"Herzliya indicators" - Prof. Gabriel Ben-Dor, Director, National Security Studies Center, University of Haifa
"From this comes the sense that we must switch the elite, not because there is a better ideology, but because they themselves are no good. "
We are presenting the "Herzliya indicators" for the seventh time. This is a very ambitious study, the widest performed in the State of Israel. About 2,000 people, representing all the various factions of the State of Israel. This is the broadest socio-political study in all of Israeli history.
National security is defined by five parameters: fear of threats, militancy, patriotism, optimism, and faith in public institutions.
A number of questions have been added in the fear and militancy indicators, as well as the indicator of the "righteousness of the path" to what extent the public believes in the righteousness of the path being taken by the State of Israel from an ethical perspective. Different populations were sampled, and we arrived at varied conclusions: the slideshow shows only the "bottom lines." The bottom line is encouraging on one hand, and frightening on the other.
The indicators show a picture of high stability within the public, which is continuing to follow its own path, and to believe in itself with a strong moral base. What were the main changes?
The trend of fear The Israeli public today is more scared than ever. This is the unsuccessful linkage of more fear of external threats and less faith in institutions for providing appropriate responses to these threats. There has been a dip in the public's faith in institutions. There is especially high fear amongst the minorities of being hit by missiles and rockets. Within the Israeli public at large, there is more fear of external threats than the terrorism threat, with which we have learned to deal.
Among Jews, the most outstanding trend is that new immigrants within the range of missiles show the highest levels of fear. The Israelis are more afraid, but not because of terrorism.
The trend of militancy The extreme militancy that the public is willing to undertake as a response to the external threats has seen almost no change. Israeli society is shown to be exceptionally tolerant. It is not accurate to say that the Israeli public is demanding that extreme actions be taken because of the war in Lebanon. The public didn't push the government into war, and didn't demand another round in order to reinstate deterrence. The public is tolerant and prepared to give time and consideration. Only among minorities is there a prominent change in the militancy trend.
The trend of patriotism Generally, there is no change. Patriotism hasn't increased or decreased because of the war. There has only been a rift among the minorities. The thesis on this issue is that the "Israelization" of minorities has advanced in recent years and the similarities between a great extent of the Arab public and the Jewish public have increased. The gap is growing smaller, but this year, this changed. In light of the war in Lebanon, minorities are much less patriotic. Thus, the gap has widened again. Among Jews, the trend is very stable. There is no outstanding change among those within range of the missiles, nor was there change among those who weren't.
Trend of trust in public institutions There is a new low in faith in institutions. All of the political parliamentary institutions have been eroding throughout the years, and, therefore, this decline is not surprising. However, two were exceptional the Supreme Court and the IDF, in which public trust was high. In in-depth interviews, people claimed that only in these institutions do they believe. But this year, there has been a double rift - a decline of nearly 10% in faith in the IDF to win decisively, and a decline of similar proportions in faith in the Supreme Court.
As the Supreme Court isn't related to the war, this trend is connected to the comments of Amnon Rubenstein.
The statistical deviation of the IDF has yet to be verified. The next study is in April, and the study in October will show if this is a one-time phenomenon, or if it is a trend. From the point of view of the public, the public needs a second chance, because it failed the test.
The trend of optimism There is a very slight trend of decline. Even though "we failed" in the war, we didn't lose faith that the State of Israel will overcome the difficult challenges facing it. Optimism and faith in the future have remained strong.
The bottom line according to the political sociologist: There is a growing gap between society and the State. The war didn't affect the core indicators. The institutional infrastructure in Israel hasn't been eroded by terrorism or war. The Jewish public reports high faith in the righteousness of our path and an increased public resilience.
The society is healthy, but the leadership and elite are sick. This is an improper situation. However, it would be worse if people didn't believe in one another. A healthy society can heal its leadership, but a sick society can't rehabilitate itself. Israeli resilience is great, and the society is resilient and healthy.
In one summarizing and "cruel" sentence the State of Israel is in a paradoxical situation in which the leadership has a better nation and society than it deserves, and the people have leadership and institutions much less worthy than they deserve. From this comes the sense that we must switch the elite, not because there is a better ideology, but because they themselves are no good.
Excellence in Education is not a luxury
Hezki Arieli, Director-General, The Society for Excellence through Education
The Israeli Society has gone through transformations. Its attitude to excellence has changed dramatically. Raising the flag of excellence has become popular. Today, the ministry of education is an active partner and initiator. Many programs are being applied with the assistance of the Society for Excellence through Education (SEE) all over Israel, in all educational sectors, in the periphery and in the center. Some of these programs have been translated to English and are applied in some of the states in the USA.
Centers for excellence are a place of hope. But the road for change passes through creating policy which will bring for the creation of culture of excellence. This is a long and challenging road.
A research projects done by the Smith Institute for the SEE indicates a number of facts and data which demand our attention. The research shows the attitude of the parents, teachers and principals in the field of excellence in education. The research raises several central points:
The lack of satisfaction with pupils' achievements is worrying, but it is also a positive opening point. Recognizing the problem is the beginning of the way to solving it.
How did it happen that we fell from the top of the table to its bottom? We fell asleep at the wheel. This has become a wide cultural phenomenon. Vanity is the recipe for failure.
The educational methods are old, and do not fit the demands and expectations of today. The world expects us, educators, not just to change accordingly, but to lead.
Despite the big investment in teaching hours, there is a feeling that at the end of the day those hours do not achieve the aim. Principals feel the education system do not prepare the pupil for what is expected of him/her outside the school.
Preparing the pupils and assimilating excellence are not luxury. It is a strategic need of the first degree. Cultivating excellence is a critical need as an educational strategy which will improve the whole system. The excellent pupils are the spear head showing the way. A system which aspires to advance needs an engine to pull from the front, and an engine to push from the back. The duty of the excellent person is to look forward and while advancing to make sure no one is left behind.
