 1948,
the Solicitor General of Palestine, M. J. P. Hogan, wrote to the Chief
Secretary:
"Under the law at present, any disposition of land, which
has not yet received the consent of the Director of Land Registration and is
not perfected by the registration of a deed, is void. This means that if the
land registries are closed, no valid disposition of land can be made.
"I understand that the Director of Land Registration has
suggested that the land registries should be closed at least two weeks
before the termination of the mandate, and, should the end of the mandate be
followed by an interregnum in the whole or any part of Palestine, it will
not be possible there to make any valid disposition of land during that
time."
Disruption of Postal Services
4. The disruption of the postal service has ensued as a result
of instructions to create a vacuum. This is confirmed by Mr. Eric Mills,
Commissioner of Withdrawals, who wrote:
"The Postmaster General is proceeding in
circumstances of great difficulty with his plans for withdrawal, but his
recommendations on important point[s]. . .have been made on the assumption
of a vacuum."
On December 3, 1947 Mr. Mills in a circular to heads of
departments and district commissioners declared:
"You will observe that the information called for. .
.makes no distinction between withdrawal leaving a vacuum or handing over to
a UNO Commission. The reason for this lack of differentiation is that in
either case a certain amount of derangement must be expected. . . ."
Artificial Deficit Produced
5. The Palestine Commission has charged the British government
with deliberately inducing a deficit where a surplus existed and thus creating
ensuing financial and economic difficulties. Four specific charges in this
connection are made by the Commission in its reports submitted both to the
Security Council and to the General Assembly.
It is stated that the deficit was created by the Mandatory
power by charging against its funds what the Commission called "certain
extraordinary items," such as the maintenance of Jewish illegal immigration
camps, and the payment of pensions to British civil servants. The commission
objected to both these charges.
As a further means of creating a deficit the British paid out
300,000 pounds recently to the Supreme Moslem Council, knowing full well that
the treasury of this organization represents the war chest of the Mufti.
The lack of a working fund, moreover, according to the
Commission, has been created by the action of the Mandatory power on March 20,
1948 in freezing an unspent balance of 3,000,000 pounds remaining from three
issues of bonds made in Palestine since 1947. This balance was invested in
British securities, pending a general financial settlement, and the Mandatory
power had decided not to make any disbursements from this total prior to the
termination of the mandate. These transactions were brought to the notice of the
Commission only after they had been arranged.
Discussing the disappearing surplus, the Commission charged on
April 10, that "the disappearance of the existing treasury surplus is almost
entirely due to special and extraordinary claims," which the Commission feels
"should not have precedence over securing essential food supplies and the
provision of essential working funds."
The Commission also expresses fears concerning the control of
the Haifa dock by the mandatory power, pointing out that "the ordinary revenue
of Palestine after May 15 will depend in a high degree on customs duties on
imports. These imports will come in mainly through the port of Haifa. Hence the
fiscal position. . .will depend partly on the manner in which the control of the
Haifa dock will be shared with evacuating troops between May 15 and August 1."
As a consequence of these acts, Palestine was in danger of
suffering a famine as a result of food shortages, which would be created by the
termination of the mandate. Although the Palestine Commission had been
discussing this problem for months, and had even sent a special representative
to London to take this matter up with the mandatory government, no agreement was
reached. The excuse of the British government was that it could not undertake to
make commitments for food after May 15 as it had no funds with which to do so.
Moreover, it refused to advance the money to the Palestine Commission even on
the promise that the United Kingdom would be reimbursed from the future revenue
of Palestine.
On April 19 a private arrangement was agreed to by the
importing firm of Steel Brothers in Palestine. The arrangement is with Steel
Brothers, the Jewish Agency, and certain Arab Chambers of Commerce, and involves
a transaction of about $5,200,000.