Cultivating excellence is a significant tool to gaps reduction, not to creating them.
Another worrying data is that the education system is not seen as nurturing, but is seen at the bottom of the ladder in comparison to other educational systems. The educational system should not be dragged, but should lead. This will not happen on its own. This is not just a question of more resources, but of how to change the priority of resources allocation.
Today, most of the funds are allocated at the middle some would say it is a nurturing mediocrity. Obviously, the desired change will not come from there. In the best case we will produce more of the same. Despite the fact that most parents have mediocre children, they still claim that resources have to be distributed equally between the weak, the mediocre and the excellent pupils.
The social message is that the issue of excellence is strategic, and is not luxury.
The founders of the state left us a legacy of excellence values, of social and intellectual. The state of Israel has reached achievements in many fields. Those achievements, together with the increase of the ambition for excellence are a source for optimism. Nurturing and cultivating excellence must come from an optimistic attitude. The success of the past and present creates the success of the future
This is a time to change, a time to lead our children in the road of excellence
Torkel L. Patterson, President, Raytheon
This morning's discussions seemed like a glass that was half empty; and focused mainly on internal issues to Israel. The existential question to Israel and Israel's place in the world is assured and is not in doubt in any way, and I think you can have confidence that you can work through these issues. Looking to the picture of the world: Let's draw away from where we are today and see where we fit in the global sphere in the Earth. I am going to try to illuminate on whether we have less or more political ideology; the radical Muslim against moderate Muslims and the West; East versus West; and our environment.
The first statistic is the population of the world. An obvious statistic, but we need to state the basics. We have the population of China, India, EU and Americas as the largest in the world. It seems though that countries with around 20 million people is where a lot of the world's attention is being focused today. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria and so on; their populations are still going to grow and their influence and world focus will grow as well. It isn't the issue of the population of China or India, but the 150,000 of them that are affluent or will soon be affluent and will have a buying power comparable to the United States. These people are coming online for the first time in history, creating another US sized population within China that can compete economically with the US. India is following this trend with its strong economic growth and development of a large affluent population. The growth of the affluent peoples in these countries has many implications.
India's economy is growing and China's economy is growing at a rate three times that of the United States. China's economy has a long way to go, but that does not mean that in a few years time it won't be a large player in global politics and influence.
The power of Japan as the world's second largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity plays a significant role in how global politics is run. The reunification of the Korea's is inevitable and they will emerge as a world player, and a very influential one at that. Talking about the major Geostrategic trends, I run into businessmen from Israel and Korea wherever I am, these people are working to promote their industry very hard so that their influence in the world is strengthened.
Defense budgets: The US is overwhelmingly large compared to that of any other nation. If you added up all of the worlds spending on defense it may barely equal that to the United State's investment into defense spending.
Technology half-life point. We talk about the rise of the middle class, as technology advances, the time it takes to improve technology the half-life to improve that technology gets less and less. We say we are ten years ahead of China in military and technological advances, but in five years from now we might be behind because of the great and fast advances in technology. We are not fighting a war of power, we are fighting a war on terror and we have focused a lot of our attention on the war on terror. Yet in the United States we are also fighting a war of dominance of who will be the world leader in fifty years, who will influence world politics in fifty years. It is not clear who will lead in influence with countries whose numbers are much larger than the United States and are developing a bloc of citizenry who can compete economically with the United States.
The 7th Herzliya Conference > Lecture Summaries
Stanley O. Roth, Vice President for Asia/International Relations, Boeing
Geopolitical Situation in Asia
"If the US is defeated in Iraq, how will that be perceived in East Asia?
Reply: The consequences would be huge. Singapore, for example, is worried about the terrorist threat in Indonesia and other Asian countries."
I was asked to focus on geopolitical developments in Asia, and in particular in China and India. However, when trying to identify events in Asia that affect the Middle East, it is impossible to ignore North Korea, which recently exploded a nuclear bomb. I will begin with a discussion of developments in China and in India and conclude with a discussion regarding North Korea.
2006 was a good year for China, and it has equally good prospects for 2007. One of its problems is actually excessive growth, which currently stands at over 10%. In addition, China is trying to manage the appreciation of its currency and its trade imbalance. Currently, China has a large and rapidly growing trade surplus; this is a major issue in the US that provides additional ammunition for critics of the China-US relationship.
Politically, the year was relatively stable. President Hu is fightingu
to maintain power, which I expect him to do. The country is continuing to prepare for the Olympics, which will require it to put its most moderate face forward.
Diplomatically, in terms of China's ties with the US, the year was also stable. Taiwan, which is a source of tension in these ties, did not figure prominently in the relationship. The US needs China in its confrontation of North Koreaa fact that reflects China's growing regional role. In addition, China's relationship with India improved, which is evident in the high level of trade between the countries. It appears that India will not become a card that the US can use against China.
Militarily, we see continued modernization of the Chinese military, which recently announced that it has obtained satellite capabilities.
The country's growth continues to place intense demand on natural resources and drive up their prices. When considering the growth in India, it is clear that it is a good time for commodities and for the Middle Eastern countries that export them. This is perhaps the greatest impact of the country's growth.
India experienced a bad year for agriculture, but economic growth was basically sustained. Still the prime minister has affirmed that conditions are insufficient and demanded that India keep up with China.
Politically, there was a fair measure of stability, as the government has managed to maintain control.
Diplomatically, the US has been embracing India as a strategic ally in non-proliferation efforts. However, this process is unfinished and necessitates an implementing agreement. The key point here is not to assume that this new relationship means that India, a traditional ally of Persia, will automatically side with the US.
North Korea's explosion of a nuclear device was not a surprise. What was unexpected was the lack of change in the situation on the ground. It had been said that North Korea's attainment of nuclear capabilities would bring about a crisis, but the country's trade is actually increasing, the borders are still open; and construction of an industrial zone has continued.
If tough sanctions are to be implemented, only Japan is in the US campand this is mostly for historical reasons. We are seeing a breakdown of four versus two, with the US in the inauspicious position of being in the minority.
The US is in a bad place. There seems to be no good military solution, in part because our troops are committed elsewhere, in the war on terror. Furthermore, some of our allies are not with us.
The world is now a more dangerous place. There are three major threats:
1) North Korea will have enough fissile material to sell; it has exported all its other resources, and there is no reason to believe that nuclear resources will be different. This is threat to the whole world, and especially to Israel. Even one sale could result in catastrophe.
2) Japan must be confident in the US's abilities; otherwise, it may become nuclear.
3) The North Korea experience has revealed the failure of effective deterrence. We must assume that Iran has noticed thisand this is the biggest threat to Israel.
What is to be done?
We must prevent the sale of fissile material both by means of threats and through counter-proliferation efforts.
We can hope that North Korea collapses; this, of course, is not a policy.
We can seek a diplomatic solution: this will likely be under the guise of multilateralism but will really be bilateral. We must remember that North Korea has no real incentive to negotiate and that no country that has developed a nuclear device has ever relinquished it.
Question: Paul Bracken, Yale University: If the US is defeated in Iraq, how will that be perceived in East Asia?
Reply: The consequences would be huge. Singapore, for example, is worried about the terrorist threat in Indonesia and other Asian countries.
Dr. Yacov Sheinin, CEO, Economic Models; The Israeli Institute for Economic Planning
Outsourcing the IDF
"The U.S. has excelled in this and the say that you can save between 4%-6% of the defense budget. The U.S. reached the point where 60% of their army's activities are outsourced to private contractors."
I won't speak about an optimal budget, but I will speak about outsourcing. The real question is how to change the structure of the IDF and how to use the business sector to make the IDF more effective.
The IDF since it was founded was the biggest and most organized "company" in the country, and actually held the business sector afloat.
Today the situation has reversed and by mistake we have formed different bodies that can answer the same need. We have all the cons of being a small country: all our army battle fields are close not like in the U.S. where they have an army that goes abroad and one that supports the country at home.
The question is can we merge these two bodies into one, and prevent the waste?
We're talking about 8 billion NIS, and if we would outsource we could get up to 25% of that which would be close to 2 billion NIS from the budget. In a world of outsourcing we could move this budget to the business sector and it would work.
The IDF leans on the reserves- the IDF has a transport branch which is not necessary; we could use the civil transportation which works all the time and if necessary call them up in emergency subpoenas. Concerning our emergency storage facilities: why can't a civilian contactor be in charge of it and the army will supervise to make sure that it's up to code. We could save a lot by working that way with keeping our advantage of expertise. It's not possible or logical that the army will be in charge of all the: cars, computers and so on. The business sector knows how to do this job. For example the public transportation during the Yom Kippur war both Egged and Dan, mobilized the army even when they were not apart of the armed services.
The U.S. has excelled in this and the say that you can save between 4%-6% of the defense budget. The U.S. reached the point where 60% of their army's activities are outsourced to private contractors.
In the issue of the peoples army: I do not suggest that we stop the mandatory recruitment, however when you do this you recruit too much and waste too much money. The IDF sees a wrong budget picture and works by it. If we would give them a set structure to work with budget wise they'd know how to work. There is a surplus of personnel in the army of about 25%. This 25% can't be discharged because of mandatory recruitment, but they could be moved to the other branches of emergency services like the Red Star of David, police, fire fighter corps and security for educational institute. What would happen if this surplus would be moved to those branches? We would save 25,000 people from the army and move them into the other emergency branches. We would obtain a solution for the whole system.
In the end we would have a situation where the army selects the people it wants and the rest would be sent to the other branches. The people now in those systems could find work in other branches of the business sector.
The future potential of savings could come to 2.2 Billion NIS by optimizing the army. This optimization is based on moving to a five to ten year budget. This optimization can not come forth without this basic change.
In a long term budget we can make the changes necessary in the support branch in the army. One example is the revolution of leasing in the army. The IDF saved 20% of expenses by transferring to leasing. The IDF hasn't moved completely to leasing since it still holds mechanics. Try to imagine what would happen if the army would transfer to outsourcing in other branches such as food and transportation.
Brig. Gen. Udi Dekel, Plans and Policy Directorate, IDF
"My main messages tonight, wish to emphasize our urgent need to prepare for the next war, we should not reflect past wars, we should learn from them and prepare to the ones of the future, according to our prediction for the future. "
We are in a growingly unstable strategic environment. The radical axis is getting stronger, and the moderate world is confused. Iran is about to become nuclear and is involved in every conflict in the Middle East. Meanwhile, we are facing different kinds of threats: from the suicide bomber to the non-conventional weapon a symmetric and an a-symmetric threat.
Already now we can identify a few dilemmas: the first dilemma has to do with the challenges of Hezbollah and Hamas. Hezbollah keeps gaining in strength with the support of Syria in Lebanon, and the question is: how do we react to this phenomenon? Meanwhile, Hamas smuggles weapons and builds up its military strength thanks to the ceasefire. It's not clear how we should deal with this, and how do we get ready for the next round of fighting when Hamas has an improved military capabilities. Another dilemma has to do with the right balance between investing in readiness now, and building our strength.
The Army's Targets in the Long Term
What is the army's security Strategy? The main transition in the security perception is the transition from three elements deterrence, alarm, and victory to four elements, the fourth being preparedness. This is a perception that combines not only attack as a central element, but also defense. This element is meant not only to defend the home front, but also to provide decision makers with flexibility, so that they can say that restraint is a form of strength.
The year 2007 is the year of preparedness. The goal is to reach a level of professional capacity that will enable us to face the current threats, and in parallel to build a multi-year program in order face future threats. The main goals are the strengthening of the ground forces, of the reserve system, and the creation of a situation in which the army is both ready and trained to deal with the present threats, while focusing on future targets, based on the four abovementioned elements.