Under this arrangement Steel Brothers will guarantee to bring
into Palestine until July 15 normal food supplies in the amount of some 30,850
tons. Steel Brothers will advance 80% of the cost of wheat, meat, and sugar to
be imported. The Jewish Agency will pay for 20% of the food going to the Jews,
and the Arab Chambers of Commerce, 20% for food going to Arabs. The food will be
imported and delivered to the warehouses of Steel Brothers in Haifa.
Distribution to the Arab and Jewish groups is left to the two communities.
Palestine Excluded from Sterling Area
6. The Palestine Commission also charged financial
complication resulting from the action taken by the Mandatory power of February
22, 1948, without consultation or even information to the Commission, blocking
the accumulated Palestine sterling balances held in London and excluding
Palestine from the sterling area.
The Commission describes the effect of this act as creating
uncertainty among Palestine importers, and says that it regards that the release
of the sterling balances in particular is essential; otherwise, "sterling may
become a scarce currency of Palestine, and imports from the sterling area may be
difficult to obtain."
=======================================
XIV. The Breakdown
of Central Authority
======================================
A continuous transfer of authority to municipal corporations
and local councils by the Palestine administration has been going on based, not
on a desire to prevent chaos, but rather to destroy central authority, to
undermine partition, and to pave the way toward a revival of a scheme for a
federal Palestine, which is the real British desire.
Preparations for this transfer were made as far back as
February 14, 1948 by Sir Henry Guerney, the Chief Secretary. In a communication
on that date to heads of departments and district commissioners throughout
Palestine, he proposed:
"I am directed to refer to the preliminary advice which
has been given to you by the Commissioner on Special Duty to the effect that
it is hoped that various government activities, buildings, stores, etc.,
will be transferred as it were in trust to local authorities until a new
central authority makes other arrangements.
"Action in this direction has been taken in certain
matters such as water supplies where experience is advisable and central
government staff is still available to give advice and assistance. I am now
to require you to communicate to the District Commissioner of the District
concerned full information regarding all other activities, buildings and
stores which you consider might be similarly placed with local authorities
if the U.N. Commission in Palestine prove not to have the necessary powers
and staff to perform all the functions of the Palestine Government.
"I am also directed to say that a decision whether each
such activity or property will finally be handed over to a local authority
will depend on consultation with the U.N. Commission; but, unless the
necessary preparatory work is done on this provisional basis, there will be
not enough time later to make definite arrangements under the general
assumption which governs this direction."
In February, 1948 a special law, to amend the Municipal
Corporation Ordinance of 1937, was enacted empowering municipal corporations and
local councils to collect property taxes due up to April 1, 1948, and
thereafter, for the fiscal year 1948 – 1949.
The purposes of this new law were explained by the Attorney
General in the following terms:
"It is anticipated that during the year 1948 – 49, the
councils of municipal corporations and local councils will have to carry out
many of the functions which would normally be carried out by Government, and
consequently they will need additional sources of revenue. On the other
hand, they may not be able to obtain from the Government the grants-in-aid
which they have received in the past.
"Government has therefore decided to enable such councils
to collect and recover arrears of urban property tax remaining due on the
first day of April 1948, and urban property tax due in respect of the year
1948 – 1949, and this draft Ordinance is designed to give effect to that
decision.
"Arrangements will be made for the handing over to such
councils of the records relating to the house property and land in respect
of which they will be entitled to collect and cover urban property tax, and
such councils will be empowered to do such acts as may be necessary to
ensure that those records will be kept up to date.
"Furthermore, in order that it will not be necessary to
prepare during the year 1948 – 1949 valuation lists to replace those
valuation lists which on the first day of April 1949 will have been in force
for five years, the period of validity of valuation lists has been extended
from five to six years."
Anticipated No Successor Government
The draft law, it was explained in a communication by Mr. L.
B. Gibson, Attorney General of Palestine, to Sir Henry Gurney, was in
anticipation of the possibility of no successor government being named.
He declared:
"My view is that it is not for this Government to
legislate for things after the termination of the Mandate – at least if
there is some other Government which enjoys legislative authority after that
date. We should, however, make available our draft to the Commission, and
there would be advantages in publishing it as part of the Bill so that any
public comment would be available for the benefit of the Commission. We
should, no doubt, inform the Commission that, although we had published the
Bill in its entirety, we did not intend in fact to enact the Second Schedule
ourselves, but there is a further question of whether we should tell the
public the same thing when publishing the Bill for public information. On
the whole I think it is unnecessary to do so, because in the event of
there being no successor Government, we might enact the Second Schedule
before we leave, but we do not want to discuss such possibilities in public
notices."
Arabs, Chief Beneficiaries of Transfers
As a result of this special legislation the three regions
heavily populated by Jews, have been placed under Jewish control. All the
remaining regions have been left to the Arabs. The exception are Jerusalem,
Haifa, the valley of Ezdraelon, and Eastern Galilee.
Ceded to the Arabs were such important installations as the
water plants at Ras-el-Ain and Safed.
In addition, the Arabs have received most of the government
services including Health, Education, Social Welfare, Agriculture and
Broadcasting Departments – services which are paid for by the taxes imposed on
the population to which the Arabs, constituting two-thirds off the population of
Palestine, contribute 26%, and the Jews, 74%.
In dividing the assets of the country the British allocated
for themselves the Haifa enclave with all its services and installations.
==================================================
XV. How the British
Safeguard
their Interests in Palestine
==================================================
While liquidating the mandate, the British have concentrated
on safeguarding in perpetuity the British hold in Palestine in key areas,
including Haifa and the Negev, and to insure uninterrupted lines of
communication by air, sea and land.
New Laws to Assure British Airfields in
Palestine
1. Thus on March 2, 1948 the Attorney General of Palestine
drafted a law, the purpose of which is to establish the legal basis for
transferring airfields or other lands now held in the name of the High
Commissioner, to various British Ministries for War, Air, or to the President of
the Air Council in London. In particular the new legislation aims to assure
continued British control of the R.A.F stations in Aqir, Ramle, Gaza, as well as
certain property in Jerusalem.
Preparations for this action began in October 1947 while the
General Assembly for the United Nations was in session.
On October 19, 1947, in a secret dispatch cabled to the Air
Ministry in London from Air Headquarters Levant, the Air Ministry was informed
that, in view of the political situation, legal difficulties might arise with
respect to the property bought by the Air Ministry in Palestine, held in the
name of the High Commissioner, in trust for the R.A.F. In subsequent cables, in
view of the pending liquidation of the Palestine government, warning was given
that the British government might lose control of these assets, and that action
was necessary. This is explained in the following exchange of cables:
From Air Headquarter Levant
To Air Ministry
"OX 303. Oct. 19. Secret. Subject – Registration of
Properties acquired in Palestine on behalf of R.A.F. One. All property
bought by Air Ministry in Palestine held in name of High Commissioner in
trust for R.A.F. leases held name of High Commissioner in trust for R.A.F.
held similar manner. Two. In view of political situation of entries in Land
Registers appear to be open to objection from legal point of view. Three.
Palestine Government request decision made into whose name this property and
leases should be vested. Four. Request you advise."
***
From Air Ministry London
To Hq. MEDNE
"F. 7283/4 Nov. unclassified
Reference Levant Signal 0.303 October repeated to you on subject
registration of properties acquired in Palestine on behalf R.A.F. Colonial
Office had no knowledge of this question and we find it difficult to know
precisely what is the tenor and purpose of Palestine Government's
suggestion. Request you investigate and advise us in greater detail what
are Government's proposals and why they are put forward. We are quite ready
to consider them."