Alarm: The main focus of interest is providing strategic alarms, while still maintaining our ability to provide day- to -day alert. Such as an alert against suicide terrorist and terrorist activity. This must be conducted, in addition to our constant combat against what is defined as "low intensity conflict". This type of conflict emphasizes the need for intelligence. This need is becoming crucial facing asymmetrical conflicts. We need intelligence which will enable us to track targets in urban as well as other problematic environments. We must improve our capabilities to gather intelligence, and we need to strengthen our operative intelligence. Meaning, improving our intelligence capabilities on all levels, from the officer level until the field level.
Deterrence: We must separate two variables - Our will to use force a will which was evident during the last war, while even Nassrala was surprise to see the Israeli determination, and on the other hand, Building a direct and credible respond against these threats. During the last war, we came to realize the importance of direct respond, we rely less and less on indirect responds, and more on direct respond against the threats we are facing. Our most important asset is our qualitative advantage, which we must maintain. In addition to our technological capabilities, which are a product of our domestic industries.
Victory: This is a central component in our national security strategy. We need to achieve victory in front of various threats, we first need to identify the threats in order to prepare in advance, and we must improve our internal process of decision making in order to evaluate the different alternatives and chose the most appropriate respond. Israel must improve its' ability to change its' scale of operations, shifting from a war to military operations and vise versa. We must realize that victory can only be achieved by land, and therefore we must emphasis the importance of land operations. This does not imply, we should not use our other capabilities. But we should focus on land operations. We need to develop capabilities which will enable us to respond to threats at multiplied theaters. It is extremely difficult to respond to threats at urban environment, and we must gain capabilities which will enable us to provide an appropriate respond to these threats. In addition, I argue, we will be capable to win an asymmetric warfare.
Once we will gain the ability to predict the other side's moves. We could respond to our enemy's actions and prevent him from achieving his goals. We must destroy our enemies' capabilities rather than intensions. We must act here and now, while using all means, including non-combat capabilities.
Preparedness: this is compulsory to deterrence and victory. Until this point we've focused on active defense, but this active defense does not provide a proper respond to long range missiles. We must include defense systems, once facing long range missiles. Our minimal investment increases as the range of attacks becomes shorter. Therefore we must invest more in the civilian population resistance.
My main messages tonight, wish to emphasize our urgent need to prepare for the next war, we should not reflect past wars, we should learn from them and prepare to the ones of the future, according to our prediction for the future. In addition we have shifted our national security strategy, from a three elements strategy to a four elements strategy. Our new strategy enables us to adjust our respond to threats, and provides us with flexibility in terms of the use of force. Last, we must improve and emphasis the quality of our military, both in terms of operations and in terms of personal. We must examine every aspect of our army and constantly improve and strengthen it. We must ensure everyone who serves in the military will wish to do so in the future.
Col. (res.), Gideon Hoshen, President and CEO, Hoshen-Eliav Systems Engineering
Recovering from the Lebanon War
" activities have started to improve the operational readiness, with its target, being first and foremost bolstering the strength of the army and confidence in the army. For this mission, we demand three partners: the IDF, the government and the Israeli people.
My friends and I are laying the ground work to renew the army and are suggesting a framework for change. We know and believe that the following suggestions can translate into an executable program."
Since the end of the War in Lebanon, 6 months have passed, the Israeli people have been saturated by a gloomy atmosphere, and the public confidence in the army has been undermined. At the same time, with the end of the military investigations, activities have started to improve the operational readiness, with its target, being first and foremost bolstering the strength of the army and confidence in the army. For this mission, we demand three partners: the IDF, the government and the Israeli people.
My friends and I are laying the ground work to renew the army and are suggesting a framework for change. We know and believe that the following suggestions can translate into an executable program.
The first partner- IDF
The key word for a necessary balance is proportion. The picture that was created after the war is not balanced. Even in the IDF's greatest military triumphs, there were failures and problems. The latest war, exposed deep weaknesses, whose roots are from years past, some of these weaknesses date back to the establishment of the state.
1. Establishment of the Army as an army of the people: The state of Israel Is a small country with large challenges, who maintains an army which consists of 4% of the entire population, this is eight times larger than the size acceptable to any other western country. In addition, the security budget is twice or three times as large as these countries.
2. Lack of operational experience, since the emanate feeling of a threat to Israel's existence isn't as relevant as it used to be: you have a generation of commanders that do not have operational experience in wars. Parallel to this is the public impression that there is no longer a threat to Israel's existence. The Iraqi front has been dismantled, there are borders with peace, and therefore there is no need for a large army. In addition, focusing on the Palestinian sphere has brought a change in the way in which war is fought; however these templates are not relevant to high intensity warfare, such as in Lebanon.
Despite the disadvantages that were previously discussed, the IDF has great strengths and abilities. The following are the positive components which help create a balanced picture:
1. How the IDF coped with the Intifada, which started in October 2000: The armed Intifada presented a challenge, in which the army needed to find a solution. The army was able to find this solution, and the quantitative achievements are evidence of this. In 2000 the army foiled a low percentage of attacks, however in 2006; the army was able to thwart 96% of attacks. In addition the number of casualties dropped from 200 in 2002 to 15 in 2006.
2. Cooperation with other bodies: IDF Incitement to deal with the Palestinians has demanded efforts which are the fruits of cooperation with the Shin Bet, Police, and other bodies. The fact that there was cooperation is an achievement within itself.
3. Quality of fighting authorities and the seriousness shown by the reserve duty.
4. Process of inquiries: Unprecedented determination to reach the truth through all inclusive investigations.
We are suggesting four central directions through which the army can initiate changes:
1. Strengthening the spirit and quality of organization: The army should be turned into a leading and quality firm: The IDF should put effort into the "programs" rather than into the "hardware". We suggest that the IDF should focus its energies on strengthening the army as an organization- development and preservation of knowledge, along with striving to excellency.