***
From A.H.Q. Levant
To Air Ministry
"0.63 Nov 12. Secret. Your F.7283 Nov 4 and my 0.303 Oct
17. Subject – Registration of properties acquired Palestine on behalf
R.A.F. One. On acquisition it has been customary to enter this property in
the Land Registry in the name of the High Commissioner in trust for the
President of the Air Council or in some cases the Secretary of State for
Air. The position of trust in Palestine law is obscure and this form of
registration may be open to objection on that account alone. In addition
registration in name of High Commissioner might give rise to difficulties
particularly when Government of Palestine is transferred from High
Commissioner to Palestinian or to a U.N.O. authority and it seems desirable
that the land should be registered directly in the name of whatever
authority the Air Force considers most appropriate either the President or
the Air Council, the Air Council or the Secretary of State for Air. Two.
Legal advice is that if properties remain in name of High Commissioner there
is risk that we may lose all chance of realizing value or of retaining
control of these assets. Three. Main properties concerned are R.A.F.
stations Aqir, Ramle, Gaza and certain property in Jerusalem."
As the result of this exchange a draft law was prepared by the
Attorney General transferring the land now registered in the name of High
Commissioner to the British Secretary of State for War, the British Secretary of
State for Air, or the President of the Air Council in London.
In submitting a draft of this proposed law to the Chief
Secretary of Palestine the Attorney General stated:
"It is probable that when all parties concerned have
approved the substance of the Bill, we shall convert it into an Order under
the Palestine Order in Council, 1948. But I think that the first step is to
get the earliest possible consideration by the parties concerned."
The Transfer of the Hejaz Railway
2. Early in 1948 the Hejaz Railway linking Palestine,
Transjordan, and Syria was transferred by the Palestine Government to the
Government of Transjordan. The explanation given was that actually the British
Government was the Mandatory power, initially for Transjordan as well as
Palestine, and therefore was trustee for Transjordan.
Transfer of the El Kantara-Rafa line to
the Egyptian State Railways
3. On April 1, 1948 the El Kantara-Rafa Railway Line was
turned over to the Egyptian State Railways by the Palestine Government. The
Egyptian Railways System is partially controlled by British capital. Moreover,
the El Kantara-Rafa Line links with Rafa in the Southern Negev, now being
transformed into a military base by the British.
By disposing of the El Kantara-Rafa Railway and the Hejaz
Railway, the British government has attempted to seal off Jewish Palestine from
access to the outside world.
The El Kantara-Rafa Railway is the principal Palestine railway
connection to the outside world and consists of three sections: (1) The El
Kantara-Rafa line which starts at El Kantara in the Suez Canal, continues across
the Sinai Peninsula into Rafa, Palestine; (2) The Rafa-Lydda link to Jerusalem;
(3) The Rafa-Haifa connection.
The Kantara-Rafa line, built by the British during World War
I, was owned by the British government, with 12% share of the capital held by
the Palestine government. Until its transfer it had been operated by the
Palestine Railways in behalf of the British government. All profits have gone to
the British government with the exception of 12%, the proportion to the
Palestine government. The Rafa-Haifa line was sold to the government of
Palestine after the establishment of the Mandate.
In disposing of the El Kantara-Rafa line to the Egyptian
Railways, which British capital also owns, the British have assured themselves a
continuous railway connection from the port of Haifa to Egypt where their
soldiers are still stationed. They have also assured a railway link between
their new military encampment at Rafa and their military encampment in Egypt. At
the same time, by placing this railway link in the hands of the Arabs, they have
placed the railway access of the Jewish community to the outside world at the
mercy of the Arabs.
The Hejaz Railway, built by the Turks, has been under British
control, although its ownership remains in dispute. In a survey of Palestine
submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of inquiry by the Palestine
administration, it is stated that the Hejaz Railway "is operated by Palestine
Railways in behalf of His Majesty's Government who hold it in trust."
The Hejaz Railway runs from Damascus, Syria to Ma-an,
Transjordan, from Ma-an to Haifa in Palestine. Two branch lines from Haifa run
from Haifa to Acre and from Haifa to Zamakh in Palestine, which is just south of
Lake Tiberias.