2. Development and application of an operational fitness model as a guide for the army: in other words the model needs to be widened and upgraded; changing it to include daily managerial instruments, through tools which measure to what extent the army is capable of achieving the goals in which the government has set for it.
3. Improvement of the culture of management: improvement of the ability to take visions and objectives and translate them into defined missions. Together with this, missions should be measured by output and not by feeling.
4. Strengthening values: a feeling of partnership, telling the truth, and strengthening of trust between high level officers and their subordinates.
The second partner- Government System
1. Removing non military mission: For example transferring the responsibility of the civilian front from the home front command to the civilian authority. The Sapir Committee and four government decisions have dealt with this. At the moment the security council is looking for ways in which it can be transferred to the civilian authority.
2. Setting a budget which reflects the goals the government has set for the army: this is said in regards to the process in which the budget is defined and not the question of its size. The final discussion surrounding the budget becomes a compromise that the Prime Minister must make between the army and the Ministry of Finance, without professional advisors. In our opinion a position needs to be created in the office of the Prime Minister, whose sole purpose is to manage the dialogue between the army and the Ministry of Finance. This is not a new suggestion, it is important that this is emphasized.
3. A creation of a multi-annual framework, which will allow improvement to occur in the planning outline.
The third partner- the Israeli people
Here we talk about the need to show responsibility and advance a joint discourse. If the people do not admire the army, they are not ready to put their future in its hands.
The direction of change which we presented, depends on a solid basis of knowledge and can be translated in substantial actions. It is possible to establish a framework in which people like us will voluntarily contribute time to the military, committed to a minimal number of years. There are excellent people, who are authorities on the issues of security and strategic economy, who once called will rally to the cause.
Dr. Ariel (Eli) Levite, Deputy Director-General (Policy), Israel Atomic Energy Commission
Changing Nuclear Strategic Picture
Paul Bracken divided the nuclear age to two ages. In my opinion we are facing of three ages. I would like to describe the tree past ages and the dangers forthcoming by the fourth age.
The first nuclear age (1945-1967): I describe this age as time of learning and surviving. This age is characterized by the development of the nuclear race and nuclear crisis. During this age five nuclear powers were formed, the world developed a new theory of deterrence and mutual assured destruction (MAD) and gradually MAD tries to deter other countries from going in this direction. There was an effort to develop a norm of preventing nuclear proliferation. After Cuba the world tried to stabilize and create agreements for partial prohibition of nuclear weapons.
The second nuclear age (1968-1989): there is a formalization of a new treaty trying to prevent the world from becoming more "nuclear". It was stated that until 1967, any state that acquired nuclear capability will be limited to the states that had already obtained it and no additional states will acquire nuclear capabilities. This age is characterized by hope, its common ground being managing the stability and making all inclusive arrangements for arms control. In this age we see both global arrangements and arrangements between the superpowers. The success in containing most of the countries was impressive. There were three states on the edge of nuclear capability that were outside the NPT (India, Pakistan and Israel), and three states that accepted the Treaty but kept the nuclear option should it be needed (Egypt and Japan). There were attempts to challenge this order, but these were treated without turmoil. An interesting aspect was the decline of the initial enthusiasm about intercontinental missiles (ICBMs).
The third age (1989 present): In my opinion, it will last for three to four more years, and will end in 2011. The default is that in 2011 a fourth nuclear age will start. The characteristics of the third age are euphoria and subsequently despair from the nuclear order. It started with signs of success (South-Africa disarmed its nuclear weapons, and perhaps the greatest event was the dismemberment of the USSR). These successes were blurring the fact that both India and Pakistan were running ahead and shortly afterwards decided to perform nuclear testing; North Korea keeps proceeding and cancels its agreement with the US; Libya had been trying to develop nuclear capability, and it is clear that the seeds of the problems that bloom today were already sown. At the same time the arms control agreements enter an ice-age. The treaty for global ban of nuclear tests was indeed signed, but not ratified, and therefore was not in effect.
The sense that accompanies this age is that the nuclear balance is decaying, while the challenges from states like North Korea seem to be difficult to deter. It is not surprising to see increasing interest in anti-missile defense, and at the same time we see that nuclear technology is widespread. There is a real interest of terrorist groups in nuclear technology. These are the seeds of calamity.
I will conclude with a word about the fourth age. My hesitation is: can we really look nostalgically upon nuclear stability, for when we look back on the Cuban Missile Crisis, history tells otherwise. Various factors might lead to instability : the continuation of the crisis in Pakistan and even its escalation with a potential for a nuclear war between Pakistan and India; the export of nuclear technology from North Korea; the appearance of nuclear Iran; the reappearance of nuclear energy as an alternative option without being accompanied by weapons control arrangements to prevent this technology from becoming an instrument of nuclear threat; and of course the continuing interest of terrorists in nuclear technology.
The calamity is not unavoidable. A new nuclear order may appear safer. For this a few things need to be dealt with: NPT, the inspection arrangements of IAEA, and elements that can deal with nuclear energy.
Prof. Paul Bracken, Yale University
Framework for the Second Nuclear Age
" We also need to rethink, or rather rebrand, arms control. In my opinion, arms control is a business that is becoming obsolete. Arms control is very different from disarmament. It is about reducing the chance of war. I believe that the United States should unilaterally declare no first use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances whatsoever, and should also strongly imply that a policy of a guaranteed second use. If "
Why do we need a framework for the Second Nuclear Age, which will change the international order? Firstly, we are already in the Second Nuclear Age, and we prefer that Iran and North Korea not have any nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is better that we have a structured framework since we are all living in the same world. Secondly, since the end of the Cold War, many decisions made in many capitals around the world are too heavily based on gut feelings and on institutions, and it will be more dangerous to do that in a world with more than ten nuclear powers.
The Second Nuclear Age is the era after the Cold War, when countries developed the atomic bomb for reasons that have nothing to do with the Cold War. Its distinctive feature is that there are multiple decision-making centers. For example, if there is going to be a confrontation between the US and China, and the US moves its forces to Taiwan, China will likely go on nuclear alert, and so will India, and then so will Pakistan. There is going to be a ripple effect which did not exist during the Cold war. Another difference between the two nuclear ages is the role of nationalism, not democracy, in the second age, which in my judgment is the most powerful force in the world today.
The international order is changing, and a great power system of countries is emerging. These countries are distinguished by their access to a $3 trillion GDP by 2025, and they can deploy some of these assets to develop huge military programs, if they choose to do so. It is important that they do not. Today, war is considered abnormal and nations prefer to avoid it, but it has never gone away.
What I have learnt from the North Korea experience is that you have a country which has a primitive, crude military force waging a very successful political strategy. The single, most important lesson from the Cold War is that you do not have to detonate a nuclear weapon to use it. We have to take this lesson seriously.
We also need to recognize that the critical countries, namely China, India, Russia, and Japan, are all going to be great powers and have access to $3 trillion GDP in the early 2020s. What characterizes them is that none of them is a revisionist power, and they are all buying into the globalization story. None of these powers wants to engage in an arms race against each other the way countries did earlier in the 20th century.
Escalation, which means an intensification of risk-taking or use of force, moves to the center stage, and it is central to deterrence. A failure to escalate in certain situations can be the first milestone of a complete breakdown of deterrence. When I looked at the war last summer in Lebanon and also the US confrontation with Iran and North Korea I noticed that the thresholds and barriers were discovered during the confrontation. We have to improve our ability to anticipate these thresholds and use them to our advantage before the confrontation. It is very dangerous to discover them only in the course of the confrontation.
We also need to rethink, or rather rebrand, arms control. In my opinion, arms control is a business that is becoming obsolete. Arms control is very different from disarmament. It is about reducing the chance of war. I believe that the United States should unilaterally declare no first use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances whatsoever, and should also strongly imply that a policy of a guaranteed second use. If any country in the world uses any nuclear weapon for any reason whatsoever against anyone else, the United States will suspend its no-first-use pledge. This should have a powerful illuminating effect on Iran and North Korea. Missile defense and security also need to be reexamined, as they are cornerstones in protecting the United States and its allies from these two potential nuclear powers.
Maj. Gen. (res.), Amos Gilead, Director, Political-Military Bureau, Ministry of Defense
Countering Strategic Threats
Today there is no controversy that Iran is on its way to achieve nuclear weapons, no matter what sanctions imposed upon it. We have two to three years until Iran becomes nuclear.
This has an effect on the Middle East. Iran is attempting to establish an axis which will threat the order in the Middle East which has existed for decades. Until now, Israel faced an Arab world that is not united in using a military option against her, assuming Israel has military superiority. But Iran might pose a psychological stance which would neutralize Israeli action against it, and under this umbrella would establish an alliance which would threaten Israel.
Iran has several extensions for this purpose: first, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Second, "Hezballastan", which unless the last Lebanon war would have strengthened. There is a re-strengthening process of Hezbollah as a terror and political entity, stronger than the Lebanese government. Third, supporting Palestinian terror.
Deterring Israel from action against Hezbollah is done by long-range rockets. Regarding the Palestinians, the same model roughly is applied creating "Hamastan". Here too our actions have delayed its creation, bud did not prevent it. "Hamastan" is supposed to erode the Palestinian entity which is ready and prepared to have peace.
There is an axis which threatens the moderate Arab world.
The substantive change is that the Arab world for the first time is truly in deep anxiety from the Iranian threat. The Saudis openly spoke lately of a Saudi nuclear option. Heads of the Egyptian regime have also made similar warnings. If Iran will be caught as such a heavy threat, they might attempt to go nuclear, despite US pressures against it.
What should Israel do? There are opportunities and they should be taken:
First, there is a common denominator with the Arab world. Relations must be enhanced and strengthened with Jordan, Egypt and Saudi-Arabia, based on common threat perception.
Second, regarding Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, this is the time to do anything to strengthen them, including military steps to weaken Hamas and Hezbolla. The latter must be prevented from strengthening and cooperating with Iran.
Third, regarding Syria. Some do not take its abilities seriously, but until today no answer has been found to the fact that Syria is able to bring to the collapse of the Lebanon government and to the fact that it supports Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Therefore, one must uproot and eliminate the existing alliance between Iran and Syria. The alliance is not the result of intersection of interests, but a result of circumstances. We should find a military or political answer in the range of one to three years. Syria should be convinced to change sides.
To conclude, on the one side we have unusual advantages. Terror has been treated with success, there is a common denominator with the Arab world, and we enjoy the US support, and strategic relations with Turkey and other countries in the East.
On the other hand, the Iranian threat is the central threat which should guide and design our policy, both in terms of alliances and in terms of military options.
Dr. Gary Samore, Vice President, Council on Foreign Relations
Iran's ability to Gain Nuclear Capabilities
"Iran is unlikely to produce nuclear weapons in the next few years but it is reasonable to believe Iran will try to develop the necessary technology that would give it the option of producing nuclear weapons farther down the road. "
I have been asked to provide a technical analysis of Iran's ability to gain nuclear capabilities. How close is Iran to achieving nuclear capability?
The same technology can be used to produce different levels of nuclear weapons. Iran claims it reached the maximum level of production but it seems that it is experiencing some technical difficulties. One problem may be a result of poor installation. Once Iran masters the technology, how long will it take until it can produce nuclear weapons? Here numbers really matter. Even under optimal conditions it will take at least ten years. If Iran builds a central plant, it can build nuclear capabilities within few years. A larger facility takes much longer than that.