The effect of the transaction is to assure British rail
connections from Haifa to Transjordan and uninterrupted military links between
the military enclave in Haifa and the British military base in Transjordan,
which continues to exist under the new British military Treaty with Transjordan.
British Establish Negev Foothold
4. A main military base has been established by the British at
Rafa at the Southern border of Palestine.
To insure undivided control, the British authorities, three
days after the passage of the partition resolution by the United Nations General
Assembly, which gave the Negev to the Jewish State, invited the Jews to evacuate
the area. The ostensible reason was the inability of the British to protect the
Jews against Arab aggression. The real reason was the desire of the British to
hold the whole of the Negev as a base for themselves.
Ask Jews to Leave Base Area
On December 2, 1947 the British Assistant District
Commissioner for the Gaza District, W. F. M. Clemens, informed the
representative of the Jewish settlements in the South, that he could not see how
Jews could be protected against Arab attack. He suggested the Jewish settlement
south of Gaza-Beersheba be transferred to the north of this road.
Two days later, on December 4, the Jewish representative was
summoned by Brigadier Nelson, the Commanding Officer of Camp Julius, who
reiterated the request for evacuation, again on the score that the Jews could
not hold out against Arab attack even for a few minutes. The offer was declined.
Thus far the Jews have retained every settlement in the Negev,
as elsewhere throughout Palestine.
British Government Grants New Concession
to the Iraq Petroleum Company
5. In March, 1948 the British government granted a new
concession to the Iraq Petroleum Company in the form of a right to build a
second pipe line terminating at Haifa.
The Iraq Petroleum Company holds the exclusive concession to
the oil fields of Iraq, Quatar, the Trucial Coast, Muscat, Oman.
A 23¾ % interest in the Iraq Petroleum is held by the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, in which the British government owns 50% of the
shares. Royal Dutch Shell, closely allied with British interests, holds a
similar percentage. The French interests own 23¾ %, and American interests, (Socony
Vacuum and Standard Oil of New Jersey) 25%. Five percent is owned by
Participations and Investments, Ltd.
The excuse offered for the granting of this concession four
months after the United Nations decision, without consultation with the United
Nations or the Palestine Commission, is that it represented the conclusion of
discussions entered into in March of 1947.
(C) The Nation, 1948 * This text is presented for educational
purposes only
This document is at
Zionism and Israel Information Center - Historical Documents and References
General History of Zionism - Zionism and the
Creation of Israel
Zionism and its Impact
External Zionism Links
This site provides resources about Zionism and Israeli history, including links to
source documents. We are not responsible for the information content of these sites.
Please do copy these links, and tell your friends about
http://www.zionism-israel.com
Zionism and Israel Information Center
Thank you.
Sister sites http://zionism.netfirms.com
Zionism Pages and Zionism and Israel On the Web
Friends and informative sites:
Zionism
- Definition and Brief History - A balanced article that covers the
definitions and history of Zionism as well as opposition to Zionism and criticisms by Arabs, Jewish anti-Zionists.
Labor Zionism - Early History and Critique - Contribution of Labor Zionism
to the creation of the Jewish state, and problems of Labor Zionism in a changing reality.
La Bibliothèque Proche Orientale- Le Grand Mufti Husseini
The Grand Mufti Haj Amin El Husseini
Zionisme
-
israelinformatie- Zionisme
Israel/Jodendom
Israelisch-Palestijns Conflict
Anti-Semitisme Shoa
- a Dutch Web site with many useful Jewish, Zionism and Israel links (in English too).
ZioNation - Zionism-Israel Web Log
Zionism & Israel News Israel: like
this, as if History of Zionism Zionism FAQ Zionism Israel Center Maps of Israel Jew Israel Advocacy Zionism and its Impact Israel Christian Zionism Site Map
|