Plants that are not subject to international inspection are easy targets for production. However, there is not enough information to evaluate the level of Iran's capabilities. The risk is that Iran has clandestine nuclear facilities.
The current objective of U.S. policy is to convince Iran to give up its nuclear program or to limit it to civilian purposes but if Iran has already established nuclear capability, the estimated utility of an attack would depend on the information we have regarding the nuclear program. If we know the location of the nuclear facilities overt or covert it would be easier to evaluate the risk and costs. Nevertheless if we are uncertain, it would be difficult to judge the benefit of military action against the costs. The assumption is that there is some level of clandestine activity.
Some workshops, such as those that manufacture centrifuge parts, are not subject to inspection by the IAEA. So, there could be small research facilities for testing or for building up against an attack. The detection of small-scale production is difficult for the IAEA. It is unlikely that Iran currently has industrial-scale nuclear weapons production facilities. Tehran's strategy seems to be to develop weapons under the guise of a peaceful nuclear program. However, even if Iran does not have clandestine facilities today, there is a risk that once they master centrifuge technology they will try to develop these kinds of facilities in the future. Components for overt facilities could be used to construct secret facilities and western governments have refused to enable Iran to build even overt facilities.
If Iran withdraws from the NPT, which it can do, they can develop these kinds of facilities. Iran is unlikely to produce nuclear weapons in the next few years but it is reasonable to believe Iran will try to develop the necessary technology that would give it the option of producing nuclear weapons farther down the road.
Dr. Robert Einhorn, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Optons for preventing Iranian Nuclear Weapons Capability
Our options for preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons capability are becoming less and less promising. I will outline four options for heading off an Iranian nuclear weapons capability.
One option is for the U.S. to enter into negotiations with Iran, either bilaterally or within a multi-national framework. U.S.-Iranian engagement along these lines may have been productive in mid-2003 because, in the wake of the victory in Iraq, the United States was riding high and the Iranians thought they would be next.
The IAEA was inspecting Iran and found many examples of Iranian cheating and Tehran was on the defensive. U.S. relations with Russia were good at the time.
To most Iranians, enrichment was what corrupt mullahs did to line their pockets.
In those circumstances, Iran made an overture to the U.S. via the Swiss, offering
to talk about the full range of issues that divided the two countries. Convinced that it was in a strong position, and that it could eventually achieve its objectives in Iran without bargaining, the Bush administration dismissed this offer in 2003.
Today the situation is very different; Iran is in the driver's seat. The U.S. is bogged down in Iraq and its reputation and influence have declined. Ahmadinejad is President, and his provocative rhetoric has gained support for Iran even in the Sunni Arab street. Russia is pursuing a foreign policy independent of, and often in opposition to, the U.S., and Iran feels Russia will block any tough sanctions in the UNSC. Given these circumstances, Iran's leaders feel little pressure to give up their enrichment program. Given what is going on, now is not the right time for negotiations.
A second option is military strikes against nuclear facilities in Iran and perhaps their regime power centers. There are two benefits to this: it can be done soon which is especially important if the goal is to prevent Iran's mastery of centrifuge enrichment technology. No other option has this advantage. The second benefit is that it would almost surely disrupt the enrichment effort. We don't know where all of Iran's nuclear related facilities are located. However, we do know that they produce UF6 in Isfahan, enrich Uranium in Natanz, and are building facilities to produce plutonium.
Iran is widely assumed to be engaged in some covert activities today, but most experts doubt that Iran is now operating a covert enrichment facility. So its enrichment activity at Natanz is a key pacing factorprobably the key pacing factor in its nuclear program.
We know where their main targets are and convential armed missiles should be able to put them out of business, but for how long? How long would it take Iran
to regenerate? Depending on how successful they would be, regenerating their program could take six months to six years. Therefore, the principal benefit of
a strike and producing, hiding and centrifuges is uncertain, while the costs of
a strike are very high. We can expect the Iranians to retaliate by using asymmetric means like supporting terrorist attacks against U.S. friends and interests in the Middle East, violence and impending shipping in the straits of Hormuz escalating in Iraq.
A few Arab leaders might privately support a strike, but we could expect a very strong backlash that would make it hard to mobilize international support around the world for continuing efforts to isolate, pressure, and contain Iran. We need that international support. For these reasons, military strikes are no ones first option. There is a small chance that force will be used. If other options continued to look unpromising, that likelihood will increase.
A third option is a regime change using overt and covert means of bringing about fundamental change in the Iranian government. A benefit of the regime change, aside from the human rights benefits and good governance, is that leaders would be more responsive to the Iranian people who might be less inclined to pay the economic and political price for the nuclear program. But there are serious problems with counting on a regime change to solve the Iranian nuclear issue. Despite widespread discontent inside Iran for the regime, the Mullah's grip on power remains strong.
Ahmadinejad, his policies, and his rhetoric have come under strong criticism from reformers and conservatives alike but there appears to be little inclination or capability to take on the regime itself. Regime change is likely to be home grown and not the result of foreign pressures and it will happen someday. It is not likely to happen soon enough to head off Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons.
That leaves the fourth option: we need to step up the pressures on Iran in hopes to widen fissures inside Iran to change Iran's behaviors on nuclear issues. Iran has been confident that it could proceed with enrichment without paying much of
a price but this option seeks to re-shape its calculation of costs and benefits.
Resolution 1737 will be used by the Bush administration to justify more pressures in Iran outside the Security Council. We can use America's economic clout to isolate Iran. We need to urge foreign governments and financial institutions in Europe and Japan to curtail any activity with Iran. The U.S. will maintain a strong military presence in the region. The U.S. is sending a message to Iran that any nuclear activity will be met with a strong response.
It's too soon to tell if anything will change from these steps. There are signs that reconsideration inside Iran has already begun. Ahmadinejad's support has gone down. Iran's Oil Minister is having trouble getting financing for projects because financial institutions are decreasing their cooperation. High inflation is the blame of Ahmadinejad. Businessmen and conservatives have criticized him for being too provocative with the nuclear issue and have called for moderation on the nuclear issue.
What is emerging today is a growing debate that Iran can't have his cake and eat it too. They can't proceed with their program while being an active and active part of the international world. What is needed is to continue pursuing this fourth option. We need to build wide international support for ratcheting up the pressure. We need to make it clear to Iran that they are on a self destructive course. But pressure alone will not be sufficient, Iran needs to see benefits if it is to reverse course. What it may prize most is a less threatening relationship with the US.
The US should be prepared to normalize relations with the current regime if it is genuinely prepared to abandon its nuclear program and other unacceptable behavior. But engagement and normalization should not be the first priority. Only when Iran realizes it has little to gain and a lot to lose will engagement be productive. That is why the military option should stay on the table and be credible.
Richard Perle, American Enterprise Institute
Need to act on Iranian Nuclear Weapons
It is not clear is if Iran's time is over. We need a few propositions put forth that we have already heard.
Current policy will not lead the Iranians to abandon their program. If we continue doing what we are doing, Iran will be a nuclear state.
Iran with nuclear weapons will not be so easily deterred and detained. One is involved in deterrence in a psychological game. In given what we've heard from Ahmadinejad, it is not clear if we can expect a replay of that psychological game. In possession of nuclear weapons, Iran is capable of using their terrorist networks to enable damage.
At some point, we have to begin to face the question where is the point of no return? The issue is one of timing and intelligence. You can't afford to wait for all the evidence. If there has been a lesson learned recently, as far as the U.S. is concerned, there is a possibility of waiting too long to take action. This is referring to the length of time we waited watching Osama bin Laden organize himself and al-Qaeda to act in terror. In retrospect, had we dealt with al-Qaeda, September 11th may not have happened. Some Americans are concerned that we should not to wait too long or it will be too late.
When we think about options, and we think about the timing of those options- I am not convinced that we have a lot of time. It is amazing that we do not have a serious political solution to Iran already. The failure until now to support any new regime is shocking. There are millions of Iranians who want to see regime change but are powerless. They are getting no help from the outside world. If we do nothing to support the internal opposition, nothing will happen in changing the regime. We had opportunities to encourage regime change in Iraq, but we wound up only with military options. If we continue on our course of action, we will be left again only with military options.
We need a serious effort to work with the internal opposition. We have seen the extraordinary ability to change regime internally. The results from political action have been impressive, less costly and less dangerous. If we fail to energize the opposition through overt and covert means and we continue on our current path, the question is 'who will act decisively and what will they achieve?' Militarily, we could destroy the facilities with minimal collateral damage using aircraft missiles. Is that the right option?
If the Israeli government comes to the conclusion that it has no choice but to take action, the reaction of the U.S. will be the belief in the vitality that this action must succeed, even if the U.S. needs to act with Israel in the current American administration.
Maj. Gen. (res.), Prof. Isaac Ben-Israel, Head, Security Studies Program, Tel Aviv University
What should the world do when facing a nuclear Iran?
What should the world do when facing a nuclear Iran? I will divide the different school of thought according to a logical division. There is a group which claims that nothing needs to be done. This group claims we can live with a nuclear Iran. In order to confront this group, we must explain that once we are dealing with Iran, this is not the case.
On the other hand, we are facing a second group which advocates no action, claiming Iran will never reach the point of possessing nuclear capabilities. Once you realize Iran will posses nuclear capabilities, you face a third group, which argues that nothing needs to be done because a nuclear Iran is, in fact, inevitable. We can only control the timing and slow it down. There is a fourth group, which claims we should avoid taking action, as it is anxious about the Iranian response. Most of these claims represent a mixed strategy of suppression and denial.
There are those who claim a nuclear Iran will create a mutual balance of deterrence under the notion of "they will never dare to use these capabilities". Even if Iran will never use a nuclear bomb, it's not going to be easy. Under a nuclear umbrella, they will become more aggressive. In addition, this will lead to a proliferation within the Arab world. This is, indeed, a new Middle East in which we are not only facing two countries who deter one another, but a far worse scenario.
In addition we must take into consideration that even if a fundamentalist such as Ahmadinejad will avoid the use nuclear power, and even if an extremist such as Ahmadinejad will not want to risk nuclear war, he actually has other ways of using nuclear capabilities, such as trafficking via a third party. Similar methods were used by Hezbollah. Only this time, we are dealing with unconventional capabilities.
This fanatic regime with nuclear capability and its direct connection to Allah accompanied by an official policy of eliminating the mere existence of the State of Israel. It is a real threat. I believe we should use everything in our ability to prevent a nuclear Iran.
There are those who argue we have nothing to worry about, as one way or another, this threat will be removed. They claim that with or without external intervention, Iran is headed towards an internal revolution. They also argue that there are those within Iran who criticize its nuclear program. Until a short while ago, there were also those who argued that Iran does not aim for nuclear capabilities. Today we can all agree these claims are false.
Western nations possess the ability to threaten Iran and make it choose a different path. I truly believe that without Western intervention, Iran will possess nuclear power within a few years.
There are those who claim that we do not possess the ability to influence Iran. Political pressure is ineffective, while military pressure is unattainable due to a lack of intelligence or distant and unknown locations. This is true to some extent, but in fact, the Western world possesses enough knowledge to delay the Iranian nuclear project. Delay is extremely important: see the Iraqi case for clear prove.
For those who claim that Iran will act against Israel regardless, I would suggest reconsidering the cost-benefit analysis of an Iranian response. The costs are an extremely intense terrorism. Weighing this against a nuclear Middle East, we do not have any alternative besides military action.
I agree with those who argue that a military option is in fact the last we resort. It is still important to remember that time is running out. Options we once had are gone. Every moment counts in this battle.
Our minimal task is to prepare all options, including the military one.
